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After the fall of the communist regime in Hungary, the country went through a transitional 
change. As a result, new financial reporting and accounting standards were put forward for 
adoption by Parliament in compliance with pertaining European and international legislation. The 
examination of credit institutions’ financial statements is an unexplored area in Hungary. This 
study set out to investigate their annual financial reports to seek evidence if credit institutions, 
both large and small by assets size, avoided earnings decreases and/or engaged in earnings 
management (EM) prior to and after the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
The Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) models and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Monte-Carlo Method, accrual, benchmark and distributional tests were 
used to study credit institutions financial statements for the period of 1999-2012. A total of 16 
banking industry specific ratios were selected to analyse credit institution’s annual financial 
statements. Four hypotheses were tested with three empirical testing approaches with 95% and 
99% confidence intervals and 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels.                                                
 
The findings of this study confirm that foreign and domestic credit institutions trading in 
Hungary, regardless of their size, not only managed their earnings but also avoided earnings 
decreases both prior to and after the 2008 financial crisis. Additionally, 7 out of the 16 tested 
ratios do not contain total assets; therefore, they do not suffer from a possible reverse accruals 
effect. The application of non-accruals base ratios for statistical testing may increase the power of 
the test.  
 
The conclusion and the original contribution this study provides to the pool of knowledge on the 
subject in question adds new evidence to existing literature on earnings management by being the 
first to examine as well as to provide significant evidence on earnings management of foreign and 
domestic credit institutions trading in Hungary, an ex-communist Eastern European economy.    
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Personal Quest to Research 
 
During my professional career, I was unwillingly become aware of aggressive accounting 
practices in several companies I worked for in the past. I raised concerns and expressed 
disagreement with such practices, where the management used accountants and finance leaders to 
achieve company goals by engaging in accounting manipulation that led to earnings management. 
Witnessing aggressive accounting practices prompted me to investigate the subject by reading 
research material on the phenomenon of earnings management.  
Bierman (2008) writes about accounting and finance lessons of the energy giant Enron. Jones 
(2011) discusses the Xerox (photocopying and printing company) company’s scandalous 
accounting reports, in which they overstated their revenues. Jones (2011) further writes on the 
WorldCom accounting scandal, where WorldCom manipulated its accounting books that led to 
the fraud of $3.9bn. Jones (2011) also points out, that apart from Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns banks, which collapsed due to accounting scandals, other companies worldwide went 
bankrupt due to creative accounting. For example, Bank of Credit and Commerce International in 
the United Kingdom, Bank of Crete in Greece, CO OP in Germany, ETBA Finance in Greece, 
Kanebo in Japan, Mirror Group in the United Kingdom, Parmalat in Italy, just a few to mention. 
Bierman (2008) writes about on the auditor, Arthur Andersen’s role in the Enron collapse. Jones 
(2011, p.475) points out that ‘…lack of due professional diligence of the auditors….’. Larcker 
and Richardson (2004, p.626) argue, as companies pay extensive fees for audits, auditors are 
becoming dependent on fees paid for audits. This form of dependence can result in a kind of 
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auditors’ ‘financial reliance’ on companies, due to the fees they receive for their auditing 
services. This state can compromise the independence of auditors who screen the financial 
statements to verify whether companies follow the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or 
GAAP. Furthermore, it seems that due to recent bank collapses, such as Lehman Brothers, Bear 
Stearns, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Bank of Crete and ETBA Finance, financial 
authorities do not have working advance warning models and/or approaches against possible 
manipulation of financial statements. Wiggins, Piontek and Metrick (2014) point out ‘Regulator 
Inaction’ prior to Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Evidence of creative accounting that led to high 
profile company bankruptcies points towards regulators failure to recognise creative accounting 
practices and thus prevent bankruptcies.  
Earnings management has been investigated in the banking industry. One of the earliest studies 
that examined banks was made by Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995). Since 2000 
additional studies investigated banks, such as Beatty and Harris (2001); Beatty, Ke and Petroni 
(2002); Shen and Chih (2005) and others. However, apart from this study, there is no evidence 
that these financial reports of credit institutions in Hungary have ever been, or are currently being 
investigated for evidence of earnings management. The sections bellow and Chapter 2 in 
particular will outline studies that were published on credit institutions in Hungary. 
 
1.2. Background of Hungary’s banking sector 
 
In the mid-19th century, Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian dual Monarchy. Financial 
institutions were still a growing industry at the time. Hungary had four big banks and a few 
smaller local savings banks. Out of these, only the First Pest Domestic Savings Banks and the 
Pest Hungarian Commercial Bank were truly Hungarian financial institutions in the mid-19th 
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century. The other two trading banks were in the ownership of the Austrian National Bank and 
the Vienna Creditanstalt branch in Pest. The major foreign investors were British, Austrian and 
French, who formed the Anglo-Hungarian Bank and the Franco-Hungarian Bank.  
By the end of the 19th-century banks from Belgium, France and Austria were the main investors 
in the Hungarian Banking industry, who formed the major banks, a total of six, referred to, at the 
time, as the Big Six. Apart from these, the Pest Domestic Savings Bank was a non-profit oriented 
bank at the time it had been formed and nearly all of its shares were owned by Hungarian 
subjects. The Pest Domestic Savings Bank later became a joint stock company. Before the First 
World War, Hungary had over 5000 banks and financial ventures. Barcsay (1991). 
 
With the breakout of the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell apart, which also led 
to a breakup of the Austrian-Hungarian Bank in 1918. The Central Bank of Hungary, (Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank - in Hungarian), was formed in 1924, the first independent central bank in 
Hungary. Functions of the central bank were taken over by the Royal Hungarian State Bank, or 
‘Magyar Királyi Állami Jegyintézet’ – in Hungarian, in 1921 and it operated until 1924.  After its 
formation, the Central Bank of Hungary had the same share of duties as its western counterparts, 
with the addition of foreign exchange tasks. Most importantly Hungary had a strong banking 
system with its independent Central Bank. (Source: the Central Bank of Hungary, and ‘A Magyar 
Országos Levéltár Segédletei’ - in Hungarian) 
 
After World War II, Hungary’s political path changed towards communism. In 1946, as part of 
the political changes, the shares of the Central Bank of Hungary (‘MNB’ in Hungarian) were 
nationalised. Commercial and savings banks were closed.  By 1947, all financial institutions were 
nationalised and the banking system went from ‘two-tier banking’ to a so-called ‘mono-banking’ 
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structure. The main role of the MNB was to ‘organise state funding, manage the investments 
accounts of the state’, and deal with commercial duties. The Central government was overseeing 
the complete operation of the Central bank. (Source: The Central Bank of Hungary – MNB) 
In 1949, The National Savings Bank, (Országos Takarékpénztár, OTP - in Hungarian) was 
formed to deal with deposits and had total monopoly. The MNB and the OTP management were 
also overseen by the central government. Prior to 1987, the Hungarian economy went through an 
early reform between 1960 and 1980, to become more open towards Western Europe. The 
reforms in 1960 led to more foreign investments in the 1970s. Due to these investments, in 1979 
the MNB took steps to modernise its functioning and started co-operation with 5 foreign banks. 
In 1979 a strict state control of banking was slightly eased, as a foreign bank, namely the Central 
European International Bank (CIB), was allowed to trade in Hungary. This was a joint venture 
with MNB, where MNB had a 34% stake and six foreign banks had 11% stakes each. The main 
tasks of CIB were to deal with ‘foreign trade payments and provide financial support for export’, 
(Neale and Bozsik, 2001; Majnoni, Shankar and Várhegyi, 2003). From the mid-1980s a number 
of changes were implemented. In 1983, the communist government reached a political decision to 
change the MNB’s monobanking structure to a two-tier banking system (Ábel and Szakadát, 
1997). 
After 1989, the communist regime fell in Hungary. The first free parliamentary election since 
World War II took place in 1990, and since then Hungary has been going through a transitional 
change. Financial reporting and accounting legislations were drawn up and adopted to comply 
with European and international reporting standards. By 1999 the Hungarian financial sector has 
gone through privatisation (for example Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank – MKB, Országos 
Takarékpénztár - OTP Bank privatisation, Budapest Bank – BB, and other, Ábel and Szakadát, 
1997), and consolidation (for example, Kereskedelemi Ès Hitelbank – K&H Bank and Magyar 
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Hitel Bank – MHB; Neale and Bozsik, 2001). Foreign banks (for example General Electric Bank 
and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - EBRD) took part in the Hungarian 
banking privatisation in the form of green-field investments (for example ABN Amro and 
Creditanstalt of Austria, Neale and Bozsik, 2001; Szapáry, 2001). In 1999, the Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) was formed, and since 2013 it is part of the Central 
Bank of Hungary (MNB).  
 
1.3. Research Gap 
 
From 1990, researchers Neale and Bozsik (2001), Szapáry (2001), Várhegyi (2008) were 
reporting about the way in which assets and loans of Hungarian banks had been privatised, 
consolidated and taken over. As yet, there have been no attempts in Hungary, as an ex-
communist state and a transitional economy, to investigate the financial statements of banks 
concerning their ‘earning anomalies’ either by domestic or foreign researchers. Both foreign and 
domestic-owned banks are operating in Hungary currently, yet only a few research papers have 
been published thus far, such as ‘Banking sector reform in Hungary: Lessons learned, current 
trends and prospects’ (Szapáry, 2001), or ‘The Hungarian Banking System 20 Years After 
Modernisation’, (Várhegyi, 2008), and the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB) published studies on 
banks’ financial dealings. 
However, this does not mean that the financial and non-financial companies were excluded from 
research elsewhere. In fact, scholars worldwide have been investigating Earnings Management 
(EM) for over 35 years. For example, a study on Bond Covenants, a type of ‘agency problem’ 
was published by Smith and Warner (1979), or Healy (1985), who investigated the effect of 
bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) show ‘EM due to 
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political costs’, whereas Schipper (1989) wrote on the ‘EM phenomena’. These early studies on 
EM had been published far earlier than the Hungarian political and economic transition began in 
1989.  
As of this thesis, there is no evidence that research on earnings management of Banks financial 
statements in Hungary has ever been investigated.   
 
1.4. Research Question 
 
The aim of this study is to examine whether there was any earnings manipulation that could have 
lead to earnings management in the year-end results within credit institutions in Hungary for the 
period of 1999-2012. The research question of this study reads:  
 
‘Did credit institutions trading in Hungary avoid earnings decreases for the period of 
1999-2012?’ 
 
Four hypothesises are tested with a total of 16 ratios to answer the research question:  
 
H0(a): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings. 
H0(b): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid 
earnings decreases. 
H0(c): Large and small Credit institutions (Banks) scaled by a median of Total 
Assets in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases. 
H0(d): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings ‘prior to’ 
and ‘after’ 2008 when the financial crisis starts. 
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Hypothesis H(a): is tested with 14 ratios, as well as with accrual models, whereas hypothesis H(b): 
is tested with two additional ratios. Details of testing for each hypothesis are explained in the 
three main empirical testing approaches, in Chapter 4.  
 
1.5. Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This study differs from earlier studies which investigated earnings management of USA, Western 
European and Asian countries and also tested accruals in non-financials industry (for example 
Gore, Pope and Singh, 2007; Sun and Rath, 2012; Enomoto, Kimura and Yamaguchi, 2013) and 
loan loss provision (for example Kwak, Lee and Eldridge, 2009; Balboa, López-Espionosa and 
Rubia, 2013; Norden and Stoian, 2014) in the financial industry. This is the first study of this 
kind in Hungary, in a post–communist, Eastern European country, that investigated earnings 
management of foreign and domestic credit institutions trading in Hungary, by applying ratio 
analysis of financial statements in combination with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge, 
Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) models and with Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Monte-Carlo Method and 
distributional tests. Additionally, this study tests samples with the accrual approach and performs 
benchmark analyses of the ratios. There is no evidence that an exact same or a similar study has 
ever been undertaken in an Eastern European country, in Hungary, or elsewhere that investigates 
Hungarian banks, with the same or similar research methods, as this study did. This study fills the 
research gap by providing statistically significant evidence that credit institutions in Hungary 
engaged in earnings management. Apart from statistical evidence, this study also provides a 
possible explanation for bank managers’ dealings that may explain why all four hypotheses were 
rejected which consequently led to an alternative answer to the research question. This study 
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provides new evidence to the existing literature on earnings management, as well as additional 
contribution to the body of scientific knowledge. 
 
1.6. Limitations and Strengths of the Study 
 
This study presents an in-depth analysis of the Hungarian banks’ financial statements in search of 
possible earnings manipulation. One limitation might be a slightly smaller length of the 
population of 10 years for financial industry compared to USA and EU studies, which test all 
industry population with a longer length of the population, for example, 18 years of USA 
population in the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) study. The second limitation, which may be 
construed as the main limitation of this study, is that it suffers from the absence of cash flow 
analysis and comparability since cash flow statements were unavailable for testing. Due to these 
limitations, the power of tests might not be the same as of the above mentioned EU and USA 
studies. Additionally, a third limitation, namely, the tests power, i.e. 9 ratios tested out of 16. This 
study could not differentiate reversal accruals from the sample, as the Dechow, Hutton, et al. 
(2012) study points out.  
 
Despite its limitations, this study has its strengths; it cross-examines the financial statements of 
the credit institutions respectively with a total of 16 ratios, instead of 2-5 variables as earlier 
studies did. This study also tests sample on assets size, searches for Earnings Management prior 
to and after the 2008 financial crisis, applies the accrual testing approach and performs 
benchmark analyses of the 14 ratios. Nevertheless, financial firms cannot be excluded from 
research, nor from testing banks’ data, as banks are an important part of the world economy. Thus 
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by excluding them from scrutiny, we would be too naive to believe that they always follow the 
rules.  
 
1.7. Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1. The introduction outlines a personal quest to research and present a brief history of the 
Hungarian banking sector as well as to highlight the current research gap. It highlights the 
research question in view of the strengths and limitations of this study. 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review on Earnings Management, its techniques, motivations, 
detection and the role of auditors. Furthermore, the literature review focus is on relevant research 
publications using financial and non-financial company data, as well as grouping studies on a 
country level. Highlighting and writing in-depth critical reviews of relevant research publications 
such as Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999); Durtschi and 
Easton (2005; 2009); Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007); Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) that 
were applied for testing the research gap in this study. Initial summary of Chapter 2, studies are 
grouped as per financial and/or non-financial companies with a short summary of findings. The 
final part of Chapter 2 summarises the chapter.  
Chapter 3 describes Hungary’s Banking industry development from 1987 since the political and 
economic transition began. The outline of Hungary’s banking sector transformation, the adoption 
of International Financial Reporting System (IFRS) and also the list of differences between 
Hungarian Accounting Standards (HAS) and IFRS are included. It points out regulations to report 
year-end financial statements under HAS, as well as to research the gap in knowledge about 
earnings management in Hungary. It includes a review of studies published on credit institutions 
trading in Hungary. A summary of key differences between Hungarian Accounting Standards and 
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IFRS are highlighted and various types of financial intermediaries trading methods are outlined.  
There is a summary of Chapter 3 at the end. 
Chapter 4 explains the types of data, and the source and length of the population, and presents 
credit institutions’ data availability format, as well as a number of credit institutions on a yearly 
basis. It presents formulas for each ratio that follows hypotheses that attempt to answer the 
research question. Furthermore, it explains accrual and distributional methods of testing, by 
presenting the accrual and the main models of Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) and 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31), as well as statistical formulas of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov one-sample test and benchmark test analysis. Each hypothesis is tested with specific, a 
total of three main empirical testing approaches. Explanations of each step of calculation in Excel 
and in SPSS are highlighted in the Appendix. Chapter 4 concludes with the summary of the 
chapter.  
Chapter 5 begins with a short summary of testing methods presented in Chapter 4. Each Testing 
Approach results, with included statistical output tables and histograms, are explained with 
arguments and comparisons to earlier similar, comparable studies in the subsections of each 
Testing Approach. Furthermore, it explains statistical and corporate reasons for accepting or 
rejecting each hypothesis. It also refers to possible limitations of the study. It interprets results of 
statistical outputs and histograms of the four hypotheses in an attempt to answer the research 
questions. Chapter 5 concludes with an in-depth discussion of the results for each Testing 
Approach. It also puts forward reasons for rejecting the hypotheses that were formulated to 
answer the research question. 
Chapter 6 concludes this study by making a brief overview of the aim of this study, as well as the 
hypotheses that made an attempt to answer the research question. It outlines the empirical 
findings of each hypothesis and points out the main limitations and strengths of the study. It 
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presents conceptual conclusions by comparing results to similar and relevant studies within the 
banking industry and also presents answers as to why this study is unique, what new is in it and 
in what way it represents a major contribution to the pool knowledge. It highlights implications 
and recommendations for a future study.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review on Earnings Management 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Chapter 1 presented the introductory section in which the rejection of the researcher to take part 
in practising aggressive accounting was highlighted, and the fact that it made him curious if this 
phenomenon of aggressive accounting to manage earnings was only a coincidence or it was and 
still is a widespread practice. It was also shown that accounting manipulation led to dramatic 
bankruptcies of well-established and respected companies. The earnings management 
phenomena, the role of accountants, and strengthening of the accounting standards were 
highlighted in the Schipper (1989) study. One of the earliest documents on management practises 
was written in the 18
th
 century by Adam Smith:  
 
‘The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are opt to consider attention 
to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a 
dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, 
more or less in the management of the affairs of such a company. (Adam Smith, 1776, 
p.408)’  
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Adam Smith elegantly expressed concerns of management bad practises. Since the 18
th
 century, 
accounting has been evolving, and one of the first definitions on Accounting was written by 
Duncan (1908, p.84): 
 
‘Accounting is that science which treats of the methods of recording transactions in 
business, and interprets the statements recorded in books and documents so that the 
layman may have a clear conception of the exact financial and managerial standing of the 
firm or enterprise both in parts and as a whole.’ 
 
A textbook, a theoretical statement by Duncan, which does not always hold true in practice 
though, as this study will present evidence in this and the following chapters, which all in all 
challenge Duncan’s statement. Similarly, a textbook explanation of accounting that Sterling 
(1967, p.97) writes: 
‘… accounting as the process of identifying, measuring, and communicating economic 
information to permit informed judgments and decisions by users of the information.’  
 
Sterling with the above statement does not clarify nor points out the intentional misinformation 
that a user will or might receive. Additional textbook explanations on accounting and financial 
reporting are by Higson (2003, p.67) and FASB 2008, CON 1. par. 43: 
 
‘Accounting is not an end in itself. As an information system, the justification of 
accounting can be found only in how well accounting information serves those who use it. 
Thus, […] the basic objective of financial statements is to provide information for making 
economic decisions.’ - Higson (2003, p.67). 
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‘The primary focus of financial reporting is information about an enterprise’s 
performance provided by measures of earnings and its components. Investors, creditors, 
and others who are concerned with assessing the prospects for enterprise net cash inflows 
are especially interested in that information…’ – Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), 2008, CON 1. par.43. 
  
The above quotations show the reader the purpose of the accounting process, financial reporting, 
but do not refer to a possibility for earnings manipulation during the accounting processes up to 
financial reporting. That is, myself and the reader might conclude, that in practise financial 
reporting presents information as they are written in textbooks. That is, financial statements 
always show true economic information of a company and no earnings management is present.  
The author of this study experienced different management practises in presenting economic 
information of the company. The company’s management has two different ways at its disposal 
to report earnings in the financial statement. They can either choose operating or accountings 
path, as McKee (2005, p.5) illustrates with an example the Management’s decision whether to 
adopt Operating or Accounting Choices to achieve earnings management (EM). By choosing 
operating direction, EM is achieved:  
 at the end of a quarter to introduce discount on products to boost sales, in order to 
meet the target and analysts’ expectations 
 hiring new staff 
 purchasing new machinery 
 delaying maintenance 
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Examples of Earnings Management achievements of accounting decisions: 
 revenues 
 accrual items 
 expenses 
 assets valuation 
 
Management has a choice to make operating or accounting decisions from the above examples to 
achieve earnings management. With their decision they also create economic costs to the 
company, i.e. by delaying maintenance they risk sudden breakdown of machinery, and thus 
booking accruals will have to make a reverse entry in the coming fiscal year. All these entries 
will have an effect on earnings level. Empirical evidence, corporate managers and directors 
suggest that earnings, as part of the financial statements, are important for users, as Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978, p.113) write ‘one function of financial reporting is to constrain management 
to act in the ‘shareholders’ interest’.  
Whether using the operating or the accountings path, the company’s economic performance must 
be recorded under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP (set of rules and 
principles of each country’s accounting regulatory body) and followed and practised by financial 
professionals. When these rules are observed, financial statements show the financial 
performance of a company for a given period of time. When an accounting transaction is 
recorded before receiving cash for it, it is called an accrual accounting. During preparation of 
year-end financial reports, it is done under accrual accounting. Due to additional information, or, 
if accounting mistakes occurred during the month, it is common practice for accountants and 
managers to correct accounting entries before ‘month-end’ closings. The same practice applies 
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for ‘year-end’ reports. During this process, accountants tend to over- or under-estimate 
accounting transactions (i.e. accruals, revenues, stock, expenses) by not following the GAAP 
principles for one reason or another.  
 
Interpreting financial statements by external users, e.g. corporate, stakeholders, analysts, scholars 
performing ratio analysis and seeking correlation of the financial statements accounts in order to 
find any weaknesses and/or strengths of a particular company. An earlier study by Deakin (1976) 
investigated normality of the distribution of financial accounting ratios for manufacturing firms. 
From the distributional testing, the author concludes, ratios are not normally distributed. 
However, the author should also have tested non-manufacturing industry, as the study would be 
more complete and more of an interest. Whittington (1980) on the other hand investigated 
properties of accounting ratios, the ‘proportional’ relationship between calculated ratios. The 
author presented cases for regression analysis. The drawback of the paper is that the author does 
not apply hypothesis testing, nor does he provide test results of an industry. Nevertheless, 
Whittington (1980, p.229) points out the importance of ‘testing empirically the appropriateness 
of the assumptions of ratio analysis’. Another interesting paper on ratio analysis was published 
by McLeay and Fieldsend (1987), who investigated the size and textile sector effect of the French 
companies. The authors observe non-normality and conclude that size and sector effect varies 
between financial ratios. A slightly different study was done by McLeay and Omar (2000), who 
investigated ratios on the bases of unbounded ratios (values can be positive or negative) and 
bounded ratios (values are only positive). The authors tested manufacturing companies in 
Malaysia. Ratios such as Sales by Net Working Capital can have both negative and positive 
values; whereas, Sales by Total Assets may have only positive values. The authors point out that 
unbounded ratio ‘may take extreme values in both tails of the distribution’. Bounded ratios may 
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have higher values on the right-hand tail only of the distribution in question. Although the paper 
is of interest, financial ratios for financials differ from the same for the manufacturing firms.  
 
2.2. Introduction to Earnings Management 
 
Most of the studies over the past 35 years concerning earnings management (EM) have 
concentrated on the balance sheet, for items in the assets, and within assets, and researchers 
tested accruals. Scholars wanted to understand if EM is present and if so, why. Schipper (1989, 
p.91) writes, ‘… the variety of accrual options available under Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles and the susceptibility of accruals to manipulation mean that the resulting accounting 
numbers could in principle be managed to the point of uninformativeness, available empirical 
evidence indicates that accruals do in fact have information content’ - Schipper (1989, p.91). The 
author only mentions accruals, as a possible means of manipulation. This study presents, in the 
subsection bellow, an overview of the used techniques to manipulate accounting figures. Scholars 
all conclude that managers and accountants use their skills to manage earnings in a positive and 
in the negative approach to conceal EM. Therefore, EM can be a positive occurrence too, as 
McKee (2005, p.1) writes: ‘Earnings management is not to be confused with illegal activities to 
manipulate financial statements and report results that do not reflect economic realist. These 
types of activities, popularly known as ‘cooking the books’, involve misrepresenting financial 
results.’ 
 
When a firm’s management does not follow Shareholders / Owner’s (Principal) expectations, i.e. 
management (Agent) exceeds its authority, and the control over management is not sufficient, the 
Principal-Agent Problem occurs, as Marnet (2005) points out, also called the ‘Agency Problem’, 
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Healy and Palepu (2001). Ronen and Yaari (2008, p.42) present an accounting scenario of a flow 
between Board of Directors, Management, Users and Gatekeepers. Part of the management’s 
responsibility is to produce year-end financial statements, which the Board, as the Shareholders 
agent, approves or rejects. For example, creditors as one of the ‘users’, use the year-end financial 
statements to evaluate the firm’s financial performance in repaying loans. Accurate and un-biased 
statements are therefore vital. If the control of the accounts is poor by the Gatekeepers, i.e. 
internal auditors, independent external auditors, analysts, credit agencies, regulators, 
manipulation is more likely to occur. Manipulation and the Principal-Agent problem can be 
suppressed if the Board of Directors and the External Auditors are truly independent (Marnet, 
2005). Executive / manager manipulations are likely when the company’s earnings are negative 
or in decline, as Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) write. 
Public users of the financial statements are interested in the firm’s operations, most importantly 
in the net profit as Ball and Brown (1968, p.160) write: ‘Net profit can be defined only as the 
result of the application of set of procedures (X1, X2,…) to set of events (Y1, Y2, …) with no 
definitive substantive meaning at all’. In other words, net profit is not a fact, only a number, an 
end result from a set of procedures that an accountant adopted beforehand.  
 
Lev (1989) investigates the ‘returns and earnings relation’. The author points out that investors, 
no matter of the industry, use earnings as a measure of company performance. Lev (1989, p.155) 
argues that ‘usefulness of quarterly and annual earnings to investors is very limited’. The author 
points out of that the possible reason for this limited usefulness lies in financial reporting quality, 
where managers manipulate accounting figures in diverse forms. The quality of financial 
statements depends on the approach the accountants adopted prior to preparing their statements, 
whether they decide to apply conservative accounting, in which case, their statements will be of 
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high quality. For example Dechow and Skinner (2000, p.239) show ‘The Distinction between 
Fraud and Earnings Management’, where the authors present accounting choices that can lead to 
earnings management, EM, or even Fraud. High quality means obeying the GAAP to the letter. 
On the other hand, a poor accounting approach and disregard for GAAP rules will result in a 
fraudulent accounting practice. Fraudulent actions are usually practised to achieve personal gain, 
i.e. higher bonus payments, career enhancements, etc. Poor accounting approach occurs when 
intentional manipulation of the accounts takes place, i.e. transactions with sales, inventory, 
accruals, expenses or assets. Balance Sheets show not only present but also past accounting 
choices made by accountants / managers. Balance sheet items are the area that is most managed, 
i.e. over or understatement of accruals, loan loss provisions for financial firms (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999).  
It is a well-known fact that company managers hold inside information about the firm’s economic 
state that stakeholders may or may not get hold of. Such situations occur when the number of 
external board members is limited or does not even exist, and all the financial information is in 
the hand of the company leader (CEO’s) who can monitor, guide and influence managers, as 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) write. If we just look back at no more than 13 years, companies such 
as Enron or WorldCom, and many-many others have contributed and gone down in history in one 
of the biggest company accounting scandals as Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2009) point out. 
Due to these high profile collapses the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of July 2002 was created in the USA. 
As per Sarbanes–Oxley, or SOX Compliance for short, publicly traded companies on stock 
exchanges in the USA must conform and comply, no matter their size. In the public statements of 
many company leaders, their primary goal has been earnings increase over the coming years i.e. 
growth of the company / earnings, increase in shareholders’ value.  
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Since 1991 cash flow statement reporting has been on the rise in the USA, EU and in some Asian 
countries, as it does not suffer from the same problem as earnings (earnings are easier to 
manipulate, which will be evaluated in more depth below). In order to reduce / eliminate EM, 
accounting standards were amended in 2003 by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), in order to improve the quality of reporting.  
Following the IASB changes, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) showed evidence, despite IASB 
(2003) amendments; EM has not been eliminated but increased. The authors argue that by 
increasing reporting quality, managers using accounting transaction to achieve EM incur costs in 
the process and the company loses its value. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005, p.1102) conclude ‘… 
real earnings management strictly increases because the tighter standards induce a greater value 
relevance, which again increases the marginal benefit of real earnings management.’ The 
authors showed that IASB 2003 amendment has not achieved its purpose of reducing or 
eliminating EM. 
 
2.3. A historical overview of Earnings Management 
2.3.1. Definition of Earnings Management  
 
Academics defined EM in several ways, the best explanation of EM is by Schipper (1989, p.92): 
‘….disclosure management’ in the sense of a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely 
facilitating the neutral operation of the process). This definition limits the discussion, in that it 
includes only the external reporting function and not, for example, managerial accounting 
reports or activities (such as lobbying the Financial Accounting Standards Board) designed to 
influence or change Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The definition of earnings 
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management adopted here does not rely on any particular concept of earnings; it is based on a 
view of accounting numbers as information.’ 
The discussion of Schipper’s (1989) EM definition is more of a general one, as the author does 
not specify where i.e. in which part in particular of the financial reports EM may or might occur. 
In other words, EM is intentional disregard for GAAP principles in order to achieve earning 
goals.  
 
Similarly, Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368) point out that: 
‘Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.’ 
 
Fischer and Rosenzweig (1995, p.433) argue: 
‘There are many ways that accountants and managers can influence the reported accounting 
results of their organizational units. When such influence is directed at changing the amount of 
reported earnings, it is known as earnings management.’ 
 
All definitions of EM show accountants’ / managers’ influence on GAAP principles but are no 
specific to point out which area of financial reporting was influenced or altered in any way to 
achieve the desired earnings level, thus demonstrating engagement in earnings management in 
the process. In the next section, this study demonstrates the known earnings management 
techniques that accountants, financial professionals use to manipulate, alter accounting 
transactions to achieve their desired earnings. 
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2.3.2. Techniques to achieve Earnings Management  
 
Although worldwide harmonisation of GAAP is slow, different continents and countries may 
have different approaches towards EM. Ayres (1994), Francis (2001), McKee (2005), Ronen and 
Yaari (2008), and others point out, earnings are managed in diverse forms, and the creativity of 
accountants to achieve EM is enormous. McKee (2005, p.13) explains twelve techniques that are 
used most to manage earnings:  
 
- ‘Cookie Jar Reserves’ technique, is a form of income smoothing, where expenses (i.e. 
estimates for pension / sales returns / warranty costs / bad debts / tax expenses) are over or 
underestimated in the current year in order to maintain expected performance in the 
present, and in the following year.   
- ‘Big Bath’ technique, also part of income smoothing, applied by companies who due to 
bad performance intend to report losses, will decide to report all possible losses at once. 
By applying this technique companies report huge losses in one year with the hope to 
close down a loss period and report steady growth in the following years. See for example 
Healy (1985, p.86). An example of reporting huge losses in one fiscal year is assets write-
down, debt or operational restructuring. 
- ‘Big Bet on the Future’ technique arises when a company takes over that is, buys another 
firm. Examples of Big Bet method are when earnings are consolidated between acquiring 
and acquired firms, thus a possible increase of earnings, or writing off costs of the 
acquired firm, i.e. writing of future costs for research and development costs, R&D, 
which enhances future earnings. Or even including earnings of the acquired company, 
thus increasing present earnings of the acquiring firm. 
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- ‘Flushing’ the Investment Portfolio, a technique used by firms who wish to invest in 
buying securities (shares, bonds, options contracts, etc.). EM can occur when the timing 
of selling these securities generates a gain or a loss, thus, the management achieves its 
strategy to generate profit or loss. Management can decide to write down securities that 
are losing market value, thus in all cases, gains or losses are reported in the earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT), also known as operating profit.  
- ‘Throw Out’ a problem child technique is applied when a parent company decides to sell 
entities that do not perform and generate losses. The company may create, a ‘special 
purpose’ entity for the transfer of financial assets, also called ‘variable interest entities’ 
(VIE), or structured entities. VIE is governed by IFRS No.10. Under IFRS 10, company 
management ‘requires deciding which entities are controlled’. The process of selling such 
a poorly performing entity provides an opportunity for EM. (Ernst and Young, 2011) 
- ‘Change GAAP’, companies once adopt an accounting principle, it is not likely they will 
change it unless they decide to ‘volunteer’ for new accounting standard, which can be 
done in every 2-3 years, as per FASB (in the USA). Firms in some industries may 
improve ‘revenue and expense recognition’ rules, which also encompass an option for 
EM.  
- ‘Amortisation, Depreciation and Depletion’ a technique under which accounting rules 
operating tangible and intangible assets are written off over a period of time. In order to 
write down the assets value, there is a need to set methodology. This process gives an 
opportunity for EM. 
- ‘Sale / Leaseback and Asset Exchange’ techniques are practised when an asset is sold / 
leased back or exchanged at a time when it is most beneficial for the company, to attain 
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gains or losses. IAS 17 governs Leases. FASB 98 accounting for sale / leaseback 
transactions for real estate. 
- ‘Operating v. Non-Operating Income’, income statements have two parts of income, the 
operating earnings or earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), the main earnings source 
of the company performance, whereas non-operating earnings or expenses are items that 
do not occur from the company’s core operation, items such as assets write-downs, 
foreign exchange gains or losses, revenue from gifts / fund raisings, real estate 
development etc. 
- ‘Early Retirement of Debt’ is a technique, where bonds as a long-term debt are earlier 
executed by the management of the year of their choice, thus in this way managing 
earnings. 
- ‘Use of Derivatives’ such as bonds, swaps, futures contracts, options are used to protect 
business interests, i.e. a financial company is trading currencies (i.e. Euros) on the futures 
market and applying options contracts to protect itself from an unexpected loss of 
earnings. Earnings Management (EM) is possible by applying derivatives and exercising 
the contract at a specific time. 
- ‘Shrink the Ship’ is mainly done when companies repurchase their own shares. If no 
income was generated with the buyback, there is no income recognition in the books. 
Shares buyback does not affect the earnings, but it affects the earnings per share (EPS). 
This technique gives an option for EM. 
 
Accountants and managers use creative EM techniques driven by motivation(s). In the next 
section, this study presents the known motivations. 
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2.3.3. Motivation for Earnings Management 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the 12 earnings management techniques are achieved by 
accounting decisions that are designed to reduce or to influence earnings fluctuation. Making 
investment or production decisions to influence and to reduce earnings fluctuations are also 
called Income Smoothing. Income smoothing has been investigated by researchers, Copeland 
(1968), Beidleman (1973), Moses (1987), Tucker and Zarowin (2006), Matsuura (2008). 
Beidleman (1973, p.653) defines income smoothing as: ‘the intentional dampening of 
fluctuations about the same level of earnings that is currently considered to be normal for a 
firm’.  
 
There is a rule in applying income smoothing: namely, if the management decides to reduce 
earnings fluctuations for long-term earnings growth, then once applied, it should not intervene in 
favour of using smoothing techniques again in the future, simply by not following this simple 
rule EM is created, Copeland (1968). Following Copeland (1968) paper, Beidleman (1973) 
investigates earnings smoothing with 6 discretionary items: Pension and Retirement expenses, 
Incentive compensation, R&D expenses, Remitted Earnings from Unconsolidated Subsidiaries, 
Sales and Advertising Expenses, Plant Retirements. Discretionary items are items that the 
management has under control. The authors present the test results of the six discretionary items 
where negative correlation suggests that earnings smoothing took place. Beidleman’s (1973) 
study is one of the earliest investigations of smoothing earnings, which had an impact on later 
studies in EM. 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) raised the question, ‘Can Big Bath and Earnings Smoothing 
Co-exist as Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies’. The authors looked at scenarios of 
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managers’ actions on financial statements when bad or good news occurred on reported earnings. 
The authors argue that managers apply the ‘Big Bath’ technique when the news is ‘bad’, i.e. cash 
flow is low; managers manage books to ‘underperform’ earnings in the current fiscal year in 
order to report higher profits in the next. Similarly, when the news is ‘good’, i.e. cash flow is not 
low or it is high, managers ‘Smooth earnings’, depending on the level of the cash flow in the 
books. In short, ‘Smoothing Earnings’ is proportional to cash flow level. Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad’s (2002) study is of high importance for understanding mangers’ behaviour in 
corporate reporting. Further work on income smoothing was researched by Tucker and Zarowin 
(2006), who investigated if income smoothing improves earnings information of firms which 
reported past, current and future earnings plus the company’s future cash flow. By testing 
accruals and other variables from the balance sheet, the authors show that higher negative 
correlation suggests higher income smoothing. The authors conclude higher income smoothing 
contributes to more earnings information.   
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.370) point out three motivations for Earnings Management:  
 
a. Capital market motivations  
b. Contracting motivations  
c. Anti-trust or regulatory motivations  
 
a. Capital Market motivations 
 
Studies in this group have been looking at elements of financial statements such as accruals 
(Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; 1988; Ronen and Sadan, 1988; Schipper, 1989; Dechow and 
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Sloan, 1991; McNichols, 2002; and others), stock market data (Beidleman, 1973; Dechow, 1994; 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; Sloan, 1996; Charitou and Vafeas, 1998; Degeorge, Patel 
and Zeckhauser, 1999; Barton and Simko, 2002; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Shen and 
Chich, 2004; Suda and Shuto, 2005; Yu, Du and Sun, 2006; Charoenwong and  Jiraporn, 2008; 
Sun and Rath, 2009; Cornet, McNutt and Tehranian, 2009; Amar and Abaoub, 2010; Jiang, 
Petroni and Wang, 2010; Tokuga and Tanaka, 2011; Abed, Al-Attar and Suwaidan, 2012; and 
others) to test Earnings Management.  
 
2.3.3.1. Studies testing financials data to investigate capital market motivations for     
Earnings Management  
 
For different types of industries, different items of accruals or balance sheet items have been 
investigated. For example for financials, for banks items that were mostly investigated for any 
possible Earnings Management (EM) were Loan Loss Provisions (LLP). One of the first papers 
that investigated LLP was by Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995). The authors examined 
bank managers’ actions to see ‘how’ they engaged in manipulation of accruals and transactions to 
meet their tax, capital and earnings ‘goals’. The authors show evidence that loan charge-offs, 
Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) and security issue where these variables influenced and/or used to 
manage capital ratios. The authors further present evidence that ‘pension settlement gains and 
miscellaneous gains and losses’ were used to manage ‘earnings and/or capital’, but divulge no 
evidence of tax avoidance. The authors’ study is one of the first to examine and to show the 
existence of EM within banks. Another paper that tests financials data was drawn up Beatty and 
Harris (2001) who investigated ‘capital management (management of security gains or losses), 
tax and earnings’ and the dealings of publicly traded banks in the US. Samples for testing were 
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used for 1991 and 1992 financial years. Before 1991, interstate banking in the US was not 
allowed. The authors wanted to see if banks manage their earnings to reduce their tax payment 
obligations on the state and ‘interstate’ level, on the company’s group (consolidated statements) 
level, and on an individual bank level. Test results present evidence of earnings management 
(EM) where banks shift their security gains / losses to subsidiaries with lower tax rates with the 
intention to reduce subsidiaries and consolidated tax amounts. Such an asset shifting contributes 
to managing company group earnings amounts. The authors conclude that banks engage in EM in 
order to reduce state tax payments, as well as their consolidated tax contributions on banks group 
level. Beatty and Harris (2001) seal the fact that EM is present not only in the non-financials but 
also in the financial sector. 
From 2000 and onwards, authors started to test only the financial industry in the search for any 
evidence of EM. For example, Lifschutz (2002) looked at evidence of EM in the US banking 
industry, specifically the SFAS No. 115 standards (the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards), that regulates security trading in the USA. The author was interested in managers 
‘gains trading’ (selling securities). A total of 88 US banks were tested for the period from 1997 to 
2000, and it was concluded that larger banks were less sensitive to ‘change in return on equity 
(ROE)’. Lifschutz (2002, p.9) presents evidence of EM where banks managers ‘took advantage 
of the flexibility in SFAS 115 and managed earnings through gains trading of securities’. 
Similarly, Schrand and Wong (2003) investigated valuation allowances for deferred tax assets 
(DTA) in relation to EM, for publicly traded banks, using Compustat database. ‘A deferred tax 
asset is recognized for temporary differences that will result in deductible amounts in future 
years and for carryforwards.’ - Statement of Financial Accounting Standards - SFAS No. 109. 
The authors conclude from test statistics that banks engage in EM when earnings are bellow or 
above the targets, apply income increases, or decrease valuation that will serve as a smooth 
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income allowance for deferred tax assets for future years. The authors in the above studies have 
proved that Earnings Management (EM) will occur whether or not the accounting standards are 
flexible or strict, as bank managers will always seek ways to engage in EM to achieve their 
objectives. 
 
2.3.3.2. Studies testing financials and / or non-financials data to investigate Capital market 
for Earnings Management motivations 
 
Dechow (1994) investigates whether earnings are a more informative measure of performance 
than cash flow. She presents evidence that ‘accruals play an important role in improving the 
ability of earnings to reflect the firm’s performance’. Earnings as a measure of performance 
contain less noise (an error term, which has a zero mean, constant variance and is non-auto 
correlated) than either cash from operations or net cash flow (NCF). Dechow also accepts 
earnings manipulation of a firm’s management. The stock market puts less weight on noisy 
components of performance and concentrates on the more permanent cash flows. Data was 
collected from Compustat, for the period from 1960 to 1989, examined at quarterly, annual and 
four-year intervals. When the observation is ranked by Long Term Operating Accruals, LTOA 
(i.e. depreciation), the coefficient of determination (R
2
) on cash from the operation’s regression 
does not fall but rises. This means that when the stock return is being regressed on cash from 
operations, the observations with low LTOA have similar results of R
2
 as the results with high 
LTOA. This suggests that the long-term operating accruals play a less important role than 
working capital accruals do. Dechow (1994) demonstrates autocorrelation and explains that 
accruals and cash flows have predictable temporary components; therefore, net cash flow (NCF) 
and cash flow from operations have more noise than Earnings do. Comparing only R
2
 may give a 
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false conclusion that the earnings have higher, better explanatory power than cash flow. Dechow 
(1994) points out the adjusted R
2
 for earnings are visibly higher than for cash flow from 
operations and net cash flow for both quarterly, annual and four yearly samples. This indicates 
that earnings are more tied to the stock returns than the cash flow. It may be concluded that cash 
flow is more difficult to manipulate than earnings. Reply to Dechow’s (1994) paper was a paper 
by Sloan (1996) where the author uses a different approach, namely, the potential ability of cash 
flows and earnings in predicting the next period’s earnings and not as Dechow suggests, whose 
approach is based on whether earnings are a more informative measure of performance than cash 
flow is. Data was obtained from Compustat from 1962 until 1991. Variables of earnings, accruals 
cash from operations were used from the financial statements. Sloan (1996, p.299) shows results 
of equation Earningst+1, confirms that earnings are mean reverting, and suggests the rejection of 
the null hypothesis. The author used the Dickey-Fuller test for testing random walk for H1. The 
statistics are very similar to the industry ones. The results confirm that the accounting rates of 
return are mean reverting. The author suggests that cash flow is more important in predicting the 
next period’s earnings, than earnings. The author concludes that although cash flow is difficult to 
manipulate, the stock prices behave as the stakeholders look only for the earnings and do not 
differentiate between accruals and cash flow.  
Kasznik (1999), on the other hand, finds that managers tend to use positive discretionary accruals 
to report higher earnings, especially during times when their earnings would fall below their 
earlier forecast due to overestimation. The author however does not mention the reversal accrual 
rule.  
A slightly different area of testing was performed by Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003), who 
looked into the effectiveness of deferred tax expenses (DTE) in search of evidence of earnings 
management (EM). Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003, p.492) define deferred tax expense as it ‘is a 
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component of a firm's total income tax expense and reflects the tax effects of temporary 
differences between book income (i.e., income reported to shareholders and other external users) 
and taxable income (i.e., income reported to the tax authorities) that arise primarily from 
accruals for revenue and expense items that affect both book and taxable income, but in different 
periods’. The authors investigate the influence of deferred tax expenses under SFAS No. 109, 
using non-financial US data for the period of 1994-2000. The authors compare deferred tax 
expenses (DTE) to accrual models in finding earnings management (EM) and present evidence 
that DTE is a better means of finding EM than the Jones and Modified Jones models (who tested 
EM by using accrual models). One limitation of the paper is that the sample period is too short 
due to an examination of SFAS No. 109. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the author’s 
results are country specific, as the tested sample referred only to US firms. Another study on tax 
expenses was done by Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills (2004), who investigate tax expenses (a 
‘cookie jar reserve’ technique to manage earnings), in order to meet analysts’ forecasts. The 
authors present clear evidence that firms lower their effective tax rate whenever other means of 
earnings management actions (i.e. accruals) are not sufficient to meet the analysts’ forecasts. The 
authors show that corporate managers use all possible means to achieve EM in order to meet 
analysts’ forecasts. Testing multiple industries to investigate EM in the Anglo-American and 
Euro-Continental accounting models was done by Othman and Zeghal (2006), who investigated 
EM motives, cases of Canadian and French companies in particular. The authors show evidence 
how societies with different social and economic realities manage earnings differently. 
Specifically, Canadian firms’ motives to manage earnings are initial public offerings (IPO’s) and 
equity offerings, where French firms’ motives for EM are tax rates and cost of debt (‘contractual 
debt costs’). The authors study shows that EM is not only country or society specific, but that it is 
present all over the world, as this study will show in the following subsections. 
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Studies of earnings management in the past were investigated with accruals and the discretionary 
accruals model, for example the Jones (1991) model. Modelling reversal accruals were attempted 
by Baber, Kang and Li (2011) who investigate the reversal of discretionary accruals in 
connection with earnings management. The authors point out that the level of ‘past accrual-based 
earnings management’ is in connection with the ‘speed of the reversed discretionary accruals’. 
The authors’ study is of huge importance as their paper is the first to point out the importance of 
reversals of the accruals, whereas earlier studies simply ignored or did not take this rule into 
account. A similar study was done by Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012) who argued that accruals 
booked in a period must reverse to the next. However, the authors do not specify the term ‘next 
period’, and state that the accrual based models have low testing power; whereas, models with 
reversal accruals improve testing power by 40%. 
 
b. Contracting motivations  
 
It is common practise in the corporate world that managers have bonus based salaries. It is also 
common practice that managers receive financial rewards on earnings-based bonus schemes. 
When it comes to contracting motivations, the papers presented by the authors do not specify 
whether specific industry data was tested. A qualitative paper on the ‘agency problem’ was 
published by Smith and Warner (1979), who investigated Bond Covenants, a type of ‘agency 
problem’, a conflict between ‘bondholder and stockholder’. This paper is one of the earliest on 
earnings management (EM) that addresses agency conflicts. The authors looked at four types of 
covenants: production/investment, bond, dividend and financing; i.e. bond covenants are 
provision types such as a ‘payment of dividends which restricts the firm from engaging in 
specified actions after the bonds are sold’. Stakeholders use policies as types of restrictions in 
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making company decisions, i.e. monitoring cost has an influence on the production / investment 
policy. Furthermore, the authors point out that ‘stakeholders use these policies to hurt 
bondholders’. The authors conclude that dividend and financing policy have lower ‘monitoring 
costs (i.e. observation of provisions)’ than production / investment policy. The authors’ data and 
their arguments are based on ‘commentaries’ on earlier evidence, where their results lie in 
‘qualitative’ evidence, and not in ‘quantitative’ evidence.  
Whereas, Healy (1985) investigated the effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions of 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals and ‘changes of accounting procedures’. The author 
used Compustat and Moody Industrial Manual sample of 94 companies for the period of 1964-
1980. Under bonus plans, companies apply diverse schemes such as stock types, ‘deferred 
salaries’, insurance / performance plans, etc. The author defines discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals, where non-discretionary accruals ‘… are accounting adjustments to the 
firm cash flow mandated by accounting standard-setting bodies (e.g. Securities Exchange 
Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board)’, and discretionary accruals ‘…are 
adjustments to cash flow selected by the manager’ - Healy (1985, p.89). The author presents 
evidence that ‘bonus schemes create incentives for managers to select accounting procedures 
and accruals to maximise the value of their bonus awards’, Healy (1985, p.106). However, 
measuring the error of discretionary accruals is one of the limitations of the study that the author 
also acknowledges. The second limitation is the total accruals used for testing discretionary 
accruals, and the third limitation is errors ‘in measuring earnings before discretionary accruals’. 
Nevertheless, over 30 years ago Healy (1985) started an important debate that bonus schemes led 
to EM under contracting motivation. 
A qualitative summary study on information asymmetry was published by Healy and Palepu 
(2001) and investigated corporate disclosures and pointed to contract difficulties between 
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investors and managers (also called the ‘agency problem’). The authors suggested ‘compensation 
agreements and debt contracts’, where managers were reporting to investors about the company’s 
performance and about the way the company assets were handled. Although this paper is a 
qualitative summary of earlier relevant papers, it is nevertheless interesting to include into the 
review of this study despite lacking quantitative elements. As it was pointed out earlier, sample 
testing provides far more tangible results. 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) examine executive compensations in relation to institutional 
ownership. The sample was obtained from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) ExecComp database for 
the 1992-1997 periods. The authors’ present test statistics evidence to highlight the link between 
‘institutional investors’ and managers ‘compensation’, as well as evidence for pay-for-
performance that relates to ‘institutional influence’. Although the authors show evidence of 
contracting motivation, it is not clear from the tested sample if the test results encompass to all 
the industry, or refer only to a specific one. 
Jiang, Petroni and Wang (2010) on the other hand investigated chief financial officers’ (CFO’s) 
and chief executive officers’ (CEO’s) influence on earnings management. The authors tested 
discretionary accruals in the pre and post Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) period. They presented 
evidence that ‘equity-based compensation’ gives motivation for CFOs to manage earnings at pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley Act way, but find weaker evidence of EM after the implementation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Limitations of the study are that the authors focus only on ‘firm-years’ data; 
and thus consider only ‘equity incentives of CEOs and CFOs’, and ignore the reversal accruals 
effect on their regression results. 
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c. Anti-trust or regulatory motivations 
 
Motivations of this kind are for those who wish to avoid investigation by industry regulators, 
often a classical example in the financial industry. Most industries are regulated in one form or 
another but the most regulated is the financial industry, where regulators rely solely on 
accounting data. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) were one of the first scholars who investigated 
and found evidence of manipulation of earnings decreases due to political costs in a regulated 
industry and in the cases of firms pressured by politics. Further research studies were published 
on banks and other financial intermediaries who engaged in Earnings Management (i.e. 
Lifschutz, 2002; Shen and Chih, 2005; Yu, Du and Sun, 2006), and also ones that examined the 
phenomenon on a countrywide level (i.e. Shen and Chih 2005; Cornet, McNutt and Tehranian, 
2009), which will be evaluated in more depth later on in this chapter. 
One of the earlier relevant papers that relates to regulatory motivations is Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1996) who investigate companies that manipulated earnings and were duly investigated 
by the Security Exchange Commissions (SEC) in the USA. The authors find that earnings 
manipulation occurs when circumstances are conducive, such as the lack of an audit committee; 
when the owner is also the chief executive officer (CEO) or the chairman of the board; or if board 
members are external; in other words, when there is lack of proper corporate governance. The 
authors also find evidence of manipulation when companies wish to raise capital at low cost. 
Although the authors accepted the fact that their findings should not be generalised, 3-7 years 
later their findings were confirmed by real accounting scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and 
others. 
Beneish (1999) looked at companies from the Compustat database for the period from 1987 to 
1993, the only firms that broke the rules and regulations of the GAAP and were subject to 
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investigation by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The tested data is not 
specified whether it relates to financial or non-financial samples. The manipulated data consisted 
of unreal, over or understated profits, non-existent inventory and wrong capitalising costs 
(expenses added to the cost of fixed assets). In order to measure whether earnings management 
(EM) took place or not, the author had to compare the Compustat samples to those companies’ 
samples which were ‘non-manipulators’. Accounting data was used to calculate variables from 
their Financial Statements; namely, variables such as days’ sales in receivables, gross margin 
index, asset quality index, sales growth index, and others, a total of eight variables. Beneish 
(1999, pp.25-27) presents test statistics and clear evidence of earnings manipulation. One 
limitation of the study is that the regression model was tested on publicly traded companies, thus 
the same model may not be applicable for privately owned companies. The second limitation is 
that the model may not be applicable in a reliable way for testing companies’ data set to favour 
earnings decreases. 
 
2.3.4. Detecting Earnings Management 
2.3.4.1. Detection of Earnings Management - Tested with all industries data (including 
financials), vs. with the exclusion of financial companies 
 
The authors back in the 1990’s applied data from Compustat by excluding financials or selecting 
a sample of all industries. Some authors argue that financials have a special regulatory 
framework, which is true; therefore, they exclude financials from testing. This section presents 
relevant papers that use all data, including all samples with financials inclued and ones which 
exclude financials. 
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Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) were examining earnings management (EM) by testing total 
accruals, or non-discretionary accruals, (non-discretionary accruals, ‘… are accounting 
adjustments to the firm’s cash flow mandated by accounting standard-setting bodies, e.g. 
Securities Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board’ - Healy, 1985, 
p.89) models of Healy (1985, p.89), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), Modified Jones and the 
Industry Model. The authors used a sample from 1950-1991, from Compustat, randomly selected 
1000 firm-years, and made an assumption on accruals as if they had been managed: expense 
manipulation, revenue manipulation and margin manipulation. They calculated variables, 
changes in current assets, current liabilities, cash and cash equivalents, debt; depreciation and 
amortisation expenses, and applied them in all 5 models. The authors presented test results with 
low earnings management in all of the models, mainly due to the complexity and low power of 
the tests. Despite acknowledging low testing powers of the models and timing issues of the 
reversal accruals, the authors do not formulate alternative testing approaches.   
Corporate leaders have goals to continuously increase earnings. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, 
p.101) show evidence ‘whether, how and why firms avoid reporting earnings decreases and 
losses’. They use industrial and research data from Compustat from 1976 to 1994, excluding 
financial institutions, banks and regulated firms. The authors apply two theories to test 
hypotheses with the transaction costs and the prospect theories. The hypotheses are 1. ‘Earnings 
are managed to avoid earnings decreases.’, and, 2. ‘Earnings are managed to avoid losses’, 
(Page 102). For the tests, the authors used net income and earnings before extraordinary items 
(Net Income Before Extraordinary Items = net income before being adjusted by extraordinary 
items such as accounting change, discontinued operations, and others). The authors present 
graphical evidence of earnings management (EM) and confirm H1: they show that distributions 
are uneven near or at the zero point, and changes appear in order to avoid earnings decreases. The 
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authors show evidence that two elements from earnings, i.e. cash flow from operations and 
changes in working capital were used to manage earnings. The authors conclude that cash flow 
from operations and working capital were used to manage earnings by company managers. 
Company managers managed earnings decline by reducing the ‘transaction costs with 
stakeholders’ applying the Prospect Theory i.e. by ‘averting losses’. The authors study is of 
pioneering importance, in the sense that instead of using the accrual approach, they applied a 
new, completely different model to test data. Additionally, the authors presented empirical results 
of the tested variables in diagrams, i.e. in the form of frequency distributions. Ever since, 
scientists have been applying the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) testing approach, 
including this study.  
Prospect theory was developed by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) as criticism of the earlier 
expected utility theory. Prospect theory is a choice between alternatives with risk attached. In 
view of that, it has two phases, the ‘Editing phase’ – an analysis of prospects, and the ‘Evaluation 
phase’ – choosing the highest value of the edited prospect. The authors are suggesting a value 
function at a reference point, a reference point between losses and gains (above or below of a 
reference point), in the form of an S-shape. The S-shape value function is ‘steepest at the 
reference point’. But they do not specify how to determine the target or reference point, which 
means that the point itself depends on ‘the specific situation’. Prospect theory is of huge 
importance, as it shows that most people understand results as gains or losses. The application of 
Prospect theory was put to the test by Fiegenbaum (1990). The author investigates risk and 
returns with the help of the Prospect theory on a sample of 3300 companies in 85 industries for 
the 1997-1984 time frames. The author tested the Prospect theory with three hypotheses. 
Fiegenbaum (1989, p.194) shows evidence in favour of all three hypotheses thus the results 
confirm the risk-return association. However, the author does not specify which industries were 
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tested; therefore, it can only be assumed that financials were also included. If so, association 
between risk and return levels might be different from industry to industry. 
 
As cash flow was more acceptable for fund managers as a measure the firm’s performance, 
researchers have started to examine cash flow influences on dividend changes. Charitou and 
Vafeas (1998) examined whether cash flow explains changes in dividends. The authors argue that 
cash flow is a better indicator of a firm’s performance than accruals, as there was evidence that 
accruals had been a subject of managerial manipulation. They argue that cash flow is positively 
related to dividend changes, as it is a measure of performance and liquidity. The authors apply 
data from the Compustat for the period 1981-1991. The variables tested were taken from income 
statements and from balance sheets, such as dividend changes, operating income, cash flow from 
operations, lagged dividend yield (previous year cash dividend with the decreased market value 
of the equity) and a market to book ratio. Charitou and Vafeas (1998) came one step closer to 
finding the importance of cash flows in setting dividend policy. The authors tested variables from 
income statements and balance sheets. They conclude that dividend payments are influenced by a 
firm’s performance, knowing that earnings are made from cash flow and accruals. Evidence 
emanating from their tests demonstrates that cash flow is neither a good measure of a firm’s 
performance nor a component of earnings which would specifically explain dividend changes. 
The authors show the importance of cash flow when it is low, or during an investment period for 
that matter. The type of industry tested is not clear. It is presumed that the authors tested all-
industry samples. This might have influenced the results knowing that high and low growth firms 
have different demands for cash flow and dividend policies. Also, the sample from 1985 to 1991 
seems to be a bit short and it is a bit odd from them not to have included companies to a later 
date, up to 1997, for example, before the actual paper was published. Nor is it clear whether the 
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tested sample is an all industry sample or not. This might also have influenced the results in view 
of the operational differences between high and low technology firms, especially in the instance 
of telecommunication, IT and financials. 
A question arises whether cash flow improves its informational value over a longer period. 
Charitou and Clubb (1999), believe that a longer period of measurement interval in case of cash 
flows improves the matching convention. The authors produce an empirical analysis of 
incremental information of cash flows and conclude by quoting that ‘multiple cash flow variables 
may have incremental information content beyond an aggregate measure of accounting earnings 
but not beyond disaggregated earnings components’. The authors tested multicollinearity 
applying the Belsley, Kun and Welsh techniques, which they found not to be high. The authors 
excluded financials from their UK data sample (1985-1992) tests. In previous researches, cash 
flow was rejected as ‘valuation relevance’. In their paper, they show that when the return interval 
increases, the performance of the cash flow variable improves due to interval increases. Despite 
the significance of cash flow as a relevant valuation factor, this study finds the tested interval of 
eight years too short.  
A similar paper on the informational value of financial statements was published by Lev and 
Zarowin (1999), who were examining how informative the earnings, cash flows, and book value 
changes are over time by applying cross-sectional regression. They were using a sample from 
1964-1996, from the CRSP database from 1964-1995 (market value portfolios) and from the 
Compustat from 1978-1996 book value portfolios. The authors conclude that the earnings are not 
informative to investors, as they may believe in manipulation of statements and stock price 
changes because of reported earnings. They further argue that the drop of the coefficient of 
determination (R2) might be influenced by an increased importance of non-accounting 
information (possibly earnings manipulation). Therefore, the cross-sectional association between 
Chapter 2  
41 
 
stock returns and reported earnings has been in decline over the sample period. The authors 
further analyse the change by classifying the firms as stable and changing ones. The R2 and the 
combined slope of the coefficient (ERC) are bigger for ‘No change firms’ and ‘Low change 
firms’ than for the ‘Change firms’ and ‘High change firms’, the significance level is lower than 
0.10. The authors show that business change is negatively associated with the informational value 
of earnings, the return earnings association has a decline but it is not statistically significant. The 
time coefficient in variables is negative and statistically significant. Business change is 
influenced by intangible investments and research and development (R&D). The authors show 
evidence that if the R&D is increased, the coefficient of determination (R
2
) and the combined 
slope of the coefficient (ERC) is larger in High-High firms than in Low-Low firms, which is a 
proof of a weak relation between earnings and returns. The same decline in returns-earnings is 
present where R&D report an increase over the sample period. Lev and Zarowin (1999) further 
analyse the business change and R&D change. Results show that the mean R&D intensity for 
high change group firms has a higher mean intensity of change than for the no change group. The 
same applies to the High change group and Low change group respectively. This confirms that 
the reliance on financial statements is minimal for firms which have a high investment in R&D. 
The authors also recommend capitalisation of intangible investments, systematic preparation of 
financial statements and restatement of financial reports towards improving the use of financial 
statements. This would help improve the matching convention. Apart from matching 
improvements, the authors should also have argued for more rigorous audits by recognised 
auditors in order to improve ‘the usefulness of financial information’ to investors, stakeholders 
and other interested parties. 
Next to Lev and Zarowin (1999), a paper on the relevance of financial information, Francis and 
Schipper (1999) also investigated the relevance of financial statements to investors. The authors 
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use a sample from 1952-94, from CRSP and Compustat. The authors are modelling the market 
adjusted returns (‘The market-adjusted return method assumes that the expected market return 
constitutes the best predictor of each security’s market performance’, a very powerful testing 
method, as it gives a clearer picture on investors’ returns) and accounting hedge portfolios. In 
explaining the market equity value, the authors demonstrated with statistical tests that there is a 
decrease in relevance of earnings information and an increase of relevance in balance sheet and 
book value information. It is fair to point out that the authors do not test the ‘level’ of decrease, 
they only present that their test statistics is an evidence of a change in value relevance. 
Further testing of cash flow as a component of earnings was done by Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1999), and showed reasons for earnings management (EM), and misreporting of 
earnings. The author’s study analyzes cash flow and earnings relevance of earnings management 
to the threshold, earnings manipulations, accruals and cash flow as measures of a firm’s 
performance. Their evidence suggests that the cash flow component of earnings gives a better 
measure of the value of a company. This has also been confirmed by Sloan’s (1996) paper. 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) show that earnings management has three thresholds. 
The first one is reporting profits, which can be positive, negative or zero (psychology has an 
important role); and another two, which are based on a benchmark as if profits were met. If it is 
bigger than the benchmark, then, it is a success; if smaller than the benchmark, it is deemed a 
failure. Executives/managers make available copies of their financial statements to investors, 
analysts and to the general public; therefore, the threshold is constantly being analyzed. When the 
manager influences financial statements, earnings are changed, and due to this change, the 
threshold changes as well. The reason for managerial manipulation varies but the most important 
reason for doing so is achieving targets. Earnings are targeted and set per periods; the authors 
show this as ‘direct management or misreporting’. Direct management would be when profits 
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increase / decrease in one year and reverse in the following year or in the year needed. Another 
typical example is inventory. Misreporting is likely only when there is no direct control over 
assets and no supervision is available. The authors have suggested that a threshold arises from 
three psychological effects:  
a) Positive and non-positive numbers have an influence on human thought, i.e. positive 
numbers appear to be more acceptable. 
b) The prospect theory. 
c) Rule of thumb for reducing transaction costs. 
The threshold is present even when there is small participation, and has a higher effect when 
participation is high, i.e. it is said that ‘The board of directors is threshold driven’. Degeorge, 
Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) suggested that reporting financial statements thresholds are divided 
into three groups: 
a) Reporting positive profits, profits above zero; 
b) Maintaining earnings from a previous financial period; 
c) Meeting analysts’ predictions, their earnings forecast. 
Managers, when report earnings, tend to report earnings above analysts’ forecast. Analysts react 
to these forecasts. For this reason, executives/managers tend to reduce analysts’ expectations by 
attempting to exert some sort of influence. The authors analyze quarterly data from 1974 to 1996. 
The selected data is 5,387, from 100,000 observations. They assume that managers have a 
constant incentive to manipulate earnings in order to achieve the threshold level. They also argue 
that ‘the board of directors is threshold driven’. The authors recognise that manipulation in itself 
is impossible to monitor, but earnings from published financial statements, on the other hand, can 
be monitored. They test the three thresholds: change in earnings per share (EPS) between two 
financial periods (EPS = EPSt – EPSt-1); forecast error of earnings per share, and zero/positive 
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profits. The authors present a histogram of change in earnings per share, where the histogram 
displays a considerable shift of earnings from zero to positive. There is a big difference in 
distribution between zero positive and negative earnings, between –2 and 0, which might suggest 
managers’ manipulation of earnings. The authors further analyzed the analysts’ expectations. The 
gap between positive and negative forecast error for EPS is again substantial. The authors present 
a histogram of forecast errors for EPS (‘the threshold of meeting analysts’ expectations’), in 
which the distribution of forecast error has a sudden drop below zero in the negative scale and a 
stable drop on the positive scale, i.e. a left-skewed distribution. The third threshold: report a 
positive profit histogram of EPS, positive/negative profits exhibit a visible jump from 0 
distributions towards the positive scale. This suggests managers’ effort to shift from negative to 
positive earnings. But, one limitation of the authors’ paper is that their model is based on 
earnings, specifically on the earnings per share (EPS), i.e. test statistics show results only for the 
EPS variable. Furthermore, the authors do not mention comparing or running the same model 
on another variable, i.e. cash flow. The authors also assume constant motivation in manipulating 
EPS over the sampled data of 20 years.  
Barton and Simko (2002) investigating Earnings Management (EM) found that managers report 
higher earnings and smaller negative earnings between periods and measure the level of 
overstatement of net assets in the Balance Sheet. Overstatement is a ‘managerial incentive’ to 
‘meet or to beat analysts’. The authors use Net Operating Assets (NOA = equity minus cash and 
securities plus debt) ‘relative to sales’ to find out if companies with large NOA also had a large 
increase in accruals. The dependent variable was total accruals and explanatory variables for 
testing were total assets, revenue, property plant and equipment. All variables were calculated on 
a quarterly basis. The authors tested data from Compustat, period from 1993-1999, a total of 
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3,649 companies. Table 4 and 5 (pages 32 and 34) show descriptive statistics, and regression 
results show evidence of earnings management, but only for ‘managerial incentives’ to ‘meet or 
to beat analysts’, which is one of the limitations of the study.  
A slightly different research was published by Durtschi and Easton (2005) who aspired to 
challenge earlier studies by re-examining them, namely, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); 
Degeorge, Patel and  Zeckhauser (1999); and others who applied the shape of frequency 
distribution of net income (NI) and earnings per share (EPS) at zero point, as determinants of 
earnings management. Earlier studies show that there is a discontinuity of frequency distribution 
for EPS, NI as an evidence of earnings management. The authors challenge this evidence and 
argue that, there is no discontinuity in the frequency distribution of NI and EPS due to deflation, 
which has no effect on the distributions of NI and EPS, as earlier studies claimed. The authors 
argue that, as earnings influence stock prices, companies with ‘small losses’ have lower stock 
prices compared to companies with ‘small profits’ that have higher stock prices. The authors 
further point out that companies with ‘small losses’ will have ‘deleted or missing’ data used for 
testing and such a sample will influence the shape of the distribution. The authors examine price 
as a deflator and show distribution results where net income (NI) does and earnings per share 
(EPS) does not have a discontinuity at zero points. The authors conclude with arguments 
pertaining to deflation, sample selection and characteristics of observation and claim that the 
shapes of distributions do not serve as good ‘evidence of earnings management’. Test results of 
this study reject Durtschi and Easton’s (2005) arguments against discontinuity of frequency 
distribution, which will be elaborated in detail in Chapter 4. Additionally, contrary to Durtschi 
and Easton’s (2005) findings, Gore, Pope and Singh (2007) present evidence of discontinuity in 
distributions of ‘earnings relative to targets’, which will be discussed in the section bellow. 
Shortly after the Durtschi and Easton (2005) paper, which questions the validity of discontinuity 
Chapter 2  
46 
 
of frequency distribution, Burgstahler and Eames (2006) presented another work on earnings 
management (EM) investigating operating cash flow and discretionary accruals as elements of 
earnings in relation to analysts’ forecasts. The authors use actual and forecast earnings per share 
(EPS) data from the Zacks Investment Research Database, from 1986 to 2000. Financials and 
utility companies were excluded from the sample. Test results of Earnings distribution show a 
clear jump at ‘zero’ point on the scale. Apart from earnings distribution, tests statistics also 
showed evidence of EM, where earnings were managed higher to meet or to outperform analysts’ 
forecasts whereas forecasts were managed down. The authors’ study would have been even more 
of an interest if they had separately tested financials as well, instead of excluding them from the 
sample. 
Incentives to manage earnings by chief executive officers (CEOs) were examined by Begstresser 
and Philippon (2006). The authors were interested whether accruals are linked to CEO’s stock-
based compensation. It is well known that accruals can be used to increase or decrease reported 
earnings. The authors show a gradual increase in the use of accruals in the past two decades with 
a visible increase after 1995. By applying test statistics, they compute total accruals, and also 
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals, similar to Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995); and 
Jones (1991). The authors show evidence for the test period 1993-2000, demonstrating that there 
is a connection between high accruals and option exercises, or sale of shares by CEOs. However, 
the authors do not mention the timing effect of the reversal accruals, which may influence the 
power of the test results, as Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) pointed out. 
Investigation of income tax and special items effect in connection with discontinuity of earnings 
around and at zero points was published by Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007). The authors 
write that ‘The term ‘discontinuity’ is shorthand terminology for an unusually low frequency of 
small loss observations and an unusually high frequency of small proﬁt observations, relative to 
Chapter 2  
47 
 
the frequencies in the adjacent intervals of the earnings distribution. It does not imply that the 
cumulative distribution function is discontinuous at zero.’ - Beaver, McNichols and Nelson 
(2007, p.526). The authors run models with pre-tax and net income data and modify the 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) model, and point out that the standard deviation of the 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) model is understated. The authors suggest an alternative to 
overcoming an overstated standardised difference of the test statistics model, see Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540). However, it is not clear why the authors do not specifically 
explain the reasons for the modification of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) standardised 
difference part of the model. The authors only refer to ‘under and overstatements’ of the 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) model test statistics, and do not explain the reasons for 
their modification (The results of this study contradict their arguments, which will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 5). The authors collected data from Compustat for the period of 1976-
2001 excluding financial and utility firms. The authors suggest that special items (depreciation, 
interest expenses), and income tax have a role in the discontinuity of the net income distribution, 
and also confirm that their results do not mean that companies do not manage earnings to avoid 
losses. The authors present distributional evidence of pre-tax income as net income shows a 
visible difference between net income and pre-tax income distribution, where the pre-tax income 
distribution discontinuity is lower than the net income distribution. These results confirm the 
authors’ argument that taxation has a direct influence on the discontinuity of net income 
distributions. The authors also show that apart from net income and pre-tax profit, special items 
also display a visible difference in distribution when included in the earnings. The authors 
confirm that their results are similar to the Durtschi and Easton (2005) results, but Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.555) also point out that ‘… results suggest that income taxes and 
special items do not cause ﬁrms to move from a small loss position to a small proﬁt position, 
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discretion in these items could enable some ﬁrms to avoid losses.’. Further on in this section, this 
study presents alternative evidence in favour of Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) which proves that 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007) results do not hold. 
In a further study from Durtschi and Easton (2009) on Earnings Management (EM), the authors 
argue that shapes of earnings distributions, or discontinuity, do not necessarily provide an 
evidence of EM. The authors investigated earlier studies by Hayn (1995), Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) on earnings 
distribution and they point out that sample selection had a critical effect on the distribution. 
Durtschi and Easton (2009) argue that earlier studies had removed more ‘small loss observations 
than observations of small profits’; thus, wrong sample selection and the application of scaling 
and averaging led to presenting false results as earnings management. Durtschi and Easton (2009, 
p.1280) conclude, ‘…the observed shapes of earnings distributions around zero are not ipso facto 
evidence of earnings management; rather, additional evidence beyond the shape of the 
distribution must be brought to bear.’. Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) study rejects Durtschi and 
Easton’s (2009) evidence, which will be presented below in this section. 
A different investigation on ‘earnings quality’ was reviewed by Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010). 
The authors present a summary of ‘earnings quality proxies’, a summary of ‘commonly used’ 
empirical proxies with (regression) models linked to theories, which additionally highlight their 
strengths and weaknesses. Empirical proxies were shown as ‘persistence of earnings; magnitude 
and residuals from accruals; smoothness of earnings relative to cash flow; timely loss 
recognition of earnings; benchmarks; investor’s responsiveness and external indicators’ - 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010, pp.351-352). The authors further review papers of ‘Cross-
country studies’ in relation to earnings quality proxies, as well as ‘the determinants and the 
consequences of earnings quality’. The authors outline the importance of reversal accruals which 
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past papers simply disregarded and failed to include as an important accounting rule in their 
models, and thus, made potential testing errors. A further interest in this paper reveals that the 
authors suggest five areas for further research, namely ‘multiple incentives on accounting 
choices; complementary accounting choices; earnings-related accounting choices; classical 
methods for construct validation; impact on earnings quality by determinant and consequence of 
quality’ – Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010, pp.390-391). The authors make an attempt at 
producing a broad investigation; however, their paper puts forward only a useful summary and a 
basic guide for research students and practitioners alike. 
 
Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012) remind the reader that accruals, according to accounting rules and 
when booked in a period, are reversed to the next. The authors argue that earlier studies on testing 
models (Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny, 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 
2002; and others) for the detection of different types of accruals (i.e. working capital accruals) in 
order to find possible manipulation in achieving earnings management, were not effective due to 
the omission of reversed accruals. The authors suggested a new approach in which tests also 
included reversed accruals, thus improving testing power. One problem with the accrual reversal 
technique is that different types of accruals are reversed in different periods. Therefore, when not 
all the accruals are reversed in a period but only a certain number, testing power does not 
improve. Another difficulty with this method is finding data that show accrual reversals. The 
authors touch on one of the most important areas of the accrual testing; whereas, most researchers 
fail to recognise or simply ignore facts about the reversals of the accruals. One of the basics of 
accounting is that an accrual must be reversed in ‘a’, or ‘the next’ period. Papers which did not 
account for reversals had biased test results.  
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In reply to the Durtschi and Easton (2005; 2009) papers, Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) test the 
evidence of Durtschi and Easton (2005; 2009), who claimed that sampling selection and research 
design remove discontinuity in earnings distribution and thus lead to a wrong interpretation of the 
results concerning earnings management. The authors furthermore point out that Durtschi and 
Easton’s (2005; 2009) study does not take into account the size effect of a variable; it only takes 
into account the small companies’ data. With the addition of ‘scaling, selection and price 
earnings relations’, it does not serve as a valid choice in explaining discontinuities. Jacob and 
Jorgensen (2007) present evidence of discontinuity in earnings distribution and contradict 
Durtschi and Easton’s (2005) claim of no evidence of discontinuity. Burgstahler and Chuck 
(2015) also investigate Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007) who state that discontinuities arise 
due to the effect of income taxes and special items. Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) present 
evidence that Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007) arguments for discontinuity arise due to 
the effect of income taxes and special items,  ‘…where there are higher tax rates above versus 
below the benchmark and is therefore limited to discontinuities in earnings levels at the zero 
benchmark.’ – Burgstahler and Chuck (2015, p.21). The authors point out that there is ‘no such 
evidence’. Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) show by excluding special items from the ‘earnings 
component’ - that it is not an evidence of discontinuity in earnings distribution. Burgstahler and 
Chuck (2015) present evidence of discontinuity in earnings before and after special items and 
evidence of visible discontinuity in earnings after special items, but no evidence of discontinuity 
before special items. This suggests that special items including income taxes do not give 
alternative evidence of discontinuity in earnings distribution as Beaver, McNichols and Nelson 
(2007) argue. Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007) argument for income taxes are applicable 
only to higher tax rates. Burgstahler and Chuck (2015, p.21) point out that, ‘…differences in tax 
rates cannot explain any of these discontinuities…’. Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) also examined 
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regulated companies, banks and insurance companies and presented evidence of discontinuity at 
zero point. Burgstahler and Chuck (2015, p.2) summarise five ‘key characteristics of 
discontinuity consistent with the theory of Earnings Management’: 1. ‘Pervasiveness’, where the 
discontinuity is present in ‘earnings measures, such as earnings, changes in earnings and earnings 
surprise’. 2. ‘Evidence of a trough below the benchmark and a peak above the benchmark’, where 
discontinuities are present below and a peak above the benchmark. 3. ‘Covariation with earnings 
management incentives’, where discontinuities occur due to managers’ interference in earnings to 
‘meet benchmarks’. Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) point to the work of Li (2014), who outlined a 
theory stating that discontinuity is positively autocorrelated to cross-sectional earnings 
distribution and presents evidence of discontinuity in earnings due to earnings decreasing and 
rising manipulation. 4. ‘Existence in earnings measures that are widely used in stakeholder 
decisions’, where discontinuities are present, namely, earnings such as net income, earnings per 
share or earnings before extraordinary items. 5. ‘Non-existence in earnings measures that are not 
widely used in stakeholder decisions’, where discontinuities are not present in earnings measures 
and that are not widely used in stakeholder decisions. Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) argue that 
earnings management characteristic 4 and 5 are ‘inconsistent with explanation’ as to why 
earnings measures are widely used in stakeholder decisions; in other words, they are difficult to 
show or to explain. Burgstahler and Chuck’s (2015) paper summarises evidence of EM in favour 
of discontinuities. The author of this study believes that the Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) paper 
is one of the most complete and up-to date studies that highlights evidence in favour of the 
presence of discontinuities in earnings distribution.  
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2.3.4.2. Detection of Earnings Management - Tested with a financials companies’ data 
 
This section summarises relevant papers on earnings management and its detection using 
financials’ data for testing. Earnings management so as to avoid earnings declines across publicly 
and privately traded banks were investigated by Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002). The authors 
hypothesized that public banks manage earnings whereas private banks do not. They investigate a 
period from 1988 to 1998, on the basis of data obtained from the Federal Reserve System, the 
Chicago Federal Reserve Bank and from Sheshenoff database. The test sample comprised 707 
public banks and 1160 private banks, a total of 1867 banks. The assets of public banks are larger 
than those of private banks. The authors tested the smoothness of distribution of change in return 
on asset (∆ROA) for privately and publicly traded banks. Separate charts of histograms for 
privately and publicly traded banks are shown on page 560, where histograms have a shift above 
zero. There is a visible jump at zero points for the publicly traded banks suggesting a more 
dramatic change for the publicly traded banks in the test of ‘small earnings change’. Apart from 
histogram investigation, the authors ran t-statistics to confirm or to reject earnings management.  
The authors concluded that there is evidence to support the hypothesis according to which public 
banks manage earnings to avoid earning declines. They show that public banks report fewer small 
declines in earnings than private banks. Also, it is shown that earning increases for public banks 
are bigger and for a period more sequential than for private banks. Furthermore, the authors find 
that public banks in order to avoid reporting small declines in earnings use their loan loss 
provisions more (non-cash expense that banks set aside to cover future losses on bad loans) than 
privately traded banks. Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) conclude that fever earnings declines for 
publicly traded banks are not a result of an economic condition but of earnings management. The 
authors have the same results as the strategies of public banks shareholders, who are using known 
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techniques and available information on ‘earnings-based’ growth, which is the base for earnings 
management. As the authors test banks data, their results should not be compared to non-
financials. 
 
2.3.4.3. Research methodologies in Earnings Management 
 
McNichols (2000) presents in her paper three research designs that have been applied by the 
researcher to investigate earnings management (EM) in diverse industries. The author 
summarises that three of these designs are ‘total accruals, specific accruals and distributions 
approach’ to investigate EM. Investigations under total accruals were mainly discretionary 
accruals and their relation to total accruals (by Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991; 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; and others); specific accruals investigation were 
concentrating on specific or single accruals (by Petroni, 1992; Beneish, 1999; Beaver and 
McNichols, 1998; and others); and distribution of earnings where earnings were investigated at a 
benchmark, i.e. zero point (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 
1999; and others). Most of the researchers at the time were concentrating on total accruals. 
McNichols (2000) also focuses on the analysis of the accrual question and excludes the 
distribution approach. The author concludes that accrual based tests, ‘… Jones and modified 
Jones model approach are not sufficiently powerful or reliable to assess earnings management 
behaviour in many contexts…’ - McNichols (2000, p.337).  
Since the McNichols (2000) paper, there was additional publishing on methodologies to 
investigate earnings management in diverse industries. These industries were split between 
financials and non-financial companies, and some papers investigating all industries data as well 
per country level. See for example Shen and Chih (2005); Suda and Shuto (2005); Yu, Du and 
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Sun (2006); Charoenwong and  Jiraporn (2008); Durtschi and Easton (2005; 2009); Sun and Rath 
(2009); Cornet, McNutt and Tehranian (2009); Amar and Abaoub (2010); Jiang, Petroni and 
Wang (2010); Tokuga and Tanaka (2011); Abed, Al-Attar and Suwaidan (2012); Hamdi and 
Zarai (2012); Burgstahler and Chuck (2015); and other studies that are relevant to this study and 
are summarised in this literature review, by groups, by financials and non-financials, and later on 
per country level. 
 
2.3.5. Limiting / Stopping Earnings Management – Increased Transparency, Role of 
Auditors 
 
Transparency is of importance when reporting financial statements, as it reduces earnings 
management (EM). To meet analysts’ forecasts company managers may decide to increases / 
decrease income, thus in this way they would manage earnings. This approach by company 
managers is also called an aggressive accounting and leads to poor transparent reporting that 
contributes to greater EM. Increased transparent reporting reduces, but it does not remove EM, 
and by poor transparent reporting earnings management (EM) increases (Hunton, Libby and 
Mazza, 2006).   
In order to make sure the company’s financial statements were prepared according to Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), auditors who are independent certified public 
accountants produce financial statements that are accurate, truthful, and complete. Auditors 
assess earnings manipulation, as well as corporate governance risks. Apart from auditors, the 
company’s management may appoint external board members as part of audit committees, whose 
role is to control the quality of financial statements. Their assessment of financial statements is 
crucial. Reliance on auditors has received criticism as Larcker and Richardson (2004, p.626) 
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write: ‘Critics contend that extensive fees paid to auditors, especially fees for non-audit services, 
increase the financial reliance of the auditor on the client. As a result, independence may be 
compromised because the auditor becomes reluctant to raise issues with the preparation of the 
financial statements at the risk of foregoing lucrative fees’. 
If auditors asses that they cannot rely on audit committees’ and on board members’ work, they 
could charge higher billing rates or refuse the appointment. In the previous literature, it was 
shown that companies who decided not to have internal controls such as audit committees had 
more cases of fraudulent financial statements. It was also shown that fewer board members 
allowed the possibility of manipulation or fraud (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996).  
Healy and Palepu (2001) write that auditors do not give any newly qualified information to 
shareholders about the companies’ annual reports, but ‘confirm’ the information. The authors 
suggest three reasons for explaining the ‘value of auditor opinions to investors’, a) close auditor-
manager relationship, b) auditor giving ‘formal assurances only on the annual report’, and c) 
auditors concern in reducing their own legal liability. In practise, the authors’ explanation of 
auditors’ opinion to investors has a very strong base, as the author of this study experienced 
exactly the same in his corporate financial and accounting experience. 
The ‘Big 8’, or ‘Big 5’, referred to by auditors as the number of big accountancy firms have been 
gradually shrinking over the decades. The ‘Big 5’ accountancy firms comprised 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst and Young (E&Y), Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
(KPMG), Deloitte and Arthur Andersen. Since the Enron scandal, Arthur Anderson stopped its 
accounting operation in 2002, and since 2002, the ‘Big 4’ accounting firms left are PWC, 
Deloitte, E&Y and KPMG.  
Krishnan (2003, pp.2-5) also lists ‘Big 6’ accounting firms and investigates the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals between specialised and non-specialised auditors (discretionary accruals 
Chapter 2  
56 
 
are non-obligatory expenses i.e. ‘anticipated bonuses’). The author did not put the ‘Big 6’ (at the 
time there were 6 of them) audit firms to one block to compare them to non-specialised auditors, 
but the comparison was done with the specialised ones as well. The author collected company 
data together with their auditors as per market industry from Compustat for a ten year period, i.e. 
1989-1999. The author’s tests results confirm that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
lower for clients with specialised auditors compared to non-specialised ones. In other words, 
highly specialised auditors eliminate accruals-based earnings management better, compared to 
non-specialised auditors, who manage to eliminate less. This is in line with the corporate working 
experience of the author of this study. 
A slightly different angle of earnings management (EM) investigation was done by Nelson, 
Elliott and Tarpley (2003) who searched for EM from an auditor’s perspective. The authors 
collected samples from a questionnaire sent to partners of the 5 Big Auditors firms. The 
questioner was directed to the partner and to two managers chosen by the partner. The base of the 
questioner was if the company’s financial statements were ‘treated as the company originally 
desired’ or not; that is, if there was a need for adjustment of the statements or not, and thus 
presence of EM. Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley (2003, p.22) show a summary of ‘Earnings-
Management Approaches’, percentages in increases / decreases / no effect on ‘expenses and 
losses, revenue and other gains, business combinations and other approaches to achieving EM 
and adjusted by auditors. The authors find that the most common approach to achieve EM was 
‘recognising too much or too little reserves, assets impairment in the current year; capitalising 
and deferring too much or too little, or modifying depreciation or amortisation methods’. The 
mentioned approaches have a current year income effect that has an influence on the future year 
periods income, thus a clear evidence of earnings management. This paper is of interest as tests 
sample of the survey data, which is the main limitation due to the accuracy of the questioners’ 
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answers, i.e. how honest, accurate were the questioners’ answers. Therefore, power and / or 
accuracy of the results is not the same as in case of the quantitative tests results. 
Bedard and Johnstone (2004) investigated auditor’s assessment of earnings manipulation risk and 
corporate governance risks. The authors hypothesize a positive relationship between earnings 
manipulation risk and planned audit hours and billing rates. They used more than 1000 clients to 
test hypotheses. For testing models, they used audit hours, planned billing rates variables and also 
added industrial variables for earnings manipulation risk and for corporate governance risk. They 
found evidence of positive connection between earnings manipulation risks with planned audit 
hours and increased billing rates. Billing rates and planned billing hours increase when auditors 
come to the conclusion that neither from the board nor from the audit committee would they 
receive any support. Furthermore, they do not find a significant relation between auditors billing 
rates and corporate governance risk. The reason for this could be that it is extremely difficult for 
auditors to evaluate in advance which firm is riskier therefore which needs more planned audit 
hours and higher billing rates. Despite the fact that auditors have tools for tracking and finding 
EM, in the case of small level EM, auditors might fail to find such manipulations. Auditors are 
distinguished between specialised (the so called ‘Big 6’, at the time of the paper was published) 
and non-specialised auditors. Specialised have large numbers of clients, take considerable time 
and funds to train their staff as well as invest in perfecting audit techniques. The ‘Big 6’ auditors 
also specialise for a variety of industries; therefore, when auditing for the sake of an argument, 
manufacturing, IT, banking, etc., they compare their results to industry-specific risks and errors. 
All these techniques help specialised audit firms to be more credible in comparison with non-
specialised ones. But, as all companies, audit companies as well will protect their brand names by 
rigorous investigation and reporting any aggressive accounting or questionable transactions. 
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Arthur Andersen audit firm serves as a reminder that profit generating is also the number one 
goal even for Big audit companies. 
A different investigating approach regarding earnings management versus audit quality was done 
by Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008). They investigated the European Union market and not, as 
previous papers, the US ones. The authors investigated if audit quality contributes towards the 
quality of financial reporting. At the time of the paper, and in earlier research papers, it was 
mentioned that there existed ‘Big 6’ audit companies, a number which was reduced to 4 audit 
firms, which are called the ‘Big 4’ auditors. The authors hypothesize that private firms audited by 
the ‘Big 4’ will not get involved in earnings management, compared to ones which are not clients 
of the ‘Big 4’ audit firms, on condition that private firms are based in a country with high taxes 
and a high level of control of financial statements by the tax authorities. The sample for a period 
of 1998-2002 was collected from six EU countries, from Amadeus European database, excluding 
financial companies. The authors select countries with similar financial and tax rules, splitting the 
six countries samples into two for testing purposes, one group with high tax rules and a second 
one with moderate tax rules. Results from tests statistics confirm that companies who appoint the 
‘Big 4’ audit firms have less involvement in earnings management than client firms of the non-
‘Big 4’ auditors. The authors also conclude low involvements in earnings management (EM) in 
countries with higher taxes and higher control of financial statements by the tax authorities. If 
one out of the four firms from the ‘Big 4’ audit companies make a poor control and fail to make 
detection, they will lose credibility and reputation. So it is in the interest of the ‘Big 4’ to be more 
rigorous and to give higher audit quality in the environment within the countries with high tax 
rules and higher control of financial statements by tax authorities. The authors’ study makes a 
solid contribution; however, the author of this study feels that the length of the tested data is far 
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too short. Instead of four years, the authors should have tested at least eight or more years. Tests 
results would have been far more rigorous and / or different from the authors’ published ones. 
A similar research to Bedard and Johnstone’s (2004), who investigated auditors in the banking 
industry, was done by Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo (2010). Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo 
(2010) investigate the auditor firm’s reputation within the banking sector and its reputation 
pertaining earnings management. The authors tested banks from 29 countries, for the period 
1996-2006. Their study concentrates on auditors from among the ‘Big 5’ and the non-‘Big 5’ 
ones and the auditor’s ability to reduce ‘income-increasing’ EM in the banks’ financial dealings. 
The authors predict that the ‘Big 5’ auditors specialised for the banking industry will lower EM 
of loan loss provision (specific for banking industry) for banks. The authors conclude, in separate 
tests of various auditor types and their expertise, that both the ‘Big 5’ and the non-‘Big 5’ 
auditors’ manage to restrict the banks’ activities towards ‘loss-avoidance’ and ‘just-meeting-or-
beating prior year’s earnings’. Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo (2010) also find that in the same test 
of various auditor types and expertise, the ‘Big 5’ auditors with industry knowledge, e.g. banking 
industry, show higher restriction in achieving ‘benchmark of loss-avoidance’ and ‘just-meeting-
or-beating prior year’s earnings’. The authors conclude that their results confirm that auditors 
have a big role in restricting banks to manage earnings. The authors’ findings are in line with 
contemporary corporate practice, as most banks hire the ‘Big 5’, now the ‘Big 4’, i.e. auditors 
who have the ‘know-how’ to audit their financial statements. 
 
2.4.  Adoption of IFRS and Earnings Management 
 
In this section, this study summarises relevant papers to earnings management (EM) and 
companies that adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as their 
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accounting standard. The IFRS is an accounting standards that was created by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) investigated EM of 
companies who apply the German GAAP versus those who apply the IFRS. A brief referral to 
IFRS is shown in their paper. The authors used to sample data between 1999-2001, excluding 
financials and utility firms. With the sample data, the authors tested discretionary accruals using 
the Jones Model (Jones, 1991). They drew three hypotheses: companies applying IFRS will not 
manage earnings comparing to companies that apply the German GAAP; they also state that the 
Big 4 auditors reduced EM more than the non-‘Big 4’ audit companies; and firms with IFRS 
reporting that are trading on the stock exchanges, engage less in EM. The authors show evidence 
from test statistics that firms which apply IFRS do manage earnings with discretionary accruals 
and ‘earnings smoothing’. The authors also pointed out that firms ‘earnings smoothing’ is lower 
when audited by the ‘Big 4’ auditors. Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005, p.177) also point out that, 
‘… in general, adopters of IFRS cannot be associated with lower earnings management.  ... the 
high-tech and innovative segment of the Deutsche Börse, which was closed after the surfacing of 
several corporate scandals and an overall slump in hightech stocks, provides an interesting 
example.’ One key drawback of Tendeloo and Vanstraelen’s (2005) paper is that the authors do 
not take into consideration reversal accruals, as for example Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012, 
pp.331-333) point out. 
As Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) investigate one country effect of IFRS on EM, Callao and 
Jarne (2010) investigate the effect of IFRS on Earnings Management in the European Union. 
Callao and Jarne (2010) were specifically interested in the European countries accounting 
practices, the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European accounting models and tested 
discretionary accruals before and after the adoption of the IFRS. The authors accept the fact that 
by implementing IFRS, the new standards improved financial reporting in a number of countries 
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as the new standards regulate accounting in areas that was not the case earlier. IFRS has also 
made financial reporting more detailed and consequently that should have led to the reduction of 
‘information asymmetry’ between stakeholders and management. The authors pointed out that 
the IFRS standard is more flexible than some European Union member states’ accounting 
standards. Their first hypothesis is that IFRS increases EM which has a negative effect on 
reporting quality and the second hypothesis is that ‘firms’ features and country factors have an 
effect on accounting discretion’. The authors used a sample of eleven European Union (EU) 
member countries stock market data, excluding financials. The tested countries were the so called 
‘old EU member states’. Data was used from the Amadeus database, excluding financials, and 
was split into ‘before’ and ‘after’ the IFRS implementation, that is 2003-2004 and 2005-2006 
respectively. To test discretionary accruals, the authors used samples from 1999-2002. The 
authors use the Larker and Richardson (2004) model which is a modified version of the Jones 
(1991) and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) model. The authors also analyzed Return on 
Asset (ROA) histograms at zero points. Test results show that not all sampled countries had a 
significant increase in discretionary accruals after the adoption of IFRS. In some countries, only 
the long-term discretionary accruals had a significant increase and in some countries, current and 
total discretionary accruals showed an increase. For the sampled data, most of the histograms for 
the ROA variable shows a clear switch above the zero point that explains the management of 
earnings to avoid losses. The authors conclude that the results confirm the first hypothesis that by 
the adoption of IFRS, discretionary accruals have increased thus confirming Earnings 
Management. The results show no evidence of earnings management (EM) for the second 
hypothesis, i.e. no difference between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ the adoption of the standards. The 
results would have been more powerful if the sample size was bigger. Two years of sample 
testing for EM before and after implementation of IFRS is far too low. The authors should have 
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waited for at least a few years, or to redo their paper with a min 8-10 years sample. Additionally, 
as a limitation, reversal of accruals should have been highlighted in their study. 
Jarva and Lantto (2011) investigated the quality of financial statements between International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Finish Accounting Standards, or FAS. The authors 
tested companies with pre (1999-2003) and post (2005-2009) adoption of IFRS, but excluding 
companies with voluntary adopters of IFRS, and also excluding financials. The authors estimated 
‘earnings-returns models’ under IFRS and Finish Accounting Standards data was from Thomson 
Reuters. The authors found that by the adoption of IFRS, there is no significant evidence of an 
increase in reporting quality as it was under local GAAP, nor they believe that IFRS is ‘superior 
to local GAAP’. However, the authors’ test results migth be biased due to the limited and low 
power of the testing model in question.  
Rudra and Bhattacharjee (2012) investigated if the implementation of IFRS reduces EM in an 
emerging country such as India. The authors used 2010 fiscal year for testing 100 firms that 
included all industries, including financials. The authors tested discretionary accruals using the 
modified Jones Model (1991) by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). The result shows that 
adopting IFRS does not reduce earnings management (EM). Rudra and Bhattacharjee (2012) are 
in line with Tendenloo and Vanstraelen (2005), excluding the ‘Big 4’ auditors’ evidence. 
Another paper on the EM and IFRS adoption in the European Union (EU) was by Capkun, 
Collins and Jeanjean (2013), who tested EM in the EU countries who adopted IAS/IFRS. The 
authors used samples from twenty nine European countries from 1994-2009. A sample of 3,853 
firms was split between early adoption (from 1994 to 2004), late (until 2005 / 2006) and 
mandatory adoption (in 2005) of IFRS. Company observation comprised 20,278 companies for 
the sample. The authors also split the sample into subgroups by dividing them into domestic 
GAAP and IFRS for early, late and mandatory adoption, tested with ‘pooled estimation models’, 
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as applied by Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008). Dependent variables were ‘change in net 
income, change in cash flow and IFRS (0,1) where 1 is for post adoption and 0 for pre-adoption 
of IFRS’. Tested explanatory variables were size, growth, % change common equity, liabilities, 
leverage, turnover, cash flow, auditors and stock exchanges. The authors hypothesize that by the 
adoption of IFRS in 2005 EM (smoothing) is higher after this date, for late and mandatory 
adopters. The authors conclude that test results show evidence of lower earnings management 
(EM) in countries with early adopters of IFRS prior to 2005 year. The results show an increase in 
EM in countries for ‘pre-2005 to post 2005 for early voluntary and late adopters of IFRS’, as well 
as increase in EM in countries for mandatory adopters of IFRS. The authors also conclude that 
possible explanations for such a trend of EM, namely, for smoothing in countries which adopted 
IFRS is that IFRS gives ‘greater flexibility in accounting treatment’ than the local GAAP. Their 
findings are in line with Rudra and Bhattacharjee (2012) and Callao and Jarne (2010). 
Wang and Campbell (2012) analysed EM before and after the adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in China. The sample data was from 1998 to 2009, all Chinese listed 
companies, including all industries, a total of 1329 companies per year, which amounts to 11947 
companies for the sample period. To test earnings management (EM) before and after the 
adoption of IFRS, the sample was split into two, one from 1998 to 2006 to investigate EM under 
Chinese GAAP and one for 2007-2009 to test EM under IFRS. The authors calculated accruals, 
cash flow from operations to find out if insiders applied techniques to smooth earnings and 
expenses. They also measured the correlation between two variables (accruals and cash flow 
from operations) applying the ‘Spearman correlation coefficient’. Test results show weak 
evidence of EM prior and after the adoption of IFRS. Results for ‘Spearman coefficient’ shows a 
small difference between IFRS and Chinese GAAP, where the coefficient under Chinese GAAP 
is a bit smaller thus a slightly higher smoothing to achieve earnings management. The authors 
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concluded that the test results do not show significant evidence that IFRS reduces or increases 
earnings management. As the authors findings do not provide significant evidence whether IFRS 
eliminates EM or not, additonal studies should be of interest to investigate the same comparison 
but perhaps with different testing, i.e distributional approach. 
 
2.5. Earnings Management studies investigating Non-Financials companies in countries 
around  the world 
 
Earnings management (EM) was investigated not only on a company level but was also looked 
into at a country level and also at a multiple-country level. Researchers investigated and 
compared statistics from one country with statistics from another and investigated the country 
itself. In this section, this study summarises and comments relevant EM papers.  
A multiple-country EM investigation was done by Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), who 
searched for EM from different continents, cultures and legal systems. The authors point out that 
company managers engage in EM to hide the company’s true performance, so the external users 
of financial statements and stakeholders could not find managers’ reasons nor their benefits from 
managing earnings. The authors split the sample into areas of strong / weak legal systems, strong 
investors’ rights, large stock markets, weak investors’ rights but strong legal systems. The sample 
consisted of thirty one countries for the period of 1990-1999. Test statistics showed that countries 
where outside investors’ legal rights are strong, have big stock markets with diverse shareholders 
owners and a strong legal system, these countries have low earnings management. The authors 
conclude that a certain country’s legal and institutional set-up has a strong influence on the 
quality of reported earnings. One limitation of the study is that the authors did not, or could not 
separate elements of the ‘institutional factors’. 
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Similarly to Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) study, Enomoto, Kimura and Yamaguchi (2013), 
investigate real earnings management (EM) against accrual based EM of non-financial companies 
of thirty eight countries, for the period 1991-2010. The accrual based EM is based on managing 
accruals during the financial year upon the manager’s discretion. By managing accruals, they can 
be discovered easier by auditors or financial authorities. Real EM is, on the other hand, more 
difficult to track, as real EM is a process where managers make business decisions that affect the 
company’s ‘future’ cash flow, i.e. cut R&D, marketing, etc. expenses. The authors hypothesised 
that accrual EM is ‘more constrained in countries with stronger investor protection’ and real EM 
is ‘more often implemented in countries with stronger investor protection’ - Enomoto, Kimura 
and Yamaguchi (2013, p.5). The authors applied the Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) models in 
testing accrual and real EM. Test statistics show a result that confirms the hypotheses, that is, 
lower accrual based EM and higher real EM due to strong investor protection. The authors also 
conclude that real EM is lower in countries where more analysts investigate company’s dealings. 
As the authors test evidence of EM based on accrual and real EM, they point out the reversal of 
accruals in future periods. However, they do not refer to possible biased test results and low 
testing power, due to the timing of the reversal accruals. 
 
2.5.1. Cases of Japan 
 
The Japanese accounting system is an investor-oriented accounting system; see for example 
Walton, Haller and Raffournier (2003) or Cooke and Sawa (1998) for further explanation and 
information. 
Darrough, Pourjalali and Saudagaran (1998) investigated earnings management (EM) in Japanese 
companies. As Japanese companies prefer debt over equity as a source of capital, the authors 
Chapter 2  
66 
 
hypothesize that a high debt to equity ratio will motivate managers to engage in ‘income-
increasing accruals’. The authors used a sample from the Nikkei Databank Bureau for the period 
from 1989 to 1992. The authors used a modified version of Pourjalali and Hansen (1996) model 
to test the sample. The model measures manipulation of discretionary accruals and consists of 
testing revenue, fixed and variable expenses. In 1990, the Japanese stock market crashed. Taking 
into account this fact, the authors tested the sample ‘before’ and ‘after’ the stock market crash. 
The explanatory variables tested were debt-to-equity, total assets, bonus, internal/external 
financing, ownership and stock market crash effect. The results show that the Debt-to-equity 
hypothesis is rejected, whereas for the total assets and for the number of employees results show 
significant evidence in favor of the hypotheses. The results also confirm income-increasing 
accruals for external financing and for the ownership of trust companies, but not for the 
ownership of financial companies. Evidence also confirms EM due to the market crash. But their 
study is limited by the length of the data tested, therefore, test results might not be as powerful as 
if they used a longer year sample.  
A slightly different area of EM investigation of Japanese companies was conducted by Suda and 
Shuto (2005), who looked at the EM of Japanese companies, listed on several stock exchanges in 
Japan. The authors were interested to see if EM was present and how the company’s earnings 
were managed. They used data from 1990 to 2000 from Japanese stock exchanges, excluding 
financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies and security firms. The authors tested 
two hypotheses, ‘Japanese firm managers manage reported earnings to avoid decreases in 
earnings and losses’, and, ‘Managers are using accounting accruals as a method of earnings 
management’. The authors used the applied discretionary accruals model, variables from the 
financial statements such as accounting receivables, sales revenue, fixed assets (property, plant 
and equipment) and other. From their tested sample, the OLS estimation provides proof (cash 
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flow is negative, the mean, median, R
2
 and other) of Earnings Management. Apart from OLS 
estimation, the authors present graphical evidence (2005, pp.30-31) of earnings changes and thus 
confirming EM. The authors also point to the fact that managers in order to avoid losses manage 
and control accounting accruals. Suda and Shuto (2005) also point out that cost is linked to EM, 
that is, companies that are able to manage earnings cheaper, will act to manage earnings to ‘move 
from negative pre-managed earnings to positive post-managed earnings’. Apart from finding 
evidence for EM, they were also looking for reasons for EM. They found three reasons for EM: 
firstly, compensations in Japan are based on the earnings based contract; therefore, the higher the 
company’s earnings, the higher the manager’s compensation. This motivates managers to manage 
earnings; secondly, the governance system of Japanese companies is a bank-oriented system, that 
is, banks play the monitoring role. This occurs when a company has a bank loan. When a 
company has poor / negative financial figures, the bank can intervene to assume full control of 
that firm and manage it. It this case, the manager who was the earlier leader of the company 
becomes subordinate to the bank, which took over control. In order to avoid such a state, the 
manager’s interest is to manage earnings; and thirdly, Earnings Management due to Tax. There is 
evidence that Japanese company managers tend to manage earnings in order to reduce profits, so 
that tax expenses would also be lower. However, one limitation of this paper is again the reversal 
accrual question, that was referred to earlier in this thesis, see for example Dechow, Hutton, et al. 
(2012).  
A Japanese executive’s compensation and earnings management were investigated by Shuto 
(2007). The author applied discretionary accruals for testing EM data obtained from Nikkei-
Zaumi for Japanese companies for the period 1991-2000. Financials and utility firms were 
excluded. The authors applied the Kasznik (1999) model with the inclusion of ‘change of cash 
flow from operations’ as an independent variable. Other independent variables used for testing 
Chapter 2  
68 
 
are total accruals, nondiscretionary accruals, discretionary accruals, net income and extraordinary 
items. Dependent variables are Salary, Bonus, and Compensation. To avoid testing company data 
multiple times, the author further tests data by applying the Fama and Macbeth (1973) model. 
Both models yielded the same results. Shuto (2007, p.24) concludes from the test results that 
‘discretionary accruals increase executive compensation’. The author further states that 
managers apply the big bath technique as well as use extraordinary items to smooth income. The 
author admits to a limitation of his study due to the ‘Keiretsu’ effect (‘Keiretsu’ refers to a type 
of corporate structure, where organisations link together, which is specific for Japanese culture), 
as it could have an effect on Salary, Bonus, and Compensation variables results. See for example 
Miyashita and Russell (1994) on ‘Keiretsu’. 
The relationship between real earnings management and accounting earnings management was 
investigated by Matsuura (2008). The author investigated the ‘relation between real and 
accounting earnings management to smooth income’ and argues that accounting earnings 
management is a result of accounting entries under GAAP; whereas, real earnings management 
comes from ‘real production and investment decisions’. The author points out, that GAAP rules 
give managers the option to manage earnings to ‘achieve their goal’, but within the rules of the 
GAAP. This approach is not a violation of rule and law. But in the case when managers cross the 
boundaries of GAAP rules, i.e. smooth income to achieve their goals, then, it certainly violates 
GAAP principles. Data was tested from 2003-2007, with companies listed on the Tokyo stock 
exchange. Dependent variables are cash flow from operation and total accruals, and the 
independent variable is ‘unexpected’ net income, a difference between current and last net 
income. The author presents test statistics, where real earnings management appears ‘before’ 
accounting earnings management. This means that company managers first make a decision they 
would smooth income to manage earnings, which upon their action reflects on the accounting 
Chapter 2  
69 
 
numbers. One limitations of the paper is that the author tests only five years data with a 
regression model, despite the fact that regression analysis needs a longer period. Secondly, the 
author does not refer to reversal accruals; despite the fact that one of the variables tested were 
total accruals. 
 
2.5.2. Case of the EU and European Economic Community countries   
 
Coppens and Peek (2005) were investigating earnings management (EM) of private firms in the 
European Union (EU), one of the first European Economic Community members. The authors 
looked if EM is present in the private and public firms, and if it is, does the Tax effect give cause 
for the presence of EM? For the test statistics, the authors used the t-distribution and the applied 
estimation model of Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999). A sample of audited data was 
selected for eight EU countries for 1993-1999 periods, from the Amadeus database. The sample 
excluded financial companies and institutions in Public Administration data. The authors used a 
consolidated financial statement, to analyse companies’ performance, their net profits and 
changes in net profits. The authors investigated two hypotheses: ‘Private firms do not manage 
earnings to avoid reporting losses’ and ‘Private firms do not manage earnings to avoid reporting 
earnings decreases’. The test results show that private companies manage their earnings to avoid 
losses, therefore, the authors reject the first hypothesis, but they cannot reject the second 
hypothesis. The authors do not provide a clear explanation for such a rejection, only a possible 
explanation of cash flow in relation to the firm’s performance and its change in performance and 
level of performance. They also make a conclusion from the test results (average return on 
assets), that in countries where tax and financial rules follow each other, the profits are lower 
compared to countries where tax and financial rules do not follow each other, and subsequently 
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profits are higher. Interestingly enough, results vary between the eight countries tested when 
looking at the ‘tax based explanation’, as in some countries results show loss avoidance, e.g. in 
Belgium and in Italy private companies have a low-profit preference and these private firms 
engage in earnings smoothing more than the public firms. The authors acknowledge the 
limitations of their research, which is due to the sample data. Also, owing to the small sample in 
case of the few countries that were tested, the authors could not test the ‘level of information 
asymmetry’, nor could they confirm that rejecting the second hypothesis is due to the small 
sample or perhaps an indicator of genuine ‘absence of earnings management’. The authors use a 
six year period of accumulated data, which seems to be a bit low. 
 
2.5.3. The Case of Malaysia 
 
The Malaysian accounting system is an investor-oriented accounting system, influenced by the 
United Kingdom and British Commonwealth countries. See Doupnik and Salter (1993) for  
further information, and / or Jurisdiction Profile on ifrs.org. 
Aman, Iskandar, et al. (2006) investigated EM for companies that listed on the stock exchanges 
in Malaysia. The authors were particularly interested in ‘reasons’ for resorting to EM, especially 
before and after the economic crisis that occurred in Malaysia in 1997. The sample tested was 
from 1995 to 1999. The sample was taken from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The authors 
used the Pourjalali and Hansen (1996) model for testing discretionary accounting accruals, and 
independent variables were debt-to-equity, total assets, tax rate, internal/external financing and 
ownership structure. From the tested variables the authors found that managers use accruals to 
smooth income upwards to gather investors. They also found that only two factors, namely size 
and ownership, show significant evidence of EM before and after the market crash. The authors 
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conclude that during the year of the market crash in 1998, they found no evidence of EM. 
Evidence on EM migth have been different if the tested sample was bigger. Furthermore, as the 
authors test total assets, they fail to refer to the possible timing of the reversal accruals. 
 
2.5.4. Cases of China 
 
In 2006, China introduced a new accounting system based on IFRS. Despite claiming that their 
accounting system is investor oriented, and bearing in mind that China is a country with a 
communist past, it is still being closely monitored as a strong tax based society. See for example 
China’s Jurisdiction Profile on ifrs.org. 
Yu, Du and Sun (2006), investigated earnings management (EM) for Chinese firms that wanted 
to engage in rights issues. Those companies which were planning to raise capital by issuing 
additional shares (rights issues) had to meet a regulatory minimum of return on equity (ROE). 
The authors also pointed out that in China during the sample period, investors’ preference for 
raising capital were rights issues and not borrowing from banks. Regulatory rules in China 
changed in the 1994-2002 period. Due to this change, the authors were particularly interested in 
this period and the sample was selected from 1994 to 2002. During this period, the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory committee (CSRC), the Securities watchdog in China, has introduced 
changes twice in the rules for the rights issues. The authors also pointed out that auditing 
practices were not of the same standard as in the rest of the world. This could also help managers 
to engage in EM to achieve their goals. In 1994, the CSRC sets rules for the minimum average 
ROE of 10% for the last three financial years for companies that wish to engage in rights issues. 
This means that any company that wants to engage in rights issue must meet the average return 
on equity (ROE) exceeding 10%. Then, the CSRS made additional changes in 1996, which stated 
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that in each of the three sequential financial years companies must meet the 10% ROE or above. 
The next change came in 1999, where the three-year average ROE had to be above of 10% but no 
less the 6%. In 2001, the CSRC further lowered the requirements level, where the average ROE 
was set to 6% or above, prior to the last three financial years of the year of the rights issue. The 
sample for the 1994-2002 periods was collected from the China Stock Market Research Series 
(CSMAR). The authors hypothesized that company managers manage earnings due to CSRC 
regulations. In order to test their presumptions, they split the sample into three periods, the first 
for the period of 1994-1998 for testing ROE for the 10% level. The second period included the 
period between 1999-2000 testing for 6% and 10% levels and for the third period for 2001-2002 
testing for a 6% level of ROE. The authors applied t-test statistics at 5% significance level due to 
a small sample, and demonstrating tests relevance, the authors show three sample distribution 
panels for the three tested periods, namely for 1994-1998, 1999-2000 and for 2001-2002 
respectively. In case of all the three distributions, non-smoothness is clearly visible, which 
confirms that companies manage their earnings in order to meet the set targets of 6% and 10% of 
ROE set by the CSRC. For the selected sample for the period from 1994 to 2002, the authors 
examined CSRC regulations for rights issues in China, where it is stated that companies had to 
achieve 6% and 10% ROE before they could engage in rights issuing. The authors clearly showed 
that earnings management is evident due to pre-set thresholds of 6% and 10% of ROE. 
Similary to Yu, Du and Sun (2006), but a slightly different area was investigated by Liu and Lu 
(2007) who tested the link between EM and corporate governance of the Chinese listed 
companies for the period 1999-2005. Liu and Lu (2007) hypothesize that low EM is associated 
with high corporate governance, where firms with ‘de-listing risk’ will have higher EM and firms 
with ‘requirements for rights issue’ will also have higher EM. The authors tested EM applying 
three types of variables: total, industry median adjusted and discretionary accruals. Test results 
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show weak evidence to support the first hypothesis that well managed firms which act truly on 
behalf of shareholders will have low earnings management (EM). Stronger support filtered 
through confirming that Chinese firms do ‘manage earnings to tunnel’ with the fact that managers 
might engage in EM for their own benefit. The reasons being that the ‘controlling shareholders’ 
of the listed firms are local governments and they engage in ‘tunneling activities’; that is ‘transfer 
resources away from the firm for the benefits of their controlling shareholders’. Tunneling 
activities hide the true and fair value of the company. The test results of t-test and Wilcoxon test 
for the second hypothesis confirm that managers engage in EM to avoid de-listings from the 
stock exchange. As for the third hypothesis, namely, the rights issue requirements hypothesis, the 
authors again test data and show evidence of EM. Liu and Lu (2007, p.887) present evidence at 
three ROE threshold points, at ROE=0, at ROE=6% and at ROE=10%. These thresholds are an 
ROE requirements points, where firms engage in EM to get ‘rights issue’ and to ‘avoid de-
listing’. The authors conclude that the presence of earnings management among Chinese listed 
firms is mainly due to ‘tunneling activities’, higher mainly in the emerging markets owing to 
poorer corporate governance. 
Although Yu, Du and Sun’s (2006); and Liu and Lu’s (2007) studies on EM have similarities due 
to the same country of investigation (China) and the same variable (ROE), the authors document 
well researched studies with similar conlcusions of evidence of earnings management. 
 
2.5.5. Cases of Australia 
 
Australia has an investor oriented accounting system, mainly influenced by the accounting 
system of the United Kingdom. See for example Doupnik and Salter (1993).  
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Holland and Ramsay (2003), investigated EM companies listed on the Australian Stock exchange 
(ASX), for the period of 1990-1997, excluding financial firms. The authors applied 
discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings at a threshold point, using Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997, pp.103-104) model and test statistics. The authors used four variables to test data 
for earnings management (EM). The same approach was calculated for Cash Flow. The authors 
hypotheses were that ‘Earnings are managed to report positive profits‘, and that ‘Earnings are 
managed to sustain the previous year’s profit performance’. Apart from test statistics, the authors 
present histograms for the same variables and evidence of earnings management (EM), revealing 
that there is ‘evidence of discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings and changes in 
earnings’ – Holland and Ramsay (2003, p.59).  Due to a smaller sample, the results are similar, 
but not as powerful as for example the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) results. 
Contrary to Holland and Ramsay (2003) who applied the discontinuity approach, Sun and Rath 
(2009) investigate EM of Australian, ASX listed, companies for the period of 2000-2006 using 
the accrual model of Jones (1991). The authors point out that the capital market is not as big as in 
the US, and in Australia financial reporting is due twice a year, whereas in the US four times. The 
authors tested total accruals (discretionary accruals) using the ‘Jones model’ (Jones, 1991), and 
added an additional variable, namely, change in operating cash flow (ΔCF) in order to remove 
any correlation of discretionary accruals. A sample of nine industries, baring financials, was 
collected from DataStream. Sun and Rath (2009) present test statistics evidence of earnings 
management (EM) which confirm that small size companies, when cash flow is low, manage 
earnings. They also show weaker evidence that earnings management does not occur only when 
companies are short of cash, but also when companies are well financed. The authors conclude 
that EM is present in Australian companies and recommend an increase in the number of annual 
reporting of financial statements. The authors apply regression analysis for a six-year sample, 
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which is rather low for a regression testing.  A more recent paper by Sun and Rath (2012) studies 
ASX listed firms, manager’s ‘benchmark-beating behaviour and circumstances’ to manage or 
beat earnings benchmark, using accruals for testing (discretionary accruals) with a ‘Modified 
Jones model’ (Jones, 1991). The sample year (excluding financial firms) is from 1999 to 2006. 
Apart from statistical testing, the authors, similarly to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), apply 
histogram analysis of earnings and earnings changes to visually observe discontinuities. The 
authors find a discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings, but also point out that 
discontinuities are not shown when discretionary accruals are not present in the earnings. They 
also show that companies with earnings below zero engage in earnings management using 
discretionary accruals to increase earnings ‘upward’, thus to ‘beat earnings benchmarks’. 
 
2.5.6. The Case of Tunisia 
 
The World Bank reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes in Tunisia, wordlbank.org. 
Amar and Abaoub (2010) investigated Earnings Management in an emerging market, with 
relatively new financial and accounting regulations. The uniqueness of this paper is that it 
investigates a debt-dominated financial market, as its firms have strong ties with the Tunisian 
banking system due to capital fundings; whereas Anglo-Saxon countries have equity dominated 
financial markets. Furthermore, the Tunisian ownership structure is a concentrated capital 
market, ownership of the share capital consists mainly of family and state-owned companies, 
whereas earlier research papers were investigating EM of a wider range of capital structures. The 
authors looking for EM set up two hypotheses: 
‘Managers seek to avoid losses.’ 
‘Managers seek to avoid earnings decreases.’ 
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The data tested was from the Tunis Stock Exchange for the period of 1997-2004. From the 
financial statements, net earnings and total assets were applied for ratios calculation. The authors 
used the testing models of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Test results of the histogram, Amar 
and Abaoub (2010, p.46) show the distribution of the Annual Net Earning, a jump at zero point, 
which points towards accepting H1. Furthermore, test statistics show a negative standardised 
difference which gives a statistical significance of accepting H1. Amar and Abaoub (2010) show 
a histogram of the distribution of Changes in Annual Net Earnings, where the distribution at point 
zero has a huge jump. The negative standardised difference from the test statistics confirms H2, a 
point where ‘managers seek to avoid earnings decreases’. Amar and Abaoub (2010) show a 
histogram of surprises of net annual earnings where the distribution of histograms does not show 
any abnormality around zero. This indicates there is no evidence of accounts manipulation in 
order to avoid negative earnings surprises. Amar and Abaoub (2010) investigated EM by 
applying the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) methodology for their tests. They find that Earnings 
Management is present in Tunisia mainly in bank dominated corporate governance. The author’s 
evidence of EM is rather weak, mainly due to a smaller tested sample. 
  
2.5.7. The Case of Jordan 
 
Despite the fact the Jordan adopted IFRS, it is not really clear whether the Jordanian accounting 
system is an investor or a tax oriented one. Due to the implementation and the endorsement of 
IFRS, the assumption that can be made is that the accounting system is closer to an investor 
oriented one. Furthermore, there is little corporate governance information on Jordanian 
corporate governance. Some information on Jordanian corporate governance, for example, can be 
found at ifrs.org Jurisdiction Profile and in the study of Al-Farah, Abbadi and AL Shaar (2015). 
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Abed, Al-Attar and Suwaidan (2012) investigate Corporate Governance and EM for non-
financial firms in Jordan from 2006 to 2009, using data obtained from the Amman Stock 
Exchange. The authors applied the Jones-model in testing discretionary accruals. The variables 
tested comprised: ‘proportion of independent directors, board size, the role of duality, ownership, 
company size, financial leverage, industry’. The authors point out that the agency problem is of 
no significance due to the ownership of firms, which are predominantly owned by an ‘identifiable 
group’, dominated by the Jordanian business culture. The authors find that only the ‘board size’ 
variable shows significant test statistics evidence of EM. A Jordanian board size is regulated, and 
each company may decide upon board membership numbers at its own discretion. The authors 
also add that companies which violate corporate regulations receive low penalties. The authors do 
not refer to the reversal accruals timing effect that may have influenced the power of their tests. 
 
2.5.8. The Case of Taiwan 
 
Taiwan implemented IFRS in 2009, see ifrs.rog Jurisdiction Profile for further information. 
Although IFRS is a relatively new implementation, Taiwan moved towards an investor 
accounting system far earlier than 2009. 
Wu, Huang and Chen (2012) investigated the earnings management of Taiwanese companies. 
They investigated executive stock option (ESO) valuation and its relation to earnings 
management. They investigated the IT industry and data was obtained from the Taiwanese Stock 
Exchange for the period of 2001-2006. As accruals play a major role in stock option valuation, 
the authors investigated discretionary (DA) and non-discretionary accruals (NDA), as well as 
return on asset (ROA) as variables in determining EM, applying the Dechow and Sloan (1995) 
model in the process. The authors present statistical evidence and confirm that company 
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managers engage in earnings manipulation in order to reduce the exercise price before the ‘grant 
date’. As managers receive more executive stock options, Discretionary Accruals are also 
increasing. As earlier studies, Wu, Huang and Chen (2012) do not refer to the timing effect of the 
reversal accruals, or to the possible impact these have on the power of the tests. Furthermore, the 
tested sample is rather low, which could have influenced the test results as well their final 
conclusion. 
 
2.5.9. The Case of the United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom has an investor-oriented accounting system. The country is dominant in 
promoting and influencing the investor-oriented accounting system both in the British 
Commonwealth countries and elsewhere. 
Gore, Pope and Singh (2007) investigate ‘accruals-based earnings management’. They tested UK 
non-financials for the period of 1989-1998. Data consist of earnings ‘before extraordinary items’ 
with earnings in the year (t) by total assets in year (t-1), and earnings change by total assets in 
year (t-1). The authors point out that there is no confirmed rule which earnings to test, earnings 
after or before extraordinary items. Extraordinary items account transactions that seldom occur in 
a fiscal year, i.e. foreign exchange gains or losses, strikes, the sales of property and others. 
However, extraordinary items do not exist in all accounting standards, as for example under 
IFRS, where they were withdrawn in 2005. The authors apply the Jones (1991) regression models 
with discretional and non-discretional accruals, and also use the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
model. The authors wanted to find out if discretionary accruals (DACC) were used to manage 
earnings, and if DACC influenced earnings distribution to achieve earning targets. The authors 
show evidence of ‘discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings’, and in contrast to 
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Durtschi and Easton (2005), managers manipulate DACC, which is the main source of 
discontinuity in the earnings distribution, thus in order to achieve positive earnings targets, they 
engage in earnings management. Gore, Pope and Singh’s (2007) paper applies a testing 
approach similar to the one applied in this study, particularly when it comes to testing the 
discontinuity of distribution. However, it cannot be seen from their work that they refer to 
reversal accruals.  
 
2.6. Earnings Management research studies investigating Financials companies in countries 
around  the world 
2.6.1. The Case of Japan 
 
As this study mentioned earlier, Japan has an investor-oriented accounting system.  
Kwak, Lee and Eldridge (2009) investigated Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) of Japanese banks at 
recession time, from mid to the end of 1990 in particular. A sample of banks was selected from 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, for the period of 1996-1999. The authors followed Beatty, 
Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) and other three methodology to test hypotheses with 
discretionary (DLLP) and nondiscretionary ‘components of LLP’. The authors conclude that 
during the recession, Japanese banks used ‘higher DLLP’s (income-decreasing) when their 
demand for external financing was high, to signal financial strength’ and ‘low DLLP’s (income-
increasing) when their capital ratio and pre-managed earnings were high’. Due to a small sample 
period, test statistics did not clearly confirm, or reject earnings management. 
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2.6.2. The Cases of Singapore and Thailand  
 
Singapore is an investor accounting system oriented toward a free market system. See Ministry of 
Trade and Industry Singapore (mti.gov.sg). IFRS will be introduced in 2018. 
Thailand also tends towards an investor accounting system. It also adopted the IFRS in 2014. See 
ifrs.org Jurisdictional Profile for both countries. 
Charoenwong and Jiraporn (2008) were examining Earnings Management in Singapore and in 
Thailand. They examined data from the Singapore stock exchange between 1975 -2003, and for 
Thailand, the data was collected from the Thai stock exchange for the period 1975 -1999. For 
both countries, data consisted of financial and non-financial companies. The variables used were 
extracted from the financial statements by computing earnings per share (EPS) between two 
financial years. Few researchers argue that testing financial companies’ data should be excluded 
due to strict financial regulation. The authors disagree with that argument, the reason being that 
financial institutions need to be investigated in the same manner as non-financial companies. 
Financial firms in the past decade have had liquidity difficulties, and in the past four years, 
financial companies have come close to illiquidity. For data testing, Charoenwong and Jiraporn 
(2008) applied t-statistics, the same as in the case of the Degoerge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) 
paper. Test results show weak evidence to sustain recent performance for non-financial 
companies for both Singapore and Thai data. Government-linked companies also show no 
evidence of managing earnings to report positive profits. The authors found a strong evidence of 
EM to report zero or positive profits in Singaporean non-financial companies and Thai financial 
and non-financial companies. The authors also found evidence that Thai financial and non-
financial firms were managing their earnings before and after the financial crisis that took place 
in 1998. Another important fact for Thai non-financial firms is that despite analysts constant 
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presence Earnings Management is present within each company’s governance. Limitation of the 
study is that the authors do not compare their results to other research papers (i.e. Degoerge, Patel 
and Zeckhauser, 1999), or to industry standards. 
 
2.6.3. The Cases of 48 countries worldwide 
 
Shen and Chih (2005) investigated investor’s protection, prospect theory and earnings 
management for the banking industry in 48 countries in North and South America, Asia, Africa, 
Europe, Australia. As banks play a major role in the capital markets their regulations are one of 
the toughest in the industry. The incentive for banks to manage their earnings is huge due to the 
banks liquidity, their assets, especially their trading assets and due to strict banking regulations. 
In every country, regulatory bodies imposed strong rules, but the strength of these rules differs 
from country to country. It has been noted as evidence in several and also in this research study 
that traders and bank managers in order to comply with the regulations manage their earnings. 
Data was collected from the Bankscope database for the period of 1993-1999, from 48 countries. 
Shen and Chih (2005) applied testing models of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degegorge, Patel 
and Zeckhauser (1999) and Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003). Shen and Chih (2005) tested if EM 
is present in the Banking industry, if the distribution is smooth at zero earnings level – at the 
threshold point and if EM differs across the countries. The authors show the distribution of 48 
countries, and there is a visible jump at zero points, and thus they found that in the majority of the 
sampled countries, there is clear evidence of Earnings Management. Furthermore, the authors 
argue, Banks above the earnings threshold are ‘risk-averters’ and point out that in countries with 
strong legal protection and enforcement, EM increases as the banks’ managers are motivated to 
avoid negative earnings in order to avoid penalties for negative earnings imposed by the 
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authorities. The authors presented and explained a high quality research study by applying 
Prospect theory in combination with discontinuity and regression analyses and showed evidence 
of EM in the banking industry. 
 
2.6.4. Cases of the USA 
 
The USA, similarly to the U.K., has an investor-oriented accounting system, and has been 
influencing developing countries with its financial reporting system. The USA implemented 
IFRS in 2010. 
Beatty and Harris (2001) were examining tax, earnings and capital management at publicly 
traded banks in the US, a subject which was earlier reviewed in this study, under Capital 
Motivation, Page 27 of the literature review. 
Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2009) investigate publicly traded large banks in the U.S., to find 
out if there is a connection between earnings management and corporate governance factors such 
as a CEO’s pay for performance, board independence and capital. The data examined with OSL 
regression analysis was for the period from 1994 to 2002. The authors were particularly 
interested in managers’ pay per performance relation to earning management. The authors 
hypothesized that low reported earnings will increase EM, CEO’s performance based salaries will 
increase earnings management (EM), a tighter board control and independence will lower EM 
and low capital will increase EM. The data for testing was obtained from Bank Holding 
Company Performance and merger database from the Chicago Federal Reserve’s Web site. The 
tested period was for 1994 - 2002. Managers record loans loss provisions in the banks’ 
accounting books to offset future bad loans. Loan loss provisions (LLP) are non-cash expenses. 
Tests statistics show that EM is present at large US bank companies due to corporate governance 
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and they cannot reject the hypotheses. They found that CEO’s performance based salaries are a 
motivational factor for EM; that is, high performance based salaries relate to high EM and low-
performance based ones to low EM. They also find that corporate governance has an influence on 
bank managers’ action; that is, CEO’s earnings management is lower in the presence of a board 
with high independence. The author’s investigation of corporate governance in relation to EM in 
the banking industry is of significant importance, as it is one the few high-quality studies to date. 
The authors show evidence that corporate governance in the banking industry, specifically 
performance, board independence and capital contribute to EM.    
The possible relation between discretionary accruals and earnings was investigated with 
regression analysis by Balboa, López-Espionosa and Rubia (2013). The authors were interested 
to find nonlinear connections and ‘patterns’ to show if bank managers used accruals in earnings 
increases or decreases. The authors point out that bank managers apply different EM techniques 
when earnings are high, i.e. income earnings are used; whereas in case of negative earnings, loan 
loss provisions (LLP) are overstated. The authors’ study shows that bank managers have 
incentives to engage in EM. 
Examining EM during the financial crisis was investigated by Cohen, Cornett, et al. (2014). The 
authors examine LLP of US banks before and during the financial crisis, and investigate the 
prediction of EM during the financial crises. The authors apply the regression model for testing 
and searching for evidence of EM by examining banks’ ‘tail risks’ during the financial crisis. Tail 
risks are ‘… extreme declines in a bank’s stock price.’ - Cohen, Cornett, et al. (2014, p.171). 
Deutsche Bank (2010, p.1) defines tail risk ‘…is technically a risk of a portfolio value move of at 
least three standard deviations (3σ) from the mean and is more probable (frequent) than 
anticipated by a normal distribution.’ The authors present a jump of the standard deviation of the 
discretionary earnings during the financials crisis. From the test results, the authors conclude that 
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prior to the crisis the prediction of EM is low, but it is high during the crisis. The authors further 
point out that evidence of EM is higher before the 2007 financial crisis. The authors acknowledge 
the reversal accruals effect of the discretionary accruals in their study. 
 
2.6.5. The Case of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries 
 
Taktak, Shabou and Dumontier (2010) investigate income smoothing in the banking industry 
within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The 
authors were seeking to find out if bank managers were smoothing earnings in ‘real or artificial 
form’, while trading securities plus ‘managing loan loss provision’, and within this process, 
whether they were complying with banking regulations. The authors point out that real smoothing 
is smoothing with real activities, i.e. selling securities when financial results are poor, while 
artificial smoothing refers to ‘manipulating accounting figures’. The data used for test statistics 
was from the Bankscope database, operating in the OECD member countries, for the period 1994 
to 2002. The authors applied Eckel’s and Beidleman’s methods for testing smoothing. Taktak, 
Shabou and Dumontier (2010) show evidence that a high percentage of the OECD member 
countries, especially ‘continental European banks’, smooth their income both by artificial and by 
real activities, or by trading securities. The authors conclude that banks operating in ‘Anglo-
American countries’ smooth their income less than banks in continental Europe. It may be 
concluded from the study that one of the main drivers of income smoothing is the legal system of 
a particular country. This is what the authors’ results show, namely, evidence of lower income 
smoothing within Anglo-American countries than within their European counterparts. 
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2.6.6. The Cases of Asian Countries 
 
Wang, Chen, et al. (2012) investigate EM in the Asian banking industry. Sample data was 
collected from BankScope, for sixteen Asian countries, for the period 1996-2009. The authors 
investigated accrual estimates, specifically loan loss provision (which is a banking sector 
specific) for banks who adopted IFRS and for banks with local GAAP. The authors also looked at 
diversification and at the relation between accounting quality and transparency. The result of test 
statistics for loan loss provision for sixteen Asian Countries can be found in Wang, Chen et al. 
(2012). They present test statistics which shows evidence of income smoothing thus earnings 
management (EM) in nine out of the sixteen countries in question. The authors point out that 
income smoothing occurs when bank earnings are higher, and the level of loan loss provision 
(LLP) depends on the ‘accounting quality, financial supervision and regulations’. The authors 
present Descriptive Statistics results combined with IFRS and local GAAPs. However, it would 
have been more of an interest if the authors split the IFRS data from the local GAAP and test data 
separately. In this way, apart from the tested hypotheses, additionally, the power of the standards 
of the tested variables could additionally be examined, i.e. IFRS vs. local GAAPs. Furthermore, 
IFRS may not treat accounting entries in the same way as the local GAAP does, as this study will 
show in the following chapter, in Chapter 3, the Hungarian Accounting Standards (HAS) vs. 
IFRS. 
 
2.6.7. The Cases of Islamic Banks 
 
Hamdi and Zarai (2012) investigate the presence of EM in Islamic banks. The authors point out 
that Islamic banks follow strict rules of ethical and moral values, as Islamic banks apply the rules 
Chapter 2  
86 
 
of Sharia’ah, the Islamic ‘jurisprudence’, that is, no interest is being applied to transactions. The 
authors apply earnings distribution and the prospect theory approach to finding evidence of EM 
within the Islamic banks. They hypothesize that ‘managers seek to avoid losses and earnings 
decreases’. The authors also point out that due to a short sample period from 2000 to 2009, the 
time series accrual based approach would not suit their testing purposes. Data was obtained from 
the Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions Information (IBIS) Database. The authors apply the 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) statistical model and test discontinuities in earnings distribution; 
additionally, they also run Fiegenbaum’s (1990) regression model. They present mixed evidence 
in their study, showing distributions that, in both cases, are not smooth at zero threshold point, 
where there is a discontinuity. Distributions to the right at zero points are higher than 
distributions to the left at zero points. The authors further present test statistics of negative mean 
and standardized difference to the left, which indicates earnings management ‘to avoid losses’. 
The Hamdi and Zarai’s (2012) results show that managers seek to ‘avoid earnings losses’, and 
not to ‘avoid earnings decreases’, and they conclude that Islamic banks are engaged in earnings 
management to ‘show positive earnings’. As the authors test total assets variables, there is no 
reference to the timing of the reversal accruals, nor any indication that the test results might be 
biased. Furthermore, results from the study are not really sufficient in order to make a conclusion 
in favour to EM. Nevertheless, paper is of interest due to its subject of investigation, namely, 
Islamic banks. 
 
2.6.8. The Cases of Dutch Banks 
 
The Netherlands adopted IFRS in 2002 and has an investor-oriented accounting system. 
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Norden and Stoian (2014) investigate the loan loss provision (LLP) of banks trading in the 
Netherlands for the period from 1998 to 2012. The authors were interested to find out if LLP 
plays a role in earnings management, specifically in the volatility of banks earnings ‘before and 
after loan loss provisioning’. They used smoothing and regression analysis of quarterly data for 
the sample period. The authors confirm from their results that they are in line with the earlier 
studies, that is, banks manage earnings by smoothing the ‘volatility of earnings with LLP’. 
Furthermore, the authors show, banks have higher LLP when ‘discretionary earnings’ are also 
higher, and banks that pay dividends will increase LLP if their ‘expected dividends are lower 
than current earnings’. The authors show with distribution and regression analysis that EM is 
present within the Dutch banks, who manage LLP to achieve their goal earnings. However, as the 
paper tests several variables, including total assets, the authors failed to refer to the timing of the 
reversal accruals. Additionally, four-year data is rather short to test reliably. Furthermore, as the 
paper was published in 2014, the authors should have mentioned, under their references, or in 
their text, the Baber, Kang and Li (2011); and/or Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012) papers, studies 
which are indispensable to refer to when it comes to researching EM with accruals.  
 
The next section presents summary on earnings management investigating non-financial 
companies and countries.  
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2.7. Summary of Earnings Management research studies, investigating Non-Financial 
companies in countries around the world: 
 
Table 2.a.   
Author(s) Name / Title 
of the Study 
Area / What was 
investigated 
What was found / Limitations 
Leuz,  Nanda and 
Wysocki  (2003). 
‘Earnings management 
and investor protection: 
an international 
comparison’. 
Examined EM in 31 
countries with different 
legal and cultural 
backgrounds. Splitting 
sample into strong and 
weak legal system, the 
authors looked at earnings 
smoothing and accruals 
manipulation as drivers of 
EM. 
The authors conclude that a 
country’s legal and institutional set-
up has a strong influence on the 
quality of reported earnings; that is, 
strong legal protection within 
corporate governance is directly 
linked to high reporting quality.  
The authors should have applied a 
different model for data testing, as 
the accrual model does not show 
high testing power. 
Enomoto,  Kimura and 
Yamaguchi (2013). 
‘Accrual-Based and Real 
Earnings Management: 
An International 
Comparison for Investor 
Protection.’ 
Investigated real EM 
(making decisions to 
affect the company’s 
future cash flow) against 
accrual-based EM 
(‘change in accruals 
processes’) of companies 
throughout 38 countries.  
EM levels and EM types depend on 
each country’s efficiency in 
enforcing investor protection. That 
is, accrual based EM is reduced by 
strong investor protection; with 
strong investors protection real EM 
increases 
Case of Japan:   
Darrough,  Pourjalali  and 
Saudagaran (1998). 
‘Earnings Management in 
Japanese Companies.’ 
Investigated ‘income 
increasing accounting 
accruals’ of Japanese 
firms before and after the 
market crash in 1990. 
The authors conclude that Japanese 
companies prefer debt over equity 
as a source of capital and managed 
earnings both before and after the 
market crash in 1990. However, as 
discretionary accruals were tested, 
the power of the test is 
questionable. 
Suda and Shuto (2005). 
‘Earnings Management to 
avoid earnings decreases 
and losses: Empirical 
evidence from Japan.’ 
Investigated if EM is 
present in Japanese 
companies traded on the 
stock exchanges for the 
1990-2000 period by 
applying the discretionary 
accrual model.  
The authors show that Japanese 
company managers manage 
earnings and influence accruals to 
‘avoid decrease of earnings and 
losses’. The authors also point out 
that the cost effect is linked to EM 
and list three reasons for EM: 
salary compensation, bank-oriented 
system and tax effect on profits.  
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Shuto (2007). 
‘Executive compensation 
and earnings 
management: Empirical 
evidence from Japan.’ 
Investigated Japanese 
executive compensation 
and EM by applying 
accruals for testing. 
Presents evidence of EM, where 
Japanese managers apply the ‘big 
bath’ technique and extraordinary 
items to smooth income, in order to 
manage earnings. 
Matsuura (2008). 
‘On the Relation between 
Real Earnings 
Management and 
Accounting Earnings 
Management: Income 
Smoothing Perspective.’ 
Investigates the relation 
between real and 
accounting earnings 
management of Japanese 
companies. 
The authors show evidence that real 
EM appears before accounting EM, 
that is, first a decision is made to 
engage in EM and then action is 
taken by manipulating accounting 
entries. 
The Case of the EU:   
Coppens and Peek (2005). 
‘An analysis of earnings 
management by European 
private firms.’ 
Investigated if EM was 
present in the public and 
private firms within the 
European Union. 
The authors specifically 
looked if companies 
engaged in the avoidance 
of reporting losses and 
earnings decreases. 
The authors test results reject that 
companies do not manage earnings 
to avoid losses. But cannot reject 
the second hypothesis as reporting 
earnings decreases. They do not 
explain why they cannot reject the 
second hypothesis, i.e. due to a 
small sample or perhaps because of 
a ‘true absence of EM’. 
The Case of Malaysia:   
Aman,  Iskandar,   et al. 
(2006). 
‘Earnings Management in 
Malaysia: A Study on 
Effects of Accounting 
Choices.’ 
By applying discretionary 
accruals, authors 
investigated EM of 
companies that are listed 
on the Malaysian stock 
exchange. 
The authors show evidence of EM 
for two variables before and after 
the market crash 1998, but show no 
evidence of EM during the year of 
the crash. 
Cases in China:   
Yu, Du and Sun (2006). 
‘Earnings management at 
rights issues threshold – 
Evidence from China.’ 
The authors investigated 
EM of the Chinese firms 
who engaged in right’s 
issue and had to meet 
regulatory minimum on 
return on equity (ROE).  
The authors found evidence of EM 
due to poor auditing practices, and 
firms manage their earnings with 
‘non-core’ income to meet the 
required ROE threshold levels for 
the right’s issue.   
Liu and Lu (2007). 
‘Corporate governance 
and earnings management 
in the Chinese listed 
companies: A tunneling 
perspective.’ 
The authors looked at EM 
and corporate governance 
of listed Chinese 
companies.  
The authors conclude that the 
presence of earnings management 
in Chinese listed firms are mainly 
due to ‘tunneling activities’, to a 
higher degree mainly in the 
emerging markets due to poorer 
corporate governance. 
The Case of Australia:   
Holland and Ramsay 
(2003). 
Investigated EM 
companies listed on the 
The authors show evidence of 
discontinuities in the distribution of 
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‘Do Australian companies 
manage earnings to meet 
simple earnings 
benchmarks?’ 
Australian Stock 
exchange (ASX), 
applying discontinuities in 
the distribution of 
reported earnings at a 
threshold point. 
reported earnings and changes in 
earnings at a threshold point. Such 
a discontinuity leads to EM, as 
managers manage earnings to 
maintain the profits trend from the 
previous years. But, the power of 
the test is weak due to a small 
sample or due to the firms’ size 
effect.  
Sun and Rath (2009). 
‘An Empirical Analysis of 
Earnings Management in 
Australia.’ 
Investigated EM of 
Australian, ASX listed 
companies, applying the 
‘Jones model’ (Jones, 
1991) to test total accruals 
(discretionary accruals). 
The author’s present statistical 
evidence of EM, for companies that 
are of small sizes, when cash flow 
is low, companies manages 
earnings. A weaker evidence of EM 
does not only occur when 
companies are short of cash but 
also when they are well financed. 
Sun and Rath (2012). 
‘Pre Managed Earnings 
Benchmarks and Earnings 
Management of Australian 
Firms.’ 
Studied ASX listed firms, 
managers’ benchmark-
beating behavior and 
circumstances to manage 
or beat earnings 
benchmarks. Using 
accruals for testing 
(discretionary accruals) 
with the ‘Jones model’ 
(Jones, 1991). 
The authors find a discontinuity in 
the distribution of reported 
earnings, but also point out that 
discontinuities are not shown when 
discretionary accruals are not 
present in earnings.  They present 
evidence that positive earnings and 
positive earnings change where 
benchmarks were applied to 
manage earnings ‘upward’, thus to 
‘beat earnings benchmarks’. 
The Case of Tunisia:    
Amar and Abaoub (2010). 
‘Earnings Management 
Thresholds: The case in 
Tunisia.’ 
Investigated EM in a debt 
dominated financial 
market in Tunisia, due to 
capital fundings from 
banks. By applying the 
Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) model, the authors 
investigate earnings 
management at zero 
earnings, last periods’ 
earnings, analyst earnings 
forecast and meeting 
earnings targets. 
The authors test distributions of 
earnings and show discontinuity in 
the tested sample. They show 
evidence of discontinuity in 
histogram results, although in my 
view the results are weak due to a 
small sample. 
The Case of Jordan:   
Abed, Al-Attar and 
Suwaidan (2012). 
‘Corporate Governance 
The authors examined 
EM of ‘corporate 
governance mechanism’ 
The authors conclude that only 
board size has a significant relation 
to earnings management. 
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Source: Own presentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and Earnings 
Management: Jordanian 
Evidence.’ 
 
 
in Jordanian non-financial 
firms by applying the 
modified Jones (1991) 
model. Sample for 2006-
2009 was used from the 
Amman Stock Exchange.  
Limitation of the study is a small 
sample size and testing power, as 
tests were performed only at 0.05 
and 0.10 significance levels. 
The Case of Taiwan:   
Wu, Huang and Chen 
(2012). 
‘Earnings Manipulation, 
Corporate Governance 
and Executive Stock 
Option Grants: Evidence 
from Taiwan.’ 
Authors tested executive 
stock option valuation and 
its relation to earnings 
management by using a 
sample of IT industry 
from the Taiwanese Stock 
Exchange. The authors 
tested discretionary 
accruals by applying the 
Dechow and Sloan (1995) 
model. 
The author’s present evidence 
where the discretionary accruals are 
‘positively’ linked to executives 
stock options. Executives 
manipulate earnings to influence 
the stock option exercise price in 
order to increase the value of stock 
options. 
The Case of The UK:   
Gore, Pope and Singh 
(2007). 
‘Earnings management 
and the distribution of 
earnings relative to 
targets: UK evidence.’ 
The authors tested UK 
non-financial companies 
for the period of 1989-
1998 applying the Jones 
(1991), as well as the 
Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) model. Apart from 
the test statistics, the 
authors also apply 
discontinuity analysis of 
the results. 
The authors find, in contrast to 
Durtschi and Easton (2005) that 
managers manipulate DACC, 
which is the main source of 
discontinuity in the earnings 
distribution, in order to achieve 
positive earnings targets, they 
engage in earnings management.  
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2.8. Summary of Earnings Management research studies, investigating Financials 
companies in countries around the world 
 
Table 2.b.   
Author(s) Name / Name of 
the Study 
Area / What was 
investigated 
What was found / 
Limitations 
The Case of Japan:   
Kwak, Lee and Eldridge 
(2009). 
‘Earnings Management by 
Japanese Bank Managers 
Using Discretionary Loan 
Loss Provisions.’ 
The authors investigated 
loan loss provision (LLP) of 
Japanese banks in relation to 
earnings management. 
Testing data was used from 
Tokyo Stock Exchange for 
1996-1999 periods.   The 
authors followed Beatty, 
Chamberlain and Magliolo 
(1995) and 3 other papers 
methodology to test their 
hypotheses. 
The authors conclude that 
during the recession, Japanese 
banks used ‘higher DLLP’s 
(income-decreasing) when 
their demand for external 
financing was high, to signal 
financial strength’ and ‘low 
DLLP’s (income-increasing) 
when their capital ratio and 
pre-managed earnings were 
high’. Due to a small sample 
the authors conclude that the 
results on EM be interpreted 
with ‘caution’.   
The Cases of Singapore and 
Thailand: 
  
Charoenwong and Jiraporn 
(2008). 
‘Earning Management to 
exceed Threshold: Evidence 
from Singapore and 
Thailand.’ 
The authors searched for 
signs of earnings 
management and tested 
Singapore and Thai stock 
exchanges financial and 
non-financial data for the 
period of 1975-2003, 
applying the Degeorge, 
Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) 
‘t-like’ statistical model.   
Test results show weak 
evidence to sustain recent 
performance for non-financial 
companies for both Singapore 
and Thai data. Government-
linked companies show no 
evidence of managing 
earnings to report positive 
profits. There is a strong 
evidence of EM to report zero 
or positive profits in 
Singaporean non-financial 
companies and Thai financial 
and non-financial companies. 
The authors also found 
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evidence that Thai financial 
and non-financial firms have 
been managing their earnings 
before and after the financial 
crisis that took place in 1998. 
The Cases of 48 countries 
worldwide: 
  
Shen and Chih (2005). 
‘Investor protection, prospect 
theory and earnings 
management: An 
international comparison of 
the banking industry.’ 
 
 
The authors investigated 
investors protection, 
prospect theory and earnings 
management for the banking 
industry in 48 countries for 
the period of 1993-1999, 
applying the Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997), 
Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1999) and 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki  
(2003) models. 
The authors show asymmetry 
in the distribution of net 
income in 48 countries, where 
there is a visible jump at zero 
point. They found that in 2/3 
of the sampled countries, there 
was clear evidence of 
Earnings Management. 
The Case of the USA:   
Beatty and Harris (2001). 
‘Intra‐Group, Interstate 
Strategic Income 
Management for Tax, 
Financial Reporting, and 
Regulatory Purposes.’ 
The authors investigated 
‘capital management 
(management of security 
gains or losses), tax and 
earnings’ dealings of 
publicly traded banks in the 
US. Samples for testing 
were used for 1991 and 
1992 financial years. 
Test results present evidence 
of EM where banks shift their 
security gains / losses to 
subsidiaries with lower tax 
rates with an intention to 
reduce subsidiaries and the 
consolidated tax amount. Such 
an asset shifting contributes to 
managing company group 
earnings amounts. The authors 
conclude that banks engage in 
EM in order to reduce state 
tax payments, as well as their 
consolidated tax contributions 
on banks group level. 
Beatty, Ke and Petroni 
(2002). 
‘Earnings Management to 
Avoid Earnings declines 
across Publicly and Privately 
Held Banks.’ 
Searched for EM by 
investigating and then 
comparing evidence 
between privately and 
publicly owned banks. 
Present evidence of EM in 
publicly traded banks by using 
LLP, then the privately traded 
banks. 
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Cornet, McNutt and 
Tehranian (2009). 
‘Corporate governance and 
earnings management at 
large U.S. bank holding 
companies.’ 
Investigated publicly traded 
large banks in the U.S., to 
find out if there was a 
connection between 
earnings management and 
corporate governance 
factors such as CEO pay for 
performance, board 
independence and capital. 
The authors applied OLS 
regression analysis. The 
data examined was for the 
period from 1994 to 2002. 
The authors show evidence of 
earnings management within 
‘corporate governance 
mechanism’, specifically 
board independence, CEO pay 
for performance and capital. 
They also show evidence of 
earnings smoothing. They also 
show that higher board 
independence reduces 
earnings management. Despite 
the small (total) sample of 593 
banks, the authors show 
evidence of EM. 
Balboa, López-Espionosa  
and Rubia (2013). 
‘Nonlinear dynamics in 
discretionary accruals: An 
analysis of bank loan-loss 
provisions.’ 
Investigated income 
smoothing by testing LLP 
with regression analysis and 
effects on earnings. 
 
 
The author’s present evidence 
that LLP is high when 
earnings are negative and 
there is income smoothing 
during high earnings and that 
is clear evidence of a 
nonlinear pattern.  
Cohen, Cornett, et al. (2014). 
‘Bank Earnings Management 
and Tail Risk during the 
Financial Crisis.’ 
 
 
 
The authors investigated 
LLP for evidence of EM 
before and during the 
financial crisis, prediction of 
EM before and during the 
financial crisis.  
The authors show that banks 
engaged in EM to a larger 
extent prior to the crisis, and 
conclude that the test results 
show the prediction of EM 
was higher during the crisis, 
and lower before the crisis.  
The Case of Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) 
countries: 
  
Taktak, Shabou and 
Dumontier (2010). 
‘Income Smoothing 
Practices: Evidence from 
Banks Operating in OECD 
Countries.’ 
Investigated income 
smoothing in the banking 
industry within the OECD 
countries. The sample tested 
was from 1994 to 2002. The 
authors looked if bank 
managers were smoothing 
earnings in ‘real or artificial 
form’ while trading 
securities plus ‘managing 
loan loss provision’ and 
The authors find that banks 
with poor results smooth their 
result with loan loss 
provisions or by managing 
security gains. Earnings 
smoothing is also present with 
‘insured deposits’ but do not 
see the connection in ‘non-
insured debts’. They also 
point out that legal system 
plays a major role in income 
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within this process whether 
they were complying with 
the banking regulations. 
smoothing and that state, 
continental European banks 
smooth income more than the 
Anglo-American banks. 
The Cases of the Asian 
Countries: 
  
Wang, Chen, et al. (2012). 
‘Income Smoothing and 
Earnings Management in the 
Banking Industry: Evidence 
in Asian Countries.’ 
Investigated EM in the 
Asian banking industry for 
16 Asian countries, for the 
period 1996-2009. The 
authors tested LLP with 
regression analysis of 
countries with IFRS and 
with local GAAP. 
The authors point out that 
income smoothing occurs 
when bank earnings are 
higher, and with less control. 
Banks that adopted IFRS tend 
to ‘estimate lower deviation 
from their expected LLP’. 
That is, the level of loan loss 
provision (LLP) depends on 
‘accounting quality, financial 
supervision and regulations’. 
The Cases of the Islamic 
Banks: 
  
Hamdi and Zarai (2012). 
‘Earnings Management to 
Avoid Earnings Decreases 
and Losses: Empirical 
Evidence from Islamic 
Banking Industry.’ 
Investigated presence of EM 
in Islamic banks in 27 
countries.   Islamic banks 
apply rules of Sharia’ah, the 
Islamic ‘jurisprudence’. The 
authors apply the Prospect 
Theory and Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) model in 
testing discontinuities in 
earnings distribution. There 
was a total of 1244 banks 
year observations for the 
sample period. 
The authors show mixed 
evidence in their study. While 
tests results show 
discontinuity in the 
distributions, thus indicating 
the presence of EM, tests 
statistics do not confirm 
‘account manipulations to 
avoid earnings decreases’. The 
authors conclude that Islamic 
banks ‘are less likely’ to 
engage in EM than non-
Islamic banks, due to the fact 
that Islamic banks are ‘risk 
averters’. 
The Cases of the Dutch 
banks: 
  
Norden and Stoian (2014). 
‘Bank earnings management 
through loan loss provisions: 
A double-edged sword?’ 
The authors investigated 
LLP of the Dutch banks, a 
total of 85, for the period 
from 1998 to 2012. They 
The authors show that banks 
manage earnings by 
smoothing ‘volatility of 
earnings with LLP’. 
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were using smoothing and 
regression analysis of the 
quarterly data for the sample 
period. 
Furthermore, banks have 
higher LLP when 
‘discretionary earnings’ are 
also higher. Banks that pay 
dividends will increase LLP if 
their ‘expected dividends are 
lower than the current 
earnings’. The authors show 
with the help of distribution 
and regression evidence that 
EM is present with the Dutch 
banks which manage LLP to 
achieve their earnings goal. 
Source: Own presentation 
 
2.9.  Summary of the Literature Review on Earnings Management 
 
Financial statements are in constant use by the general public, analysts, investors, government 
and regulatory bodies alike. Credibility and trustworthiness of the numbers are therefore vital. By 
using financial statements, the likelihood of earnings management has always been a question. 
Chapter 2 presents summary of critically reviewed papers, published on the topic of Earnings 
Management (EM) that had been investigated for over three decades. Early research papers were 
published in the US and other countries in the EU and Asia. The motivation for these papers was 
diverse. The authors searched for the motivation behind EM itself, fraud, EM techniques, EM and 
corporate governance, the existence of EM. Evidence of EM presence was well documented 
within the research community in different industries as well in several countries and continents. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, only a handful of research papers have been published investigating 
banks, compared to vast existing literature on EM within non-financial industries.  
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EM was investigated with different techniques such as total accruals, specific accruals and 
discontinuity approaches looking items from profit and loss accounts, balance sheets and cash 
flow. Some researchers argue against manipulation, some showed firm statistical evidence within 
financials and other industry types that the existence of earnings management (EM) cannot be 
denied. It is up to the reader to decide for him or herself whether the researched evidence 
substantiated these claims. Having read the relevant papers, this study concludes that there is no 
perfect model for testing earnings management (EM). Furthermore, under accrual accounting, 
accrual entries must be reversed, as it may influence the testing power, as Baber, Kang and Li 
(2011) and Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012) argue. However, papers critically reviewed in this study 
that investigate EM on accrual bases (i.e. by applying Jones, 1991; or other accrual testing 
models) simply do not refer to this basic accounting rule.   
In limiting EM, auditors also play a major role and history has confirmed their role with more or 
less success in eliminating EM, although published evidence shows that auditors did / do not stop 
EM. Regulatory bodies also play an important role in finding any possible financial 
manipulations and earnings discrepancies. Apart from conservative accounting, well-controlled 
management, auditors and regulatory bodies play an important role in the transparency of the 
financial statements and also in stopping earnings management.  
An intense search was performed to seek domestic or foreign published papers on EM pertaining 
to Hungarian credit institutions. There are few scientists in Hungary who have been researching 
financial intermediaries. The most up-to-date studies on the country’s financial matters can be 
read on the Central Bank of Hungary’s (MNB) internet site. Most studies investigating banks 
were published on the subject of mergers and acquisitions, banking periods since 1987 and 
competitions in the banking world in Hungary. Most of these research studies miss in depth 
econometrical tests and analyses. Only few studies were published, mostly by the Central Bank 
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of Hungary (MNB), where there is some limited statistical analysis. However, even these 
research works are completely irrelevant to this study, as not even a paragraph refers to earnings 
management. The available research works are on general economics, on the monetary policy of 
the Central Bank of Hungary, as well as on comparisons of ratios, limited to return on equity 
(ROE) and return on assets (ROA). However, as of writing this thesis, there is no evidence of any 
published studies on earnings management of credit institutions in Hungary, or similar studies of 
any of the industries operating in Hungary. Due to this research gap, this study focuses entirely 
on investigating financial statements of domestic and foreign credit institutions trading in 
Hungary in search of evidence of ‘earnings anomalies’, that is, evidence of earnings 
management.  
Despite detailed literature search for earnings management studies in Hungary, it was concluded, 
that since the 1930’s, 1970’ or since 1987 neither the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB) nor the 
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (now under umbrella of MNB) published any 
research papers on financial intermediaries pertaining to earnings management. Studies on the 
history and types of Hungarian financial intermediaries represent an exception and they are 
included in this study, in the next chapter, in Chapter 3. It is fair to conclude that the Hungarian 
research community in the field of finance is still in its infancy compared to the EU, the USA and 
the so called ‘newcomers’, namely, the Asian scientists. It is also a strong fact that elements from 
the past communist regime are still present and influencing the Hungarian financial as well as the 
rest of the industry.  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, presents the Hungarian financial banking history from the 
transitional period up to the present day.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Hungary’s Credit Institutions 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Chapter 1 of this study presents a brief summary of the Hungary’s banking sector from the mid-
19
th
 century until 1989. Chapter 2 critically evaluates published research papers on earnings 
management (EM). As pointed out in Chapter 2, despite an intense search, the author of this 
study could not find any papers published in Hungary, or elsewhere, pertaining to earnings 
management within the financial sector nor within other sectors in Hungary.  
 
Sections of Chapter 3 below summarise the most relevant published papers of the Hungarian 
credit institutions relevant to this study. 
 
3.2. Hungarian financial institutions and the development of the banking industry from 
1987 until the present day 
3.2.1. The Central Bank of Hungary – Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB)  
 
On 1st January 1987, the first significant change was introduced to the Central Bank of Hungary 
(MNB), namely, single-tier banking operations were scraped to be replaced by a two-tier banking 
system. Also, from 1987 the MNB stopped its commercial tasks and transferred the commercial 
duties to three newly formed banks, Kereskedelmi és Hitel Bank - K&H (Commercial and Credit 
Bank), Magyar Hitel Bank and the Budapest Bank. These newly formed banks were under-
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capitalised, and they had inherited bad loans. In 1991, new banking legislations were drawn up, 
the so-called ‘LX.’ (where ‘LX’ is a specific notation for the banking law, for 1991 year). Each 
legislative act has its own Roman numeral notation with the year when the law was passed and 
published in the ‘Hungarian Journal, Official Gazette’. In the case of ‘LX, 1991’, for example, it 
refers to a law numbered ‘LX’ that was published in 1991. The ‘LX, 1991’ law gave a clean path 
to the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB) to regain its independence as well as to concentrate its 
efforts on monetary policy tasks. The ‘LX.’ legislation also guaranteed to MNB (being part of its 
independence) that the government could no longer give any instructions to the bank. The first 
interest rates decision was made by the MNB in 1989, and since 1990 interest rate policy has 
been an MNB task as part of the monetary policy (Balatoni, 2008). 
The MNB had new legislation passed in 2003 that filled legal / financial loop-holes of the 1991 
legislation. After 2003, further financial legislative acts were drawn up with the latest being 
passed in 2013. The MNB’s main objective is price stability and it operates as an independent 
institution. It performs and implements monetary policy, sets the rate of interest, issues HUF 
(HUF refers to Hungarian Forint, HUF being the code for Hungarian currency) as legal tender, 
manages reserves in foreign exchange and gold, implements foreign exchange rate policy, 
oversees money circulation and publishes statistical data, (www.mnb.hu). 
 
MNB regained its independence, became a member of the European System of Central Banks, 
and signed Article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, ‘the MNB Act, 
which establishes the Bank’s primary objectives and basic tasks as well as its institutional, 
operational, personal and financial independence and operation, stipulates that the primary 
objective of the MNB is to achieve and maintain price stability. … The MNB Act also stipulates 
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the independence of the Bank in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.’ (Source: MNB Yearly Report, 2012). 
 
After over 40 years, Hungary’s stock market was also decentralised in 1989 and reopened in June 
1990 and has been operational ever since. 
 
3.2.2. Hungary’s Banking sector transition towards market economy after 1987 
 
During the process of transformation from a single to a two-tier banking system in 1987, 
managers at the newly formed commercial banks had few experienced staff members. Managers 
dealing with banking duties, such as accounting, internal controls and corporate governance were 
also inadequate (Szapáry, 2001). From 1988, prior to privatisation, four types of financial 
institutions were operating: commercial, investment and savings banks, plus specialised financial 
institutions. The services of these institutions were limited comparing to today’s banking 
products. These were personal banking services, long-term project financing, commercial 
services and ‘specific aspects of banking’, (Neale and Bozsik, 2001).  
As part of the transformation process, further regulations were drawn in 1991, namely, the ‘1991 
LXIX’, an amended law that regulated banking operations (The ‘LXIX.’ law refers specifically to 
banking regulations and was published in the ‘Hungarian Journal, Official Gazette’ in 1991). 
Furthermore, new accounting legislation was created in 1991, namely the XVIII accounting law, 
and the banks were obligated to follow these rules to increase their trading transparency 
(similarly in 1991, it was published in the ‘Hungarian Journal, Official Gazette’ ‘the XVIII’ law, 
which describes accounting rules and principles). Bankruptcy laws were also drawn in 1991, the 
‘IL’ regulation, which took effect in 1992. (Ábel and Szakadát, 1997). (the Roman numeral and 
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publication year is the reference for each law respectively. The ‘IL, 1991’ law refers to 
Bankruptcy and Liquidation Proceedings published in the year 1991). 
The ownership structure of banks was also changing. Despite the two-tier banking model, the 
state was still in ownership of the Hungarian banks. Additional laws (tax, privatisation, banks 
consolidation act in 1993 and other legislation) by the government gave green light not only to 
privatisation but they also made possible for foreign credit institution to mark their presence in 
the Hungarian banking market. Furthermore, one of the biggest challenges for banks was bad 
loans of the state-owned institutions at the age of bankruptcy. This led to different waves of 
consolidations (Neale and Bozsik, 2001): 
 
a. Credit consolidation (instead of bad debts, 20 years long treasury bonds were used)  
b. Bank consolidation (involved recapitalisation by the state) 
c. Debtor consolidation (injection of capital to ‘bank’s debtors’) 
 
But consolidation of Credit and Debtor consolidation as well as Capital increase was not free, for 
the period 1992-1994, it cost over HUF 333 billion. (Neale and Bozsik, 2001). 
Another challenge was the privatisation of state-owned banks, such as the Hungarian Foreign and 
Trade Bank (Magyar Külkereskedelmi Bank – MKB), the National Savings Bank (OTP), 
Budapest Bank (BB), the Hungarian Credit Bank (MHB), the Savings Bank (Takarékban), the 
Commercial and Credit Bank (K&H) and the Mezobank (Meadowbank) / Agrobank. The 
privatisation of banks began with the MKB, in 1993. By 1994, the EBRD (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) and other foreign banks started to buy stakes in the four big 
Hungarian banks, Kereskedelmi és Hitel Bank – K&H (Commercial and Credit Bank), Budapest 
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Bank - BB, Magyar Külkereskedelmi Bank – MKB (Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank), and 
Magyar Hitel Bank – MHB (Hungarian Credit Bank), as part of the privatisation. Only Országos 
Takarékpénztár – OTP (the National Savings Bank) was privatised through offering on the stock 
exchange, the only bank out of the five big banks which remained in Hungarian ownership. 
Mezobank (Meadowbank) / Agrobank was formed in 1980 and its main operation was to finance 
the Hungarian agrarian sector, (Neale and Bozsik, 2001).  
 
Foreign banks entered the Hungarian banking industry as green-field investments and as part of 
the privatised institutions. Foreign banks saw different interests in acquiring Hungarian banks. In 
1990’s, Hungary’s financial market was split between corporate and retail market, where foreign 
banks focused mostly on the corporate markets, whereas Hungarian banks focused mainly on 
retail banking, i.e. OTP (Országos Takarékpénztár), Savings Cooperatives, Postabank, K&H 
(Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank), MHB (Magyar Hitelbank), (Balatoni, 2008; and Várhegyi, 2008). 
In 1994, foreign employees were employed in several foreign companies trading in Hungary. By 
opening branches in Hungary, foreign banks not only wanted to be present in the Hungarian 
financial market but also to provide quality banking services to foreigners living and working in 
Hungary. After 1990 and until 2002, both the concentration and the market share of the 
Hungarian banks were in constant change, Várhegyi, (2004). Furthermore, the main goal of 
foreign banks in Hungary was profit, mainly making money for the parent companies based in 
Germany, Austria, France, and England. A good example of this are the Austrian banks in the 
‘90s, the profit margin was the highest in the Eastern European markets (Várhegyi, 2001). But 
some banks were cautiously present in Hungary with a ‘wait and see’ policy. The overall goal of 
the acquisitions of Hungarian banks was presence in Eastern Europe and the exclusivity of 
ownership of the newly acquired Hungarian financial intermediaries. From 1995 to 2000, the 
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ownership of banks was in rapid change. In 1995, foreign banks had more than 79% ownership 
and by 2000 it was 91%, see ownership breakdown of banks, (in Hungarian, Várhegyi, 2001). 
See also the percentage of ownership of Hungarian banks for the period from 1988 to 2008 
(Banai, Király and Nagy, 2010). 
In 1997, the Second Banking Act was drawn up which gave a free path to forming branches in 
foreign financial intermediaries thus complying with pertaining OECD regulations, and also, 
opened the way for the EU membership preparations (Majnoni, Shankar and Várhegyi, 2003). 
The privatisation process was finalised by 1997 and most of the consolidations and takeovers 
were also finalised by 1999. In 1992, just prior to privatisation, Hungarian banks were on the 
edge of bankruptcy, unregulated, corrupted and badly managed, which led to an increased 
number of bad loans. Furthermore, two thirds of the bad loans were accumulated only with fifty 
companies. By the end of privatisation, Hungarian banks became stronger, stable enterprises. 
From 2000 onwards only a few takeovers took place and the Hungarian banking market settled 
down, (Neale and Bozsik, 2001). As the banking industry settled down, Hungarian banks’ 
profitability had a gradual increase. For example, as Várhegyi (2004) reports, from 1999 the 
KPI’s (Key Performance Indicator’s) for the banking industry in Hungary, such as return on 
equity (ROE) was 5.8% and return on assets (ROA) was 0.49%. Molnár, Nagy and Horváth 
(2007) show that between 2001 and 2005 return on equity (ROE) was in the region of 19% with a 
gradual yearly increase, and the return on assets (ROA) increased from 1.6% in 2001 to 2.5 % in 
2005, thanks to high fees, commissions and retail lending. However, the uptrend of ROA was 
declining from 2005 to be in the region of 1% in 2008, as Banai, Király and Nagy (2010) report. 
After 2008 ROE and ROA was in continuous drop reaching year end of 2011 in the region of 
0.3%, and in 2012 ROA increased above 0.5%  (Sources: The Central Bank of Hungary, MNB, 
2012, 5. Annex -Chart A66; MNB, 2013, Chart A75). 
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In the monobanking system, the state, apart of being an owner, also took control of the 
supervision of banks and the MNB. During the transformation process, i.e. at the beginning of it, 
banks were regulated by the Ministry of Finance. Later on the supervisory tasks were given to an 
autonomous agency in 1992. Lack of supervisory knowledge and limited powers mean that this 
autonomous agency could not perform efficiently, although supervision was significantly 
improved by the time its powers were expanded (Szapáry, 2001).   
In 1999, the government recognised the importance of establishing a supervisory financial 
authority that would oversee the financial sector. Thus the Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority - HFSA (Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete, PSZÁF – in Hungarian) was 
formed on 1
st
 April 2000. After its formation, a number of legislative acts were drawn, and the 
Act of CXXXV. 2007 regulates its operation (the ‘CXXXV’ law refers specifically to the 
financial sector and was published in the ‘Hungarian Journal, Official Gazette’ in 2000). The 
HFSA oversees operations of all the financial institutions, foreign or domestically owned that are 
trading in Hungary. It has gone through many positive changes, and today it is an independent 
body that not only monitors financial intermediaries but also cooperates with international 
financial and non-financial institutions. In 2013, under new legislation called ‘Act CXXXIX’, 
specifically on 1
st
 October 2013, the HFSA was merged with the Central Bank of Hungary 
(MNB) and now they are operating as one institution (Legislation, ‘Act CXXXXIX. in 2013’ 
regulates tasks of the MNB that includes the tasks of the Supervisory Authority). With the 
gradual transformation in Hungary, the Hungarian Accounting Standards (HAS) have also gone 
through a slow but systematic change. First changes in the accounting practises were introduced 
after 1989 with the accounting XVIII law that took effect in 1992. The next major change in HAS 
took place in 2000, the ‘Act C of 2000’ law on accounting, whose purpose was to harmonise the 
Hungarian accounting practise with the EU directives. Since 2000, the ‘HAS’ has gone through 
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many amendments. Under HAS, it is obligatory to prepare Cash Flow as part of annual accounts. 
Only under simplified annual reports, cash flow is not obligatory. Financial intermediaries are 
required to prepare and to provide, apart from the Profit and Loss Account and Balance Sheet, the 
Cash Flow statements to the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority – PSZÁF / MNB.  
One of the main benefits of the privatisation of the Hungarian banking industry was the initial 
capital injection to the undercapitalised and mismanaged banks, the implementation of new 
management practises and information technology, improved lending to corporate markets as 
well as to the public, improved banking services and constant training of staff by foreign banks. 
The first half of 1990 was a time of ‘depression and imbalances’. But the change to an economic 
growth took place in the second half of 1990, an increase in incomes increased consumption on 
the part of the population especially after 2001, (Várhegyi, 2008). As an example of 
Macroeconomic and financial indicators for Hungary for 1992-2006, this confirms the points 
made above (Várhegyi, 2008). Such growth demanded more consumer lending, especially after 
2001, and in 2004 under the socialist government program, which had ‘an income raising 
effect’….’meant that the economic environment favoured consumption lending’, Várhegyi (2008, 
p.353).  
 
The Hungarian owned retail banks (for example Országos Takarékpénztár - OTP, saving 
cooperatives) were engaged in the retail market, whereas foreign international banks mostly 
concentrated on corporate lendings. The conservative government (1998-2002) introduced ‘home 
loan support’ that put a strain on public finances, and when the socialist government took power 
in 2002, they made an amendment to the home loan scheme. Still under the socialist government, 
lending by banks to consumers and companies was on the rise from 2001. In 2001, loans to 
households, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) were 4%, and in 2007, it amounted 
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to 21%. Comparing Hungarian lending to those of other Eastern European countries and to the 
EU, Hungary had modest lending, Várhegyi (2008). 
 
Due to an aggressive lending policy by banks, a more visible increase in lending to Households 
sector was evident from 2003 as Figure 3.1 shows: 
 
Figure 3.1. Lending to Households 
 
Notes: Figure 3.1 shows a visible increase from 75% in 2003 to a jump in lending reaching 97% in the years 
2008/2009. Source: Annex 1. The Central Bank of Hungary (MNB) 
 
In 2008, Lehman Brothers went into bankruptcy plus the US housing market collapse initiated a 
recession. Hungary and its industry were not an exception. Banks in Hungary enjoyed big returns 
in earlier years from 2000, as parent banks gradually eased their conservative lending policy in 
Hungary. The return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) percentage of Hungarian banks 
were almost twice as higher as those of foreign counterparts. But that changed soon enough as 
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banks began to tighten credit conditions terms, see for example The Central Bank of Hungary, 
MNB Report - Trends in Lending - August 2013. From 2005, consumer (housing, car and other) 
and corporate lending were increasing with a significant jump in 2008 in foreign currencies such 
as Swiss Francs (CHF), EUROs, Japanese Yens (JPY) and in Hungarian Forints (HUF). The most 
significant jump in foreign currency lending was in CHF from 2006, mainly for housing and car 
loans.   
 
Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 present lending histories to Consumers and to the Corporate Sector from 
2003, prior to the crisis, where there is a gradual increase in lending with a jump in 2008/2009:  
 
Figure 3.2. Lending to Consumers 
 
Notes: Figure 3.2 presents lending to consumers HUF 500 billion in 2003 and then an increase to almost HUF 4000 
billion in the second half of 2008. This is an increase from 60% to 100% from years 2003 to 2008 / 2009. Lending 
after the 2008 financial crisis was between HUF 3500 billion to HUF 4000 billion on annual basis. Source: The 
Central Bank of Hungary (MNB) 
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Figure 3.3. Lending to Corporate Sector 
 
Notes:  Figure 3.3 shows a similar increase in lending to corporate sector as in Figure 3.2, lending to consumers, the 
corporate sector’s lending increase was similar, it went from 38% to 80% increase from years 2003 to 2009. After 
the 2008 financial crisis lending was between HUF 6000 to HUF7000 billion on annual basis. Source: The Central 
Bank of Hungary (MNB) 
 
In October 2008, banks started to face their own vulnerabilities due to their aggressive lending 
policy. The foreign parent banks’ policy started to change, as the Hungarian banks came to a 
liquidity trap and needed to recapitalise. In the last quarter of 2008 over 3 billion Euros were used 
to recapitalise the Hungarian banks by their foreign parent banks, (Banai, Király and Nagy, 
2010).  
 
The contribution of individual factors to changes in banks’ credit conditions in the corporate 
segment and to changes in corporate loans are presented in Figure 3.4 and in Figure 3.5 
respectively: 
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Figure 3.4 Changes in credit conditions 
 
Notes: Figure 3.4. Due to the 2008 financial crisis the ‘Change in credit conditions’, the dashed line, has a significant 
decline since 2008 until Q2 2013. Liquidity, capital and credit conditions of the banks were also declining. Source: 
The Central Bank of Hungary (MNB), Aug. 2013 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Changes in corporate loans 
 
Notes: Figure 3.5 shows a decline of outstanding corporate loans in Hungary since the financial crisis started in 
2008, compared to Eurozone and rest of the countries. Only the Baltic States witnessed a better decline in 
outstanding corporate loans, whereas Bulgaria, Romania and Poland increased in corporate lending. Changes in 
corporate loans outstanding in an international comparison (October 2008 = 100, exchange rate adjusted). Source: 
The Central Bank of Hungary (MNB), Aug. 2013 
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  Figure 3.6. Changes in credit conditions 
 
Notes: Figure 3.6 shows a huge jump in the tightening the credit conditions at the beginning of 2008, due to the 2008 
financial crisis, and then banks slowly started to ease their lending conditions with the most significant ease in 2012 
for Consumer and Housing loans. Easing Consumer loans was more significant beyond 2013. Source: The Central 
Bank of Hungary (MNB), Aug. 2013 
 
 
3.3. The adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards into the Hungarian 
Accounting Standards 
 
Hungary, as a full member of the European Union (EU) since 2004, adopted IFRS on January 1
st
 
2005. All financial companies listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange (BUX) must prepare 
consolidated financial statements by applying International Financial Reporting System (IFRS) 
rules under the ‘EU Regulation of 1016/2002’. The adopted IFRS is the same version as the one 
adopted in the EU, with differences mainly pertaining to financial instruments. Despite the 
adoption of IFRS, all companies trading in Hungary must file annual accounts under the 
Hungarian Accounting Standards (HAS) to the court of registry and to the Ministry of Public 
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Administration and Justice, or Közigazgatási és Igazságügyi Minisztérium (KIM) in Hungarian, 
as per ‘Act of Accounting 2000’, or Act ‘C’. Act ‘C’ also consists of regulations referring to 
banks and insurance firms that are required to comply with the European Central Bank. Act ‘C’ 
for financial firms was amended in 2001. Firms with parent companies also prepare consolidated 
financial statements, regulated under Act ‘C’. The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, or 
the HFSA/MNB, requires all financial intermediaries to prepare financial statements, Income 
Statements and Balance Sheets to be audited under the Hungarian Accounting Standards, or 
HAS. Firms are also obliged to provide a copy of their annual audited statements to the 
HFSA/MNB. The HFSA/MNB does not monitor consolidated financial statements whether they 
comply with IFRS rules or not. For example, if a certain company adopted IFRS rules, regardless 
of this standard, a year-end financial statement is mandatory to file under the HAS. Tax returns of 
companies are prepared under the HAS and not under IFRS. (Source: World Bank, 2004 and 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2009). 
 
‘In the area of accounting, financial reporting, and auditing law, Hungary implemented the 
Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth EU Company Law Directives, and ISA. All companies, including 
banks and insurance entities, are required to present financial statements and, insofar as they are 
parent companies, consolidated financial statements prepared in conformity with the accounting 
regulations in Act C on Accounting of 2000’…. ‘While Hungarian accounting regulations are 
based on the Fourth and Seventh EU Company Law directives, they may not always be adequate 
to meet the expectations and needs of users - especially foreign users - of financial statements 
prepared by those public interest entities’, (World Bank, Executive Summary, 2004).  
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3.3.1. Differences between the Hungarian Accounting Standards and the International 
Financial Reporting Standards 
 
Table 3.1 The Hungarian Accounting 
Standards (HAS) 
The International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
Measurement bases Uses historical cost, except for 
specific asset components (for 
instance derivatives and some 
securities) that are measured at 
fair value. 
Uses historical cost, but intangible 
assets, property, plant and 
equipment (PPE) and investment 
property may be revalued. 
Derivatives, biological assets and 
most securities must be measured 
at fair value.  
Full set of financial 
statements 
Balance sheets, income statement, 
statement of changes in equity, 
cash flow statement and notes 
including accounting policies and 
comments. Statement of changes 
in equity and cash flow statements 
are not required in a number of 
cases. 
Statement of financial position, 
Statement of Comprehensive 
Income, Statement of changes in 
equity, Statement of cash flows 
and accounting policies and notes.  
 
Format of financial 
statements 
A standard format (structure) is 
prescribed according to 4th EU 
Directive. Companies can choose 
between type A and type B. 
Does not prescribe any particular 
format of financial statements. 
Elements of 
financial statements 
No definition of elements exists. 
The elements are listed by the 
Ministry of Finance. 
Definition of assets, liabilities, 
equity, income and expenses is 
stated in the IFRS Conceptual 
Framework. 
Functional currency Not defined. Financial statements must be 
prepared in functional currency. 
Afterwards, financial statements 
can be presented in any currency. 
Statement of Com- 
prehensive Income 
Does not exist. Required for all companies from 
2009 according to IAS 1. 
Revenues 
recognition 
Mainly the tax rules followed. Detailed guidance for revenue 
recognition in IAS 11 and 18. 
Construction 
contracts 
Revenue and cost based on 
invoiced amounts. 
Percentage of completion method 
preferred; guidance in IAS 11. 
Extraordinary items  Include unusual operations with 
regard to the normal activities of 
an entity and cases of random 
events, changes in accounting 
methodology and corrections of 
material prior-period errors. 
Prohibited from 2005. 
Prior period errors Included in extraordinary items in Comparatives are restated 
Chapter 3  
114 
 
Change in 
accounting policy 
Included in extraordinary items in 
the income statement of the 
current period. 
Comparatives are restated 
(retrospective adjustment). 
Intangible assets Measured at cost. According to IAS 38, revaluations 
are permitted in rare 
circumstances. 
Acquired intangible 
assets 
Capitalised if the definition of 
intangible assets is met; amortised 
over their useful life. 
Revaluations and indefinite life 
are not permitted. Start-up costs 
are capitalised. 
Capitalised if recognition criteria 
are met; intangible assets may 
have indefinite useful life or are 
amortised over the useful life. 
Intangible assets with indefinite 
useful life are tested for 
impairment annually. Training 
costs and advertising costs are 
expensed. 
Internally generated 
intangible assets 
Research and development costs 
are capitalised.  
Research costs are expensed as 
they are incurred. Development 
costs are capitalised only if 
stringent recognition criteria are 
met. 
Property, plant and 
equipment 
Measured at historical cost. Spare 
parts are inventory (not property, 
plant and equipment). 
Component approach to 
depreciation is not allowed. Time 
value of money in case of 
deferred payment is not taken into 
account. 
According to IAS 16, measured at 
historical costs or revalued 
amounts (fair value). Material 
long-term spare parts are 
property, plant and equipment. 
The component approach must be 
applied in determining 
depreciation for property, plant 
and equipment. Time value of 
money in case of deferred 
payment is taken into account. 
Assets held for sale No guidance exists – assets are 
presented and measured under the 
group of assets in which they 
were initially recognised until de-
recognition. 
According to IFRS 5, non-current 
assets are classified as held for 
sale if their carrying amount will 
be recovered principally through a 
sale transaction rather than 
through continuing use. A non-
current asset classified as held-
for-sale is measured at the lower 
of its carrying amount and is not 
depreciated. 
Leases  classification A lease is only accounted for as 
financial lease when the 
ownership is transferred to the 
According to IAS 17, leases are 
classified as finance leases if 
substantially all risks and rewards 
the income statement of the 
current period. 
(retrospective adjustment). 
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leassee at the end of the lease 
term. 
of ownership transferred to a 
leassee. Substance rather than 
legal form is important. 
Conditions for finance lease are 
broader than just transfer of the 
ownership. 
 
Impairment of assets No detailed guidance was given. According to IAS 36, if 
impairment indicated, write down 
assets to higher of the fair value 
less cost to sell and the value in 
use based on discounted cash 
flows. Reversals of losses 
permitted (excluding goodwill). 
Borrowing cost Capitalised contractual interest, 
not full borrowing costs. 
Full borrowing cost capitalised 
according to IAS 23. 
Investment property No specific guidance; investment 
property treated as property, plant 
and equipment. 
According to IAS 40, measured at 
depreciated cost less accumulated 
depreciation or fair value; 
changes in fair value recognised 
in the income statement. 
Biological assets No specific guidance. Treated as 
inventories or fixed assets, fair 
value measurement not permitted. 
Measured at fair value according 
to IAS 41. 
Foreign exchange 
losses 
Particular exchange losses can be 
capitalised. 
According to IAS 21, exchange 
gains and losses are expensed. 
Long-term liabilities In the case of deferred payment, 
time value of money is not taken 
into account. 
In the case of deferred payment, 
time value of money is taken into 
account. 
Provisions Provisions for contingent 
liabilities, possible risks and 
expected losses are permitted. 
Provisions for future repairs of 
property, plant and equipment are 
created. Time value of money is 
not taken into account. 
According to IAS 37, The 
provision is recognised if a 
present obligation from past 
events exists; the outflow of 
resources is probable and the 
amount can be reliably estimated. 
Where the effect of the time value 
of money is material, the amount 
of a provision shall be the present 
value of the obligation. 
Deferred tax Rules for deferred tax accounting 
are not included. 
Full recognition of deferred tax 
liability and deferred tax asset 
when (for an asset when particular 
conditions are met). 
Treasury stock Recognised as investments. Recognised as a reduction of 
equity. 
Segment reporting Minimum requirements. Include the definition of a 
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segment and detail requirements 
for segment reporting and 
disclosure in IFRS 8. 
Risk analysis Not required. Detailed requirements for risk 
analysis in IFRS 7. 
Share-based 
payments 
No guidance Detailed guidance for recognition 
and measurement in IFRS 2. 
Financial 
instruments 
Detailed guidance for banks 
comparable to IFRS. Minimum 
requirements for other businesses. 
Detailed requirements for all 
businesses including banks and 
other businesses.  
Events after 
reporting period 
Not defined. Detailed guidance in IAS 10. 
Related party 
disclosures 
Minimum requirements. Detailed guidance and 
requirements for disclosure in 
IAS 24. 
Earnings per share No requirements. Basic and diluted EPS must be 
presented in the Statement of 
Comprehensive income according 
to IAS 33.  
Notes: Table 3.1 presents differences between the Hungarian Accounting Standards (HAS) and the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Own presentation. Source: RIBZ Consulting – Ildikó Rózsa (2013)  
 
This study arrived at the conclusion that there are significant differences between the Hungarian 
Accounting Standards (HAS) and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The 
main reason for this discrepancy is that the main goal of introducing HAS was to get the year-end 
figure for the deduction of corporate income tax, whereas the IFRS has its focus on informing 
investors. The IFRS is principle-based while the HAS is itemised, that is, rule-based, and almost 
every transaction is regulated. Despite the fact that the Hungarian accounting regulations are 
based on the Fourth and Seventh EU Company Law directives, the author of this study does not 
believe that the implementation of the IFRS as the main reporting standard will occur in Hungary 
in the foreseeable future. It is debatable whether the IFRS would be a better reporting standard 
than the HAS. For example, Jarva and Lantto (2011) argue that IFRS is ‘not supperior’ to the 
local GAAP, i.e. to the Finish accounting satndards. 
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3.4. Type of financial intermediaries trading in Hungary 
 
The type and number of financial intermediaries operating in Hungary at the end of the year 
2012: 
 
 Credit Institutions operating as joint stock companies, a total of 41 
 Cooperative Credit Institutions, a total of 128 
 Branches of Foreign Credit institutions, a total of 9 
 Financial Enterprises, a total of 250 
 Payment Institutions, a total of 4 
 Investment Enterprises, a total of 25 
 Investment Fund Managers, a total of 35 
 Insurance Associations, a total of 19 
 Insurance Institutions, a total of 35 
 Insurance Intermediaries, a total of 80 
 Pension funds  – health and voluntary mutual assistance, a total of 106 
 
Source: The Golden Book, 2012 – HFSA / MNB 
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3.5. Summary of the Hungarian Credit Institutions 
 
Growth of Hungary’s credit institutions since the 19th century, before and after the World War I 
and II, to the present day has been a long and difficult journey. Before the transition, Hungary 
had an inefficient economy, a communist-run state where all decisions, not only political but also 
economic, were centralised by the communist regime. Since the transformation began in 1987, 
Hungary and its financial institutions have gone through long and difficult changes. New 
legislation was drawn up for a more efficient, competitive banking system and since then, the 
Hungarian Accounting Standards have become transparent. By joining the European Union 
Hungary adopted the EU directives as a full member of the EU. Total economy GDP has been 
rising ever since, including foreign investments and international reserves. Banking products for 
consumers and corporate clients have also been widened. Since the millennium change, the 
banking industry has become a modern and competitive industry with over forty Banks, 
Cooperative Institutions, Financial Enterprises, Pension Funds and other financial companies 
with foreign and domestic owners. Since its establishment, the Financial Supervisory Authority 
has been supervising the dealings of financial intermediaries in Hungary, and since 2013, it has 
been under the aegis of the Central Bank of Hungary, (MNB).  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 4 presents the context of research design and data used in this study. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Context of Research Design  
 
The primary focus of Chapter 4 is on data, research methods, hypotheses, theories and testing 
approaches in an attempt to answer the research question that reads: 
‘Did credit institutions trading in Hungary avoid earnings decreases for the period of 
1999-2012?’ 
 
4.1. Research Data  
4.1.1. Types of Data  
 
Crowther and Lancaster (2012) write that data can be primary and secondary. Primary data 
becomes existent through research, i.e. it is collected via surveys, observations, interviews and 
experiments. Secondary data is existent prior to research and only awaits collection. Apart from 
being primary and secondary, data can also be qualitative and quantitative, as Crowther and 
Lancaster (2012) point out. Quantitative data is said to be objective and more scientific as it is 
‘… associated with more traditional scientific approaches to research…’ – Crowther and 
Lancaster (2012, p.75). ‘Numbers are used to record much information about science and 
society, for example pressures, bending forces, population densities, cost indices etc. This type of 
data is called quantitative data’, as Walliman (2011, p.71) explains. The author further describes 
that Qualitative data is based on words, for example, on emotions, ideas, beliefs, judgements and 
it refers to qualities or attributes. Qualitative data is difficult to measure due to its form, whereas 
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quantitative data does not convey emotions, ideas or beliefs. Therefore, both types of 
measurement of data depend on the type of research being conducted.  
 
Once the type of data has been determined, the next step is data collection. Data can be collected 
in various forms, as Crowther and Lancaster (2012) point out. These comprise case studies, 
secondary data collection, experimentation, observation, interviews, surveys and action research. 
The type of data required in the context of the research question is called secondary data. 
Secondary data is already existent; it was produced by experts. In order to collect secondary data, 
there is a need to locate it and to assess its credibility. Sources of secondary data can be in diverse 
forms: 
- Written materials (such as organisational materials, production records, personal data, 
emails, letters, etc.);  
- Non-written materials (such as television and radio programs, video and tape recordings, 
etc.); 
- Survey data (such as economic data, economic forecast, a government census of the 
population, sales, etc.). 
 
Secondary data can also be accessed via the internet, for example, the company’s financial 
statements such as its profit and loss account, balance sheet, cash flow statement and other 
available data. There are also companies that offer services, as part of their database 
management, for scientific research, which can also be downloaded from the internet. 
Specifically, the internet site of Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (http://www.bvdinfo.com) 
statistical offices of particular countries, financial authorities etc. For example for the Hungarian 
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financial authority secondary data, i.e. the so called Golden Book can be accessed via 
https://www.mnb.hu/en/supervision, from where data for this study was gathered.  
 
Population consists of the whole survey sample. Donley (2012, p.92) defines a population as ‘… 
the complete list of elements that the sample will be derived from.’ Walliman (2011, p.94) shows 
Sample relation to Sampling Frame and Population, where Population consists of the whole 
survey. Sampling Frame is part of the Population, as it is interested in a specific area, or in 
‘certain groups’ of the population.  
 
4.1.2. Gathering the Data of the Hungarian banks 
 
Since 1989, the accounting regulations have gone through changes, with a major law passed in 
2000, namely the ‘Act C of 2000 on Accounting’ act, and harmonisation has been on-going ever 
since. Hungary has adopted the European directives and implemented them into the Hungarian 
Accounting Standards, or HAS. Under the ‘Act C’ The Profit and Loss Accounts and Balance 
Sheet statements are mandatory for companies at the end of each fiscal year. A cash flow 
statement is also obligatory, but only as a part of Notes accompanying the financial statements. 
Companies’ financial reports are required by law and must be submitted to the Court of Registry 
and to the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, or Közigazgatási és Igazságügyi 
Minisztérium (KIM) in Hungarian, where the general public, analysts, investors can access them 
for various purposes. Financial intermediaries are obliged by the Hungarian Accounting 
Standards (HAS) to send their year-end audited reports to the Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority, the HFSA (PSZÁF, in Hungarian). On 1
st
 October 2013, the HFSA merged with the 
Central Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank - MNB, in Hungarian). Prior to 1
st
 October 
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2013, the HFSA was accessible on www.pszaf.hu internet site, and since 1
st
 October 2013, it can 
be reached on the MNB internet address: https://www.mnb.hu/en/supervision in English. 
Additionally, the reader can find further information on Credit Institutions’ Data on the MNB 
internet site. Credit Institutions’ Data is prepared under the Hungarian Accounting Standards 
(HAS) only. 
Prior to gathering data, it was necessary to ascertain that the data collected was reliable, valid and 
relevant to test the research question. The collection of reliable data connotes that the data 
findings will consistently be without any error(s) or bias, as Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
(2012) point out. The source of the data was, therefore, crucial, as the credibility of the tests rely 
on credible data, with nil or minimal possible errors. As the research of this study focuses solely 
on the investigation of credit institutions trading in Hungary, the first attempt to gather data on 
banks in Hungary was from the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, or the HFSA / MNB. 
After making contact with the HFSA/ MNB, credit institutions audited data was obtained from 
the HFSA / MNB, for the period from 1999 to 2012. Due to takeovers and mergers, the period 
before 1999 was excluded due to the incompleteness of financial reports; consequently, using 
data from the period prior to 1999 would have created the risk of possible false results in the 
statistical analysis due to ‘Type I’ or ‘Type II’ errors. ‘Type I’ error refers to a ‘…probability of 
rejecting true hypothesis...’, whereas ‘Type II’ error refers to ‘…the probability of accepting the 
false hypothesis…’, (Gujarati, 1995, p.131). 
The sample for testing is not as large as for example Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) or Holland 
and Ramsay’s (2003) as they were testing all industries except financials. The HFSA/MNB 
publishes data on a yearly basis according to Hungarian Accounting Standards (HAS). The 
samples consist of one listed and other non-listed companies. Only the OTP Bank is listed on the 
Hungarian Stock Exchange, but despite its listing, the OTP Bank yearly figures were prepared 
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under HAS. Furthermore, banks’ data applied in this study is from the year-end financial 
statements of diverse total assets sizes. Banks trading in Hungary prepare and send their audited 
financial statements to the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA / MNB) as well as 
to the Court of Registry. Banks calculate their own Equity book value at each year-end, on 31
st
 of 
December, whereas in the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) study, the authors use the calculated 
‘beginning-of-the-year market value of common equity’ from the Compustat database.  
 
The population for testing consists of companies of different asset sizes in all areas of the 
industry. The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, as part of the Central Bank of 
Hungary, (HFSA/MNB) publishes data on a yearly basis according to Hungarian Accounting 
Standards (HAS) only. The nature of the data published by the HFSA / MNB has its own 
limitations, as only Profit and Loss Accounts and Balance Sheets are available. A further 
limitation is that the HFSA/MNB does not use the detailed financial statements of financial 
intermediaries, but prepares its own. For example, under current assets, ‘Cash and current 
accounts’ are published as one figure, whereas in company statements, they are usually split. The 
HFSA/MNB states that the Golden Book is, ‘The data of credit institutions, and it contains the 
data of joint-stock companies and the data of financial enterprises qualified as credit institutions 
from a prudential point of view.’ (Source: www.mnb.hu).  
 
An extract of the published Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss account and bank data are 
included as an example and are presented in Table 4.1 and in Table 4.2:  
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Table 4.1: Extract from the Golden Book’s Balance Sheet 
 
  Table 4.1 presents Golden Book extract. Source: The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA/MNB) 
 
In order to see what ‘Other accruals and other assets’ under Assets truly comprise is difficult to 
state due to the lack of explanations in the ‘Golden Book’ – the main source of data in this study.  
 
Table 4.2: Profit and Loss accounts that the HFSA/MNB publishes contain credit institutions’ 
data on a yearly basis in the following format: Table 4.2: 
 
Table 4.2: Extract from the Golden Book’s, the Profit and Loss account 
 
Table 4.2 shows Golden Book extract. Source: The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA/MNB) 
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In the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority’s (HFSA/MNB) Golden Book, the 
characteristics of the Population are ‘Grouped by Type’. For example, profit and loss account is 
grouped by ‘Total Interest Income’, or for ‘Profit or Loss After Tax’, please see Tables 4.1 and 
4.2 while ‘Grouped by type’ population refers to distinctive groups. However, a number of banks 
undergo changes during the financial year due to takeovers and mergers. The population at the 
time of the collection of data was available for the period from 1999 to 2012 financial years and 
it is only for Credit institutions operating as joint-stock companies. A sample of the population 
ranges from 37-44 banks per year.  
 
Comments cited from the yearly Golden Book’s ‘methodology’ part: 
‘The banking sector's data include the figures of credit institutions working as public or private 
limited liability companies (Nyrt. / Zrt.), that is, banks and specialized credit institutions 
(mortgage lending institutions, home savings and loan associations) together with state-owned 
MFB (Hungarian Investment and Development Bank) and EXIM (Hungarian Export-Import 
Bank) and also the clearing house so called KELER Rt. Some institutions went through 
transformation such as acquisition, merger, and some wound up without successor. The 
institution named ‘Postai Elszámoló Központot Működtető Intézmény (Magyar Posta Zrt.)’ is 
listed in the sector of payment institutions, because the institution has to operate according to the 
regulations for payment institutions – with a few exceptions’.  (Source: Methodology - Golden 
Book’s, HFSA/MNB). 
 
Figure 4.1 presents yearly fluctuations of the Credit institutions operating as joint stock 
companies in Hungary for the period between 1999 and 2012. Figure 4.1:  
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Figure 4.1: Yearly fluctuations of the Credit institutions 
    
Notes: Figure 4.1 shows credit institutions operating as joint - stock companies. The chart above outlines that number 
of changes of banks on the yearly basis. This is caused mainly by takeovers and mergers. Source: The Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA/MNB) Golden Book and own calculation and presentation. 
 
The available population data was not as detailed as the data from foreign databases, for example 
from Compustat or Amadeus; nevertheless, it gave me an opportunity to outline the research 
design so as to test the research question and hypotheses. This is discussed in Section 4.2. 
 
4.2. Hypotheses 
 
Chapter 1 of this study presented the Research Question, it reads as: 
 
‘Did credit institutions trading in Hungary avoid earnings decreases for the period of 
1999-2012?’ 
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Panik (2005, p.569) writes, the ‘… hypothesis is a statement about the probability distribution of 
a random variable.’  In an attempt to investigate the research question, this study applies an 
alternative (research) hypothesis, namely, a ‘directional’ approach, as Martin and Bridgmon 
(2012, p.32) write. Martin and Bridgmon (2012, p.31) note ‘A directional alternative hypothesis 
does state an expectation of the outcome of the study’.  
 
To answer the research question, the following four hypotheses were formulated from five 
research studies. Hypothesis H0(a): was designed from the Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) study, 
hypothesis H0(b): from the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) paper, hypothesis H0(c): from the 
Holland and Ramsay (2003) paper, whereas hypothesis H0(d): was designed from the 
Charoenwong and Jiraporn (2008) and from the Cohen, Cornett, et al. (2014) studies. Hypotheses 
H0(a-d): read as: 
 
H0(a): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings. 
H0(b): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid 
earnings decreases. 
H0(c): Large and small Credit institutions (Banks) scaled by median of Total 
Assets in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases. 
H0(d): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings ‘Prior to’ 
and ‘After’ 2008, when the financial crisis starts. 
 
Hypotheses H0(a-b): are directly linked to the research question, whereas Hypotheses H0(c-d): are 
additional hypotheses to investigate EM per banks’ assets size, prior to or after 2008.  
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4.3. Testing Approaches 
 
In the literature review of this study, in Chapter 2, the summary of Dechow, Ge and Schrand’s 
(2010) study was critically reviewed and the ‘commonly used’ empirical proxies were 
highlighted, such as accruals, with (regression) models linked to theories. This study also applies 
a regression model, testing Total Accruals and Non-Discretionary Accruals. However, in search 
of evidence of earnings management (EM) by applying only the accrual approach is not robust 
enough, therefore it may not be sufficient, as evidence based only on accruals is rather weak, see 
for example Healy (1985). Knowing the weakness of the accrual method, this study additionally 
applies the standard discontinuity model. However, Durtschi and Easton’s (2005; 2009) studies 
argue that discontinuity may arise other than EM. In contrast to Durtschi and Easton’s (2005; 
2009) arguments, Gore, Pope and Singh’s (2007) and Burgstahler and Chuck’s (2015) evidence 
reject Durtschi and Easton’s (2005; 2009) findings.  
 
This study concludes that by applying only the accrual or only the distribution method may not 
be robust enough, and uses both the accrual and the distribution method for testing. Additionally, 
the author of this study designed the Distribution of Ratios Method, a new testing approach.  
 
The three main empirical testing approaches are:   
 
1. The Standard Discontinuity Method. Hypothesis, H0(b): is tested with Scaled Earnings(t) 
(Profit after Tax(t) by Total Assets(t-1)), or PAT(t) / TA(t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change 
(ΔProfit after Tax by Total Assets(t-2)), or ΔPAT / TA(t-2) ratios. 
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2. The Accrual method. With the availability of accruals, the author of this study designed 
the following two regression models:  
1. Et = β1jt (TACCR. jt) + εjt 
2. PATt = β0jt + β1jt (NDAjt) + β2jt (DAjt) + εjt. 
Where E(t) = Scaled Earnings change in period(t); TACCR. = Total Accruals in period (t) 
divided by Total Assets in period (t-1); PAT(t) = Profit After Tax in period(t); NDA(t) = 
Non-Discretionary Accruals(t) = Accrued interest payable(t); DA(t)= Discretionary 
Accruals(t) = Other accruals and other liabilities(t); β jt = j and t are firm and time for the 
parameter; εt
 
= error term in period (t).  
Models tested TACCR. (Total Accruals), DA (Discretionary Accruals) and NDA (Non-
Discretionary Accruals) data to answer Hypothesis, H0(a):. 
 
3. The Distribution of Ratios Method. It has four Testing Approaches:  
3.1. From the 14 ratios, in SPSS, histograms were run at median, zero point, which is the 
threshold point for visual investigation only. 
Apart from the accrual approach, as well as from the visual investigation of the 14 ratios, 
this study re-calculates the 14 ratios to test Hypothesis H0(a): by applying Burgstahler and 
Dichev’s (1997, p.103), as well as Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) models, 
and then histograms and test statistics with Kolmogorov-Smirnov one sample test are 
performed. Additionally, benchmark analysis was calculated for each ratio. 
3.2. Earnings (Profit After Tax) in period (t) divided by Total Assets (TA) in period (t-1), or 
PAT(t) by TA(t-1) and Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets (TA) in period (t-2), or 
ΔPAT by TA(t-2) variables were calculated with Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, 
p.540) modified Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model. 
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3.3. The same as Holland and Ramsay (2003, p.54), Total Assets (TA) were split into large 
(LC) and small (SC) companies based on sample median of total assets and calculated 
with the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) and the Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) models of Earnings in period (t) divided by Total Assets in 
period (t-1); and Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios. 
Additionally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test statistics was run to test H0(c):.  
3.4. Splitting Total Assets (TA) into ‘prior to’ and ‘after’ 2008, when the financial crisis 
started, H0(d):, was tested with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test statistics with 
Earnings in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1), and Change in Earnings 
divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios. 
 
4.4. The First Empirical Approach – The Standard Discontinuity Method 
4.4.1. Descriptive Statistics of the sample used for the First Empirical Approach 
 
Prior to calculations of each ratio in Excel, to start with, banks’ year-end audited financial 
statements results were used from the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (the HFSA / 
MNB’s) database, for the period from 1999 to 2012. Then from each year’s balance sheet and 
profit and loss account numbers for the total assets and liabilities, equity, deposits, loans, accrued 
interest receivables, total interest income, total interest expenses, net interest income, profit or 
loss after tax amounts were imported to ‘Credit Inst (banks) BASE variables calculation 
2012_1999.xlsx’ excel sheet. For example, the ‘Credit Inst (banks) BASE variables calculation 
2012_1999.xlsx’ excel sheet for the year 2012 is presented in Table 4.3. 
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  Table 4.3: Extract from Credit Inst (banks) BASE variables calculation 2012_1999.xlsx excel sheet 
 
Notes: Table 4.3 presents data as follows: in column ‘A’, the number of banks, in column ‘B’, the name of the credit     
institutions, in column ‘C’, the ‘total assets’, etc. Within the file, there are 14 sheets, each sheet representing the 
fiscal year with ratios calculations. The process of inputting amounts were done for each balance sheet and profit and 
loss account item to calculate each ratio for each year from 1999 to 2012, using formulas as described under section 
4.6.2., Chapter 4. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Prior to testing the models, descriptive statistics of the ratios were run from the base sample.   
 
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 Earnings t / Total 
Assets (t-1) 
Change in Earnings / 
Total Assets (t-2) 
Number of Observation 482 411 
Mean .0007 .0027 
Std. Error of Mean .00194 .00224 
Median .0048 .0014 
Std. Deviation .04252 .04544 
Variance .002 .002 
Skewness -3.947 1.722 
Std. Error of Skewness .111 .120 
Kurtosis 27.438 32.214 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .222 .240 
Range .48 .72 
Minimum -.37 -.31 
Maximum .12 .41 
Notes: Table 4.4 shows descriptive Statistics for Scaled Earnings (Profit After Tax in period t divided by Total 
Assets in period t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change (Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period t-2) ratios, 
calculated from the base sample, for period 2000 - 2012. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
The next section outlines the Standard Discontinuity Methods. 
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4.4.2. Earnings Management Model 1 
 
This study calculates descriptive statistics of scaled earnings and scaled earnings change, the 
same ratios as in Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) study, where scaled earnings equals Profit After 
Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1); and scaled earnings change is ΔPAT = 
Change in Earnings (t) – (t -1) divided by Total Asset in period (t-2). Due to the nature of the data 
in the balance sheet, it cannot be distinguished if accruals were reversed, and if so, in which 
period. Therefore, testing scaled earnings and scaled earnings change might also suffer from 
testing power, due to reversal accruals as, for example, Dechow, Hutton et al. (2012) study 
explains.  
Testing was performed with the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model:   
 
EM1 = (AOi - EOi) / SDi      (1) 
 
EM1 is equal to the actual observation (AO) in period (i) minus the expected observation (EO) in 
period (i). The result of the actual minus the expected observation is divided by the standard 
deviation (SD) of the difference in period (i).  
 
Where,   
EM1 = Earnings Management testing Model 1 
AOi = Actual Observation in interval (i) 
EOi = Expected Observation in interval (i) = (ni-1 + ni+1) / 2      
SDi = Standard Deviation of the difference; where the SDi is the difference between actual 
and expected observation in interval (i) 
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The Actual Observations (AO) of the ratios were calculated earlier, and we need to calculate the 
Expected Observation (EO), the Estimated probability observation ‘i’ divided by total 
observation, which was needed to calculate the SDi = Standard deviation of the difference, in 
interval (i). The standard deviation of the difference was explained by Shen and Chih (2005), and 
by Hamdi and Zarai (2012) who similarly interpret the Standard Deviation of the difference 
formula, as this study does. With this approach, this study tests hypothesis H0(b): for Earnings 
(Profit After Tax) in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1); and for Change in 
Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios.  
 
In Appendix 2.1, this study explains elements and calculations of the SDi formula with an 
example. Additionally, the SDi formula is outlined in testing Approach 3.2, bellow of Chapter 4. 
 
4.4.3. Earnings Management Model 2 
 
Same as for Earnings Management Model 1, (EM1), the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s 
(1999, p.31) model was applied to tests smoothness and continuity of the distribution, a ‘t-like 
test statistics, Ʈ ’.  
Earnings Management Model 2, EM2, formula reads: 
 
EM2 = Ʈn = [ Δpn - mean (Δpi) ] / s.d. (Δpi)     (2) 
 
where, i ϵ R, i ≠ n. pi is the ratio of the actual sample for year i of banks years, Δpn is the 
difference of pi - pi-1. Mean (Δpi) is the average of Δp but excluding pi and s.d. (Δpi) is the stan- 
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dard deviation of Δp, excluding Δpi.  The same model was applied by Shen and Chih (2005).  
Testing Approach 3.1, with EM2 model, H0(b): is tested for the Profit after Tax in period (t) 
divided by Total Assets in period (t-1); and Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period 
(t-2) ratios. The actual observations (AO) of each variable per yearly base was imported from the 
base excel sheet called ‘Credit Inst (banks) BASE variables calculation 2012_1999.xlsx’ to 
‘Degeroge et al – EM2.xlsx’ excel sheet. For example, for the variable debt to equity, DTE, all 
variables’ data for 2012 is copied into a new sheet, namely, into the 2012 column. The same was 
performed for the year 2011 until 1999. An explanation for each calculation is shown in 
Appendix 2.2. 
 
4.5. The Second Empirical Approach - The Accrual method  
4.5.1. Descriptive Statistics of the sample used for the Second Empirical Approach 
 
Since 1991, researchers investigated earnings management (EM) by applying the accrual 
approach, the widely used Jones’s (1991) accrual model. The authors tested total, non-
discretionary and discretionary accruals in search for EM. See for example Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) for more details. Prior to modelling, this study runs descriptive statistics. The 
Sample was tested with the Accrual Method with data from the Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority (HFSA), now part of the Hungarian Central Bank (HFSA / MNB). In the balance sheet, 
within assets and liabilities, accruals such as ‘Accrued interest receivables’, ’Other accruals and 
other assets’, ‘Accrued interest payable’ and ‘Other accruals and other liabilities’ are available 
for testing. It is not clear what ‘Other accruals and other assets’, and ‘Other accruals and other 
liabilities’ comprise.  
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To test accruals, this study applies Total Accruals, and is calculated as:  
 
TAccr. t = Total Accruals in period (t) = Accrued interest receivables t + Other accruals 
and other assets t - Accrued interest payable t - Other accruals and other liabilities t 
 
From the sample, an assumption was made that accruals were reversed as a necessity in their 
required time frame. The following tables present descriptive statistics of each variable. The 
tested variables are: Total Accruals scaled by Total Assets (TACCR); Scaled Change in Earnings 
(E); Non-Discretionary Accruals, (NDA); Discretionary Accruals, (DA); Profit After Tax in 
period t, (PATt); as shown in tables bellow: 
 
Table 4.5. Descriptive Statistics of TACCR and E 
 TACCR = Total 
Accruals divided 
by Total Assets 
E = Scaled 
Earnings Change 
Number of Observation 365 365 
Mean -.0278 .0000 
Std. Error of Mean .00853 .00154 
Median -.0144 .0015 
Std. Deviation .16288 .02941 
Variance .027 .001 
Skewness -16.894 -2.544 
Std. Error of Skewness .128 .128 
Kurtosis 307.836 38.991 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .255 .255 
Range 3.17 .48 
Minimum -3.00 -.27 
Maximum .16 .20 
 
Notes: Table 4.5 presents Descriptive Statistics for TACCR = Scaled Total Accruals; and E = Earnings Change 
divided by Total Assets, for period 2000 - 2009.  Data from 2010 to 2012 was unavailable, due to HFSA / MNB 
changes in the ‘Golden Book’, the main source of the sample. Source: Own calculation and presentation  
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Table 4.6. Descriptive Statistics of Non-Discretionary Accruals (NDA) 
Year 
Number 
of 
Obser-
vation 
Min. Max. Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
2012 41 0.00 12237.0 1342.9 472.1 3023.2 2.35 .37 4.66 .72 
2011 41 0.00 7602.0 838.6 317.1 2030.5 2.50 .37 5.20 .72 
2010 40 0.00 9029.0 851.7 309.1 1955.0 2.76 .37 8.01 .73 
2009 40 0.00 97997.0 11062.7 3477.8 21995.7 2.64 .37 7.01 .73 
2008 41 0.00 135433.0 12301.7 4009.0 25670.3 3.29 .37 13.02 .72 
2007 40 0.00 44227.0 7190.1 1822.1 11524.3 1.84 .37 2.80 .73 
2006 40 0.00 40052.0 5227.8 1367.4 8648.4 2.33 .37 6.02 .73 
2005 37 8.00 64221.0 5181.7 1966.1 11959.8 3.96 .39 17.45 .75 
2004 38 0.00 51029.0 5739.6 1740.2 10727.4 2.81 .38 8.74 .75 
2003 38 0.00 22261.0 3712.6 884.2 5450.7 1.89 .38 3.22 .75 
2002 38 0.00 12508.0 1944.1 452.0 2786.4 2.10 .38 4.77 .75 
2001 40 0.00 9082.0 1470.4 337.5 2135.0 1.94 .37 3.46 .73 
2000 42 0.00 10510.0 1510.2 343.0 2223.0 2.47 .36 6.63 .71 
1999 43 0.00 15391.0 1680.1 453.2 2972.4 3.15 .36 11.18 .70 
Notes: Table 4.6 shows Non-Discretionary Accruals (NDA) variable Descriptive Statistics calculated from the base 
sample for the period 1999-2012. Source: Own calculation and presentation 
 
Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics of Discretionary Accruals (DA) 
Year 
Number 
of 
Obser-
vation 
Min. Max. Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
2012 41 0.00 53798.0 8260.5 2252.1 14420.9 1.94 .37 2.78 .72 
2011 41 0.00 49036.0 7886.1 2126.1 13613.7 1.89 .37 2.68 .72 
2010 40 0.00 52613.0 7261.0 2027.9 12825.9 2.15 .37 4.21 .73 
2009 40 40.00 128084.0 20198.4 5450.5 34471.9 1.78 .37 2.14 .73 
2008 41 4.00 260588.0 33106.0 9404.2 60216.2 2.19 .37 4.61 .72 
2007 40 6.00 229261.0 23846.9 7114.1 44993.7 2.94 .37 10.57 .73 
2006 40 17.00 181826.0 23908.7 6429.4 40663.1 2.46 .37 6.57 .73 
2005 37 120.00 141356.0 17300.2 4588.9 27913.4 2.82 .39 10.13 .76 
2004 38 67.00 116116.0 13305.7 3640.1 22439.4 3.03 .38 11.49 .75 
2003 38 37.00 90026.0 9029.2 2596.1 16003.4 3.86 .38 18.03 .75 
2002 38 34.00 71770.0 9594.8 2674.5 16487.0 2.78 .38 8.14 .75 
2001 40 13.00 74146.0 8489.8 2568.6 16245.3 2.84 .37 8.35 .73 
2000 42 30.00 55524.0 6698.8 1751.2 11349.1 2.59 .36 7.80 .72 
1999 43 34.00 51799.0 6396.4 1711.4 11222.2 2.55 .36 6.96 .71 
Notes: Table 4.7 shows Discretionary Accruals (DA) variable Descriptive Statistics calculated from the base sample 
for the period 1999-2012. Source: Own calculation 
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Table 4.8. Descriptive Statistics of Profit After Tax (PAT) 
Year 
Number of 
Obser-
vation 
 
Min. Max. Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
2012 41 -127310.0 52573.0 -4371.7 4426.3 28342.2 -2.76 .37 10.31 .72 
2011 41 -147854.0 136607.0 -6889.6 6164.9 39475.1 -.60 .37 8.31 .72 
2010 40 -112787.0 108964.0 -432.7 4181.4 26445.9 -.15 .37 15.34 .73 
2009 40 -3059.0 102329.0 5282.7 2684.9 16981.3 5.10 .37 28.79 .73 
2008 41 -5475.0 54211.0 5985.3 1739.5 11138.6 2.58 .37 8.11 .72 
2007 40 -4530.0 119883.0 8421.8 3171.0 20055.7 4.67 .37 25.40 .73 
2006 40 -1103.0 186187.0 9195.1 4650.9 29415.3 5.86 .37 35.96 .73 
2005 37 -257.0 138346.0 9081.0 3756.8 22851.7 5.29 .38 30.35 .75 
2004 38 -505.0 104818.0 7612.7 2804.8 17290.5 5.05 .38 28.53 .75 
2003 38 -5506.0 71562.0 4768.4 1938.5 11949.7 4.96 .38 27.82 .75 
2002 37 -82744.0 10868.0 -2005.8 2264.1 13772.3 -5.88 .38 35.52 .75 
2001 40 -17093.0 2368.0 -801.7 482.0 3049.0 -4.52 .37 22.47 .73 
2000 42 -3633.0 1073.0 -318.0 135.6 879.1 -2.01 .36 5.96 .71 
1999 43 -7081.0 1552.0 -678.6 220.7 1447.3 -2.79 .36 9.74 .71 
Notes: Table 4.8 presents Profit After Tax in period (t) variable Descriptive Statistics calculated from the base 
sample for the period 1999-2012. Source: Own calculation 
 
Chapter 2 of this study critically reviewed earlier studies investigating Earnings Management 
with the Accrual approach, see for example Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995); Dechow, Ge 
and Schrand (2010); McNichols (2000) and Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012). 
 
4.5.2. Regression Model 1 
 
This study investigates if Total Accruals were used to manage earnings and classifies the Scaled 
Total Accruals (TACCR.) as the predictor, or the independent variable; and Scaled Earnings 
Change (E) as the dependent variable.  
 
The author of this study designed the regression Model 1:  
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Et = β1jt (TACCR. jt) + εjt      (3) 
 
Where, 
E(t) = ΔPAT / TA(t-1) = Scaled Earnings change in period (t) 
ΔPAT(t) = PAT(t) – PAT(t-1) 
PAT(t) = Profit After Tax in period (t) 
PAT(t-1) = Profit After Tax in period (t-1) 
TA(t-1) = Total Assets in period (t-1)  
TAccr (t) = Total Accruals in period (t) = Accrued interest receivables (t) + Other accruals and other 
assets (t) - Accrued interest payable (t) - Other accruals and other liabilities (t) 
TACCR. = TAccr.(t) / TA(t-1) = Total Accruals in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1)  
Β1jt = j and t are firm and time for the parameter  
εt
 
= Error term in period (t) 
 
4.5.3. Regression Model 2 
 
From the sample of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, Accruals are classified, 
(within liabilities), as ‘Accrued interest payable’ and ‘Other accruals and other liabilities’. 
However, it is unclear from the sample what ‘Other accruals and other liabilities’ comprise.  
From the sample, this study names ‘Accrued interest payable’ as non-discretionary accruals, or 
‘NDA’; and ‘Other accruals and other liabilities’ as discretionary accruals, or ‘DA’. However, 
despite naming ‘Other accruals and other liabilities’ as ‘DA’, it is probable, that ‘Other accruals 
and other liabilities’ might consist of both NDA and DA accruals, as well as ‘other liabilities’ that 
do not classify accruals. This study highlights in Chapter 2, in the literature review, Healy’s 
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(1985, p.89) definition of the non-discretionary accruals (NDA) and the discretionary accruals 
(DA). Accruals are the predictors and Profit After Tax (PAT) is the dependent variable. From the 
sample, assumptions were made that discretionary (DA) and non-discretionary (NDA) accruals 
were reversed as necessary in their required time frame. This study tests whether NDA and DA 
were used to manage earnings. The author formulated the regression Model 2. It reads as: 
 
PAT(t) = β0jt + β1jt (NDA jt) + β2jt (DA jt) + εjt    (4) 
 
Where, 
PAT(t) = Profit After Tax in period (t)  
NDA(t) = Non-Discretionary Accruals (t) = Accrued interest payable (t)   
DA(t) = Discretionary Accruals (t) = Other accruals and other liabilities (t) 
β0jt, β1jt  and β2jt = j and t are firm and time for the parameters  
εt
 
= Error term in period (t) 
 
Model 1 and Model 2 were run in SPSS with 95% and 99% confidence and 0.01 and 0.05 
significance levels.  
 
4.6. The Third Empirical Approach – The Distribution of Ratios Method 
4.6.1.1. Descriptive Statistics for sample used for the Third Empirical Approach 
 
As in the First and the Second Empirical Approaches, Descriptive Statistics of the following 14 
ratios are tested in the Third Empirical Approach. These are: Interest (Sales) Receivables Index 
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(IRI), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit 
Margin (PATM), Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), 
Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Equity to Loans (ETL), Gross Yield on 
Earning Assets (GYEA), Equity to total Assets (EtA) and Debt to Equity (DTE). 
 
The following Table 4.9 presents Descriptive Statistics for 14 ratios: 
 
Table 4.9. Descriptive Statistics of 14 ratios  
Ratios 
Number 
of 
Obser-
vation 
 
Min. Max. Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
DTE 447 .12 152260.00 1602.82 388.17 8206.91 14.93 .115 260.62 .23 
ETL 398 .00 9.34 0.12 0.04 0.72 10.32 .122 116.52 .24 
LTD 457 .00 72149.00 262.32 162.61 3476.27 19.60 .114 403.57 .23 
LTA 541 .00 53.06 0.66 0.10 2.27 22.77 .105 526.00 .21 
GYEA 554 .01 13.63 0.50 0.03 0.70 12.32 .104 220.35 .21 
RPF 536 -.02 19.12 0.08 0.04 0.83 22.82 .106 525.25 .21 
SGI 474 .00 25.56 2.14 0.15 3.27 4.00 .112 17.83 .22 
IRI 467 .01 84.31 1.23 0.18 3.93 20.34 .113 429.48 .22 
GMI 471 -2.37 5.38 1.01 0.02 0.52 0.86 .113 24.90 .22 
NIM 474 -.03 3.30 0.29 0.01 0.31 3.47 .112 20.97 .22 
PATM 545 -118.70 324.49 0.16 0.64 14.94 17.95 .105 417.27 .21 
ROE 400 -2062.00 1098.67 1.09 6.76 135.12 -8.36 .122 152.27 .24 
ROA 474 -.32 .12 0.00 0.00 0.04 -3.42 .112 24.31 .22 
ETA 389 .00 5.89 0.03 0.02 0.30 19.31 .124 377.82 .25 
Notes: Table 4.9 presents Descriptive Statistics of the 14 ratios, namely, Interest Receivables Index (IRI), Sales 
Growth Index (SGI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit After Tax Margin (PATM), 
Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Loans 
to Deposits (LTD), Equity to Loans (ETL), Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Equity to Total Assets (EtA) 
and Debt to Equity (DTE) were  calculated from the base sample for the period 1999-2012. Source: Own calculation 
 
The following sections present four independent modelling of ratios under the Third Empirical 
Approach.  
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4.6.1.2.  Testing Approach 3.1 
 
Chapter 2 presented various approaches to achieve Earnings Management. It also critically 
reviewed studies of Deakin (1976), Whittington (1980), McLeay and Fieldsend (1987), McLeay 
and Omar (2000) who investigated correlation, normality and other properties of the distributions 
of financial accounting ratios. Earlier studies were focusing only on one or two variables in 
testing EM. However, Beneish (1999) applied data from all industries and tested several ratios 
from the financial statements such as days’ sales in receivables, gross margin index, asset quality 
index, sales growth index, and other, a total of eight variables. Beneish (1999) presented a testing 
model and test statistics for variables and a clear evidence of earnings manipulation. Earlier 
studies omitted reversing accruals when applying the accrual testing method, as Dechow, Hutton, 
et al. (2012) point out. Furthermore, in Chapter 4, section 4.1, it was highlighted that it is difficult 
to see what ‘Other accruals and other assets’ under Assets truly consist of in the data tested in this 
study, due to lack of explanations in the ‘Golden Book’ of the HFSA / MNB pertaining published 
data of financial intermediaries.  
 
Taking into account the above mentioned premises, for the distributional approach, this study 
follows Beneish (1999), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s 
(1999) methods. Furthermore, instead of the Wilcoxon test, this study applies the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov one-sample test, to test hypotheses. Like Gore, Pope and Singh (2007); Shen and Chih 
(2005) or Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), this study does not test one or two variables, 
but investigates any possible sign of Earnings Management (EM) and it cross-examines year-end 
financial statements. Testing one or two variables in search of EM is not robust enough compared 
to the higher number of variables, which are more likely to provide statistically significant 
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evidence in favor of, or against EM. Therefore, in search of any sign of earnings management 
ratios that could show evidence of EM will not be excluded, and that are available to compute 
from the available data, as Benish (1999), as well as Fridson and Alvarez (2002) explain ratio 
calculations. This study calculates: Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI), Sales Growth Index 
(SGI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit Margin (PATM), Return on 
Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Loans to Total Assets 
(LTA), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Equity to Loans (ETL), Gross Yield on Earning Assets 
(GYEA), Equity to Total Assets (EtA) and Debt to Equity (DTE). In order to calculate each 
formula, at first, for each year, the data was used from balance sheets and profit and loss accounts 
from the HFSA/MNB. For example, Total Assets (TA), average total assets (calculated as TAt + 
TAt-1)/2), total liabilities, equity, deposits, loans, accrued interest receivables, total interest 
income (or sales), total interest expenses, net interest income, profit or loss after tax. Formulas 
containing ‘t’ refer to a specific year. For example, for ‘year (t)’, data is from the base year, from 
where the calculation was made, that is if year (t) = 2012, then the calculation of the ratio was 
performed from year 2012 data. If the ratio contains year (t-1), then the data is from the previous 
year. For example if the base year is 2012, then (t-1) refers to the 2011 financial year. If the 
formula comprises year (t-2), then the data for the ratio refers to two years earlier from the base 
year. That is, if the base year is 2012, then (t-2) refers to the 2010 financial year.  
 
The tested formulas are: 
 
- Debt to Equity (DTE) = Total Liabilities (t) divided by Equity (t).  
- Equity to Loans (ETL) = Average Equity (t) divided Loans (t). Where:  Average Equity 
(t) = (Equity (t) + Equity (t-1)) / 2 
Chapter 4  
143 
 
- Loans to Deposits Ratio (LTD) = Loans (t) divided by Deposits (t). 
- Loans to Total Assets (LTA) = Loans (t) divided by Total Assets (t).  
- Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA) = Total Interest Income (t) divided by Total 
Earning Assets (t).  
- Rate Paid on Funds (RPF) = Total Interest Expenses (t) divided by Total Earning Assets 
(t).  
- Sales Growth Index (SGI) = Sale (t) divided by Sales (t-1).   
- Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI) = [Accrued Interest receivables divided by sales 
(t)] divided by [Accrued Interest receivables divided by sales in receivables (t-1)]. 
- Gross Margin Index (GMI) = Gross Margin (t-1) divided by Gross Margin (t). Where: 
Gross Margin (t) = Total interest income (t) - Tot Int. expenses (t ) divided by Total 
Interest Income (t) 
- Net interest Margin (NIM) = Net Interest Income (t) divided by Average Earning Assets 
(t-1). Where: Net interest income = Total interest income (t) - Total Interest Expenses (t). 
Average Earning Assets correspond to all assets that earn income, that is, the sum of 
earning assets per number of earning assets, i.e.: securities for trade, investments; 
placements at banks and central bank; loans; equities and participations; accrued interest 
receivables; other accruals and assets.  
- Profit Margin (PATM) = Profit After Tax (PAT) (t) divided by Net Interest (sales) (t).  
- Return on Equity (ROE) = Profit After Tax (t) divided by Average Equity (t).   
- Return on Asset (ROA) = Profit After Tax (t) divided by Average Total Assets (t).  
Where: Average Total Assets = (Total Assets (t) + Total Assets (t-1)) divided by 2 
- Equity to Total Assets (EtA) = Equity (t) divided by Average Total Assets (t). 
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At first, search is conducted to see if earnings management is present within credit institutions 
trading in Hungary. This is done by visual investigation of the histograms, and additionally, with 
testing Hypothesis H0(a):. Secondly, possible evidence is investigated which might indicate 
avoidance of earnings decreases, tested with Hypothesis H0(b):. Thirdly, if there is a size firm 
effect to engage earnings management (EM), evidence is investigated with Hypothesis H0(c):. 
Fourthly, if EM was/is, or has been ongoing ‘prior to’, or ‘after’ 2008, when the financial crisis 
started, evidence is tested with Hypothesis H0(d):. 
From the ‘Credit Inst. (banks) BASE variables calculation 2012_1999.xlsx’ excel sheet for each 
14 base ratio results for the whole sample period were inserted into SPSS in the observed 
frequency and a histogram run at median zero points. At this point, at first, only visual 
investigations of the ratio histograms were performed and no statistical analysis was created in 
the first part of Testing Approaches 3.1. The purpose of no statistical testing was to see if the 
‘properties of the distribution are symmetrical around its mean value’ – Gujarati (1995, pp.769-
772). A detailed explanation of inputting ratios and creating histograms in SPSS is given in 
Appendix 1.  
After the visual investigation of the ratios, histograms were performed. This study follows, as 
part of the Testing Approach 3.1, the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) and the Degeorge, 
Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) models, explained in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 respectively 
and uses the statistical tests approach of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov One Sample (K-S) non-
parametric test to test Hypothesis H0(a):.  
 
To summarise, Hypothesis H0(a): is tested both with the Accrual Method (Testing Approach No. 
2), as well as with the Distribution of Ratios Method (Testing Approach No. 3.1). 
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4.6.1.3. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test statistics 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one sample test, ‘… can be used with small sample sizes…’, and, ‘…it 
is more powerful than the chi-square test for any sample size’, Lilliefors (1967, p.399). It is 
applicable for ratio or interval data. A sample of N observations: 
 
D = max x∈ R | F (x) – F0 (x) |     (5) 
 
where, F (x) is the cumulative normal distribution, and F0 (x) is the sample cumulative 
distribution, with μ =  sample mean and σ2 = s2  sample variance with denominator n-1. 
 
  H0(a,b,c,d): F (x) = F0 (x)  for all x from −∞ to ∞      
H1(a,b,c,d): F (x) ≠ F0 (x)  for at least one value of x     
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one sample test (K-S) is non-parametric, a distribution-free, an exact 
test. Massey (1951, p.68) writes: ‘…sampling distribution does not depend upon either the 
explicit form of, or the value of certain parameters in, the distribution of the population. Such 
tests have been called non-parametric or distribution-free tests.’ 
 
The decision to choose the non-parametric test was explained by Panik (2005, p.570), where the 
author presents arguments for choosing the parametric or the non-parametric method of testing. 
The parametric method is applicable for a small sample, whereas the non-parametric is applied 
for small and medium sized random sample consisting of a population of n ≤ 50, where the 
distribution is unknown. The non-parametric method is applied to test interval or ratio data, as it 
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does not assume functional (i.e. normality) form. The parametric method assumes ‘some form of 
knowledge of the population probability distribution (normality)’. 
 
Within the K-S test statistics this study also applies the Monte Carlo Simulation test. The Monte 
Carlo Experiment or ‘… simulation studies are a useful way of reinforcing or checking 
theoretical results.’ – Thomas (1997, p.6). Monte Carlo simulation is defined as ‘…process of 
modelling and simulating a system affected by randomness: Several random scenarios are 
generated, and relevant statistics are gathered in order to asses, e.g. the performance of a 
decision policy or the value of an assets.’ -  Brandimarte (2014, p.3). As Brandimarte (2014) and 
Thomas (1997) pointed out, the Monte Carlo simulation test was run for results comparisons and 
for reinforcing the test results.  
 
4.6.1.4. Histograms  
 
Histograms are applied to graphically present the distribution of a variable. Histograms are a 
popular method in testing discontinuity of a distribution of cross-sectional data to confirm or to 
reject ‘statistical significance’. See for example, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); Degeorge, Patel 
and Zeckhauser (1999); Dichev and Skinner (2002); Holland and Ramsay (2003); Shen and Chih 
(2005); Burgstahler and Eames (2006); Gore, Pope and Singh (2007); Jacob and Jorgensen 
(2007); Amar and Abaoub (2010); Jorgensen, Lee and Rock (2014); Li (2014); Burgstahler and 
Chuck (2015) and others who also apply histograms to investigate EM. 
Holland and Ramsay (2003, p.47) point out, ‘To construct a histogram, a relevant interval width 
must be chosen’. Dichev and Skinner (2002, p.1108) write, ‘Fineness demands that bin widths 
are sufficiently narrow to trace even subtle properties of the distribution, while precision of 
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estimation demands that bin widths are sufficiently wide that idiosyncratic noise is filtered out. 
This means that bin width should be positively related to the variability in the data and negatively 
related to sample size. There is no theory that dictates the correct bin width; text discussions 
typically characterize these choices as rules of thumb’. 
 
In order to examine earnings decrease, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.126) suggest that EM 
will occur with distributions of ‘low frequencies of earnings decreases and high frequencies of 
earnings increases’. Furthermore, Jorgensen, Lee and Rock (2014) argued that neither sample 
selection nor scaling are the causes of asymmetric distribution. Burgstahler (2014) also confirmed 
Jorgensen, Lee and Rock’s (2014) argument that sample selection and scaling is not the cause’ of 
the discontinuity in histograms, but earnings management is. 
 
4.6.1.5.  Benchmark  
 
Benchmark for any Hungarian credit institution should not be compared to other countries’ 
standards due to the specifics of the Hungarian Accounting Standards (HAS), as the only 
reporting standard in Hungary. Comparison could have been made if the benchmarks of credit 
institutions were universal; however, they are not. Furthermore, despite an in-depth search, there 
is no evidence of a research paper(s) that specifically investigate benchmarks of credit institutions 
financial ratios in Hungary, or elsewhere. In other words, a table with a list of industry standards 
for each financial ratio for the financial industry. Papers published on benchmarking of non-
financials are, for example, Kent and Routledge (2015); Sun and Rath (2012); Dechow, Ge and 
Schrand (2010); Crump and Teeguarden (2009); Habib (2007); Dattakumar and Jagadeesh 
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(2003); Yasin (2002); and Gupta and Huefner (1972). Using non-financials benchmark for the 
comparison of results would be of little value to this study.  
In order to make a comparison, this study calculates benchmark as follows; benchmark was 
calculated for the Hungarian credit institutions for the sample period of 1999-2012, for each ratio, 
with a formula that reads as: 
 
     ∑xi, j 
j =        (6) 
      Ni, j 
 
Where: 
j = Is the Mean 
∑xi, j = The sum of all ‘x’ values  
Ni, j = The number of ‘x’ values 
i, j = Ratios and years respectively  
 
This study tests benchmark for each ratio by applying formula (6). Results from each ratio are 
shown in descriptive statistics and histograms, and are presented in Chapter 5. 
 
4.6.2. Testing Approach 3.2 
 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007) investigate income tax and special items effect in 
connection with discontinuity of earnings ‘around’, and ‘at’ zero points. To see if Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) modified model of Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, 
p.103) model has a significant difference in test results and in the distribution of the histograms, 
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this study applied Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) modified Burgstahler and 
Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model. Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) did not explain why 
they modified the formula, that is, why there is an understatement of the estimated standard 
deviation in the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model. One drawback of testing the 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) modified Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) 
model in this study is that special items cannot be identified from the Hungarian credit 
institutions’ data. Profit ‘before and after tax’ data, however, is available. Beaver, McNichols and 
Nelson (2007, p.526) argue, ‘…consistent with the predictions of our model, our empirical results 
show that income taxes and special items contribute to a discontinuity at zero in the distribution 
of earnings.’ 
The method of testing and calculation of the Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) 
model is identical as in section 4.4.2. The first difference are the variables: Scaled Earnings, or 
Profit after Tax(t) divided by Total Assets(t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings 
divided by Total Assets(t-2) ratios, which were earlier calculated from the raw data used for the 
yearly financial statements in the ‘Credit Inst. (banks) BASE variables calculation 
2012_1999.xlsx’ excel file name. The second difference is the second part of the standardised 
difference (SDi) formula, and the third difference is that special items and tax data is included in 
the tests of this study due to a reason explained earlier in this section. Once the Scaled Earnings 
and the Scaled Earnings Change ratios were calculated in the ‘Credit Inst. (banks) BASE 
variables calculation 2012_1999.xlsx’ excel file for the years 2000-2012 with Hungarian credit 
institutions data, then the results of the two ratios were imported in the ‘Burgsthaler calculation 
method of all variables.xlsx’ excel file (where all the ratios are, and were calculated under 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997, p.103 model), then the Earnings Management Model 1, or EM1 is 
calculated, as per Formula (1) to test H0(b):. EM1 for Scaled Earnings and for Scaled Earnings 
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Change ratios were calculated in an exact way, as the rest of the ratios were for EM1 model. 
Section 4.4.2 explains these calculations. Once the EM1 calculations were performed, the next 
step was to import the ratios results to SPSS to test Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test statistics. 
Detailed SPSS calculation for Scaled Earnings and for Scaled Earnings Change ratios of Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) model is shown in Appendix 2.3. 
Both the Holland and Ramsay (2003); and the Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007) papers 
follow and apply Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model with the difference that Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson (2007) adjust the ‘Standard Deviation of the difference, SDi’ formula. 
Although the authors test excludes financials, the ‘Standard Deviation of the difference’ of the 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) model is modified per Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s 
(2007, p.540) model. Additionally, Holland and Ramsay (2003, p.48) do not adjust the ‘Standard 
Deviation of the difference’ formula of the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) model whereas 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) do. The difference between the two models is 
shown below. The Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) standard deviation of the difference 
model reads as: 
SDi = [Npi (1– pi ) + ¼ N (pi-1  + pi+1 ) (1– pi-1 – pi+1)] ½ 
where,  
SDi = Standard deviation of the difference in interval (i); pi = probability of an observation 
will fall in interval (i); N = number of total sample; Npi = total number of estimated Standard 
Deviation (SD) in interval (i); pi-1 = number in interval i-1; pi+1= number in interval i+1. 
 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) argue that the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, 
p.103) standard deviation of the difference, ‘SDi’, model is overstated and the EM1 is 
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understated. Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) suggest a modified standardised 
deviation of the difference formula: 
 
SDi = [Npi (1– pi ) + ¼ N (pi-1  + pi+1 ) (2– pi-1 – pi+1)] ½ 
Where,  
SDi = Standard deviation of the difference in interval (i); pi = probability of an observation 
will fall in interval (i); N = number of total sample; Npi = total number of estimated Standard 
Deviation (SD) in interval (i); pi-1 = number in interval i-1; pi+1= number in interval i+1. 
 
The difference is in the third part of the SDi formula, or (2– pi-1 – pi+1), where Beaver, McNichols 
and Nelson (2007) instead of digit ‘1’ put digit ‘2’ to remove overstatement of the standardised 
deviation of the difference (SDi) formula. However, it is not clear from Beaver, McNichols and 
Nelson (2007) argument for overstatement, nor their reason for changing the SDi formula. Apart 
from statistical tests, histograms around zero for both variables were also calculated. Appendix 
2.3 explains Histograms build in SPSS. Once results in SPSS are ready with the Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) model EM1 histograms, statistical and K-S tests, 
comparisons are made to Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.48) and Burgstahler and Dichev’s 
(1997) studies, as outlined in Chapter 5. 
 
4.6.3. Testing Approach 3.3 with Earnings Management Model 1 
 
Apart from ratio calculations, this study additionally investigates earnings manipulation based on 
assets sizes of the credit institutions for two ratios: Scaled Earnings (Profit after Tax in period (t) 
divided by Total Assets in period (t)); and Scaled Earnings Change (Change in Earnings divided 
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by Total Assets in period (t-2)). By splitting companies by asset size, an opportunity is given to 
search for an evidence of earnings manipulation primarily by assets size. The search for earnings 
manipulation will be based on assets size, for Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change 
ratios. For example, scaled by large and small companies to test if small assets size companies 
manage earnings more than the large assets size companies, or vice versa, or, perhaps assets sizes 
do not have any impact of earnings manipulation. It is also probable that an assets size has no 
influence nor there is earnings management in evidence. This area is of particular interest, as, in 
Hungary, domestic and foreign credit institutions are trading with different assets sizes. The same 
testing approach was applied by Holland and Ramsay (2003). 
 
At first the ‘Credit Inst (banks) BASE variables calculation 2012_1999.xls’ excel file the Scaled 
Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios were calculated. Then total assets (TA) were split 
into large (LC) and small companies (SC) based on the sample median of total assets. Once the 
median split is performed, the calculation of Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change 
follow, with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), with Earnings Management Model 1, or EM1, as 
shown under formula (1), section 4.4.2, and Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), with 
Earnings Management Model 2, or EM2, shown under formula (2), section 4.4.3. Under Testing 
Approach 3.3 the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test statistics is performed to test H0(c): 
hypothesis. 
To split the sample per assets size the following action was necessary: Total Assets of each 
company for each year were imported from the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(HFSA/MNB) Golden Book file to the ‘Credit Inst (banks) BASE variables calculation 
2012_1999.xls’ excel file. To calculate the median of the Total Assets for each year, the ‘total 
assets’ numbers were selected from the ‘Credit Inst (banks) BASE variables calculation 
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2012_1999.xls’ excel file. For example, for year 2012, selecting column C numbers from the 
‘Credit Inst (banks) BASE variables calculation 2012_1999.xls’ excel file, and importing the 
selection into the SPSS Data View sheet. The same was applied for the Total Assets numbers for 
the rest of the years. Calculation of the Median of Total Assets in SPSS for EM1 is explained in 
Appendix, Section 2.4. 
 
Once the medians of assets for each year are created, then the Scaled Earnings (Profit after Tax in 
period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t)); and the Scaled Earnings Change (Change in 
Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2)) ratios are sorted per median size for Total 
Assets per large and small companies. This was done by importing the total assets numbers for 
each year and then calculating Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios for each 
company. The split of the assets size is in the ‘TA ratios by sizes variables 2012_1999.xlsx’ excel 
file. In this file, it is shown, for example, for the year 2012, which is named as 2012 sheet and 
where there are 7 columns, where column A is only the numbering, in column B are the names of 
the intermediaries, in column C are the numbers of Total Assets, in column ‘D’ are the numbers 
of calculated ROA, in column F are the calculations of Scaled Earnings and in column G are the 
results of Scaled Earnings Change. The SPSS output for Total Assets median for year 2012 
results are in Hungarian Forints, HUF 135266 million. This number of HUF 135266m for total 
assets is the separation or the median amount between the large and small assets sizes. Therefore, 
any number that is above 135266 is in the group of Large Company Sizes (LC) per Total Assets, 
and any number below 135266 is under the Small Company Size (SC) per Total Assets. With this 
approach, assets were separated per size, per LC and SC for Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings 
Change ratios for each year. The same approach was applied for each sample year per assets size, 
for Large Companies (LC) and Small Companies (SC). 
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The following step was to calculate EM1 and EM2 models per assets size for large companies 
(LC) and small companies (SC) for Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios followed 
by importing the scaled sample data of LC and SC for each year. The calculation was done in the 
same way as in Section 4.4.2.  
 
Tables 4.10 – 4.14 present extracts of the Actual (AO), Expected observation (EO), the Estimated 
(SD) Probabilities, the Standard Deviation of the Difference (SDi) and the Earnings Management 
Model 1: 
 
Table 4.10. The Actual Observation (AO) 
Profit after taxes (t) by Total Assets t-1  
Large Companies scaled by size of Total asset  - Actual Observation (AO)
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
1 0.0078 0.0220 0.0166 0.0174 0.0103 0.0268 0.0518 0.0454 0.0380 0.0299 0.00004 0.0012 0.0005
2 -0.0034 -0.0501 0.0095 0.0058 0.0057 0.0154 0.0064 0.0110 0.0158 0.0023 0.0011 -0.0139 -0.0045
3 0.0091 0.0014 0.0014 0.0001 0.0115 0.0124 0.0108 0.0114 0.0130 0.0135 -0.0016 0.0001 0.0003
4 -0.0328 -0.0405 -0.0389 0.0072 0.0002 0.0100 0.0069 0.0121 0.0133 0.0125 -0.0006 -0.0031 -0.0026
From TA ratios by sizes variables file
PAT / TA t-1    LARGE companies
 
 
Notes: Table 4.10. presents Actual Observation (AO) for Scaled Earnings (Profit After Tax in period (t) divided by 
Total Assets in period (t-1)), for Large companies scaled by Total Assets - Extract. Source: Own calculation 
 
Table 4.11. The Expected Observation (EO)  
Profit after taxes (t) by Total Assets t-1  
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
1 0.0122 0.0197 0.0134 0.0221 0.0310 0.0361 0.0449 0.0377 0.0190 0.0156 0.0003
2 0.0030 -0.0222 0.0076 0.0106 0.0060 0.0132 0.0111 0.0067 0.0084 -0.0058 -0.0017
3 0.0053 0.0007 0.0064 0.0062 0.0112 0.0119 0.0119 0.0125 0.0057 0.0068 -0.0007
4 -0.0359 -0.0167 -0.0193 0.0086 0.0036 0.0111 0.0101 0.0123 0.0064 0.0047 -0.0016
Large Companies scaled by size of Total asset  - Expected observation (EO)
[n(t-1) + n(t+1)]/2
PAT / TA t-1    LARGE companies
 
 
Notes: Table 4.11 shows Expected Observation (EO) for Scaled Earnings (Profit After Tax in period (t) divided by 
Total Assets in period (t-1)), for Large companies scaled by Total Assets - Extract. Source: Own calculation 
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Table 4.12. The Estimated (SD) Probabilities Observation  
Profit after taxes (t) by Total Assets t-1  
Large Companies scaled by size of Total asset  
2012 pi 2011 pi 2010 pi 2009 pi 2008 pi 2007 pi 2006 pi 2005 pi 2004 pi 2003 pi 2002 pi 2001 pi 2000 pi
1 0.000391 0.001099 0.000873 0.000918 0.000514 0.001490 0.002588 0.002524 0.002000 0.001663 0.000002 0.000061 0.000026
2 -0.000172 -0.002507 0.000499 0.000303 0.000285 0.000858 0.000318 0.000613 0.000832 0.000130 0.000064 -0.000696 -0.000217
3 0.000457 0.000069 0.000072 0.000006 0.000576 0.000687 0.000541 0.000634 0.000686 0.000750 -0.000096 0.000005 0.000016
4 -0.001641 -0.002025 -0.002049 0.000378 0.000011 0.000557 0.000345 0.000672 0.000702 0.000696 -0.000032 -0.000153 -0.000123
Estimated ( SD) probabilities observation "i" divided by total observation of the year i
 
 
Notes: Table 4.12 presents the Estimated (SD) Probabilities Observation for Scaled Earnings (Profit After Tax in 
period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1)), for Large companies scaled by Total Assets - Extract. Source: 
Own calculation 
 
Table 4.13. The Standard Deviation of the Difference (SDi)  
Profit after taxes (t) by Total Assets t-1  
Large Companies scaled by size of Total asset  
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
1 4.478465 4.371352 4.366783 4.487677 4.262121 4.49412 4.270697 4.384244 4.253757 4.136077 4.472193
2 4.480015 4.342006 4.36383 4.479565 4.245243 4.481632 4.249763 4.362382 4.248924 4.118696 4.472628
3 4.47566 4.359276 4.36351 4.475668 4.249362 4.480102 4.250276 4.367265 4.245373 4.128996 4.471565
4 4.450837 4.351578 4.343472 4.478602 4.244074 4.479895 4.248884 4.367113 4.246072 4.127271 4.471396
Standard deviation of the difference (Sdi)
 
 
Notes: Table 4.13 shows The Standard Deviation of the Difference (SDi) for Scaled Earnings (Profit After Tax in 
period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1)), for Large companies scaled by Total Assets - Extract. Source: 
Own calculation 
 
Table 4.14. The Earnings Management model 1 - EM1  
Profit after taxes (t) by Total Assets t-1  
Large Companies scaled by size of Total asset  
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
1 0.002183 -0.000713 0.000917 -0.002641 -0.000986 0.003479 0.000131 0.000070 0.002568 -0.003758 0.000210
2 -0.011869 0.007296 -0.000419 -0.001095 0.002216 -0.001532 -0.000014 0.002091 -0.001437 0.001669 -0.002725
3 -0.000865 0.000144 -0.001452 0.001179 0.000283 -0.000239 -0.000121 0.000131 0.001838 -0.002042 0.000169
4 -0.001038 -0.005117 0.006107 -0.001868 0.001520 -0.000927 0.000464 0.000236 0.001445 -0.001282 -0.000332
EM1 = (AO - EO) / SDi
 
 
Notes: Table 4.14 presents the Earnings Management model 1 - EM1 for Scaled Earnings (Profit After Tax in period 
(t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1)), for Large companies scaled by Total Assets - Extract. Source: Own 
calculation 
 
Once all parts of Earnings Management testing Model 1, or EM1, were calculated, the EM1 was 
calculated for each sample year for Scaled Earnings ratio for the Large Companies. The testing 
approach is the same, as in Section 4.4.2. The results of EM1 for the Large Companies PAT(t) / 
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TAt-1 were copied and then pasted as numbers only in the next table that was named ‘For SPSS 
calculations’:  
  EM1 = (Act. Obser. - Espec. Obser.) / SD.diff.  
 
The same approach was done for large companies (LC) and small companies (SC) companies for 
the Scaled Earnings Change ratio. For both LC and SC, this study scale all data for both ratios 
and import the numbers to SPSS into Data View, and in the Variable View labelling the name of 
the first variable as ‘PAT by TA t-1 Large comp.2011-2001’, the second variable as ‘PAT by TA 
t-1 Small comp.2011-2001’, the third variable as ‘Delta PAT by TA t-2 Large comp. 2011-2002’ 
and the fourth variable is labelled as ‘Delta PAT by TA t-2 Small comp. 2011-2002’. Once all 
four variables were labelled, in SPSS One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test statistics are 
calculated.  
 
4.6.4.  Testing Approach 3.3  with Earnings Management Model 2 
 
Calculation approach was performed as in Section 4.4.3, Earnings Management Model 2, or - 
EM2. The only difference is the actual observation ‘AO’ numbers are large ‘LC’ and small ‘SC’ 
companies by total assets size for Scaled Earnings, or earnings (Profit After Tax) in period (t) 
divided by Total Assets in period (t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or change in earnings 
divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) variables. The assets sizes for ‘LC’ and ‘SC’ were 
imported from the ‘TA ratios by sizes variables 2012_1999.xlsx’ file to ‘TA company by size - 
Degeorge model.xlsx’ file. The way the ‘LC’ and ‘SC’ were selected for the PAT(t) / TAt-1  and 
ΔPAT / TAt-2 variables was explained in Section 4.4.3. 
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The first sheets in ‘TA company by size - Degeorge model.xlsx’ excel file is labelled as PAT(t) / 
TAt-1 large companies, second PAT(t) / TAt-1 small companies, third ΔPAT / TAt-2 large 
companies and the fourth sheet as ΔPAT / TAt-2 small companies. In each sheet the large 
company, ‘LC’ assets data goes to the labelled large assets sheet and the small company assets 
‘SC’ into the labelled small company’s sheet. This study performs the same type of calculations 
as in Section 4.4.3 with formula: 
 
 EM2 = Ʈn = [ Δpn - mean (Δpi) ] / s.d. (Δpi)    (2) 
 
where, i ϵ R, i ≠ n. pi is the ratio of the actual sample for year i of banks years, Δpn is the 
difference of pi - pi-1. Mean (Δpi) is the average of Δp but excluding pi and s.d. (Δpi) is the 
standard deviation of Δp, excluding Δpi.   
 
In the first sheet ‘PAT(t) / TAt-1 large companies’ the first table is the yearly actual figures of the 
large companies by assets size, for the variable Scaled Earnings. As earlier pointed out, the 
testing approach for the calculation of each part of the formula, i.e. ‘pi’, Δpi, mean and standard 
deviation of Δpi. The second table is the ‘pi’ table, the third is the Δpi, = pi - pi-1, and the fourth 
table is the calculation of EM2. For each large and small company, LC, SC, the same approach 
was applied to calculate Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios. The results for ‘LC’ 
and ‘SC’ for both variables were imported to SPSS and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric 
tests statistic’s was run. Tests also include Asymptotic and Exact Sign., as well as Descriptive 
analysis for each variable. In the Descriptive Statistics, this study runs mean, Sd and Percentile 
Values of 25%, 50% (Median) and 75% split. The same Percentile Values as Holland and 
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Ramsay (2003) study. Calculation of the Median of Total Assets in SPSS for EM2 is explained in 
Appendix, Section 2.4.1. 
 
4.6.5. Testing Approach 3.4 - Splitting Total Assets prior to and after the 2008 financial 
crisis 
 
Splitting the sample per companies’ assets size prior to and after the 2008 financial crisis gives an 
insight whether credit institutions in Hungary managed their earnings or not. That is, how banks 
acted when there was a smooth period, and how they did when there was a crisis, and whether 
there was a difference between large companies (LC) and small companies (SC) prior to and 
during the crisis. Testing Approach 3.4 tests: 
 
H0(d):. Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings prior to and after 
2008 when the financial crisis starts. 
 
Earlier in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 of Testing Approach 3.4 – the Earnings Management Model 1, 
or EM1, and the Earnings Management model 2, or EM2 of this study outlined the Total Assets 
(TA) by large and small companies for Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios with 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) and Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999, p.31) models, 
the same as EM1, as shown under formula (1), and EM2, shown under formula (2). The same 
results were applied as in the Testing Approach 4 that are in the ‘PA by TA's by sizes variables 
2012_2000 using Burgstahler model.xlsx’ and ‘TA company by size - Degeorge model.xlsx’ excel 
sheets, and splitting EM1 and EM2 data at 2008 year, when the financial crisis began. That is, 
splitting equal years prior to and after 2008. For example, before the financial crisis began in 
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2008, four year periods are selected from the EM1 results, from 2004-2007, and four year sample 
periods after the crisis started, from 2008-2011. The reason for the selection of four year periods 
is that there is an equal set of four years data prior to and after 2008, when the crisis started, and 
this way, there is an even number of years for testing. 
 
Testing Approach 3.4 aims to investigate H0(d): with Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings 
Change ratios and to see if there is an earnings management (EM) ‘prior to’ and ‘after’ the 2008 
financial crisis. Periods prior to and after 2008 financial year consist of all assets sizes. In the 
‘PA by TA's by sizes variables 2012_2000 using Burgstahler model.xlsx’ excel sheet, in the last 
sheet named ‘before and after 2008’ are the results for both variables, namely Scaled Earnings 
and Scaled Earnings Change. The sheet ‘before and after 2008’ consists of all LC and SC assets 
sizes data for both Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change variables. For example in the 
‘before and after 2008’ sheet in column A there is ‘after the crisis’, or ‘AC’, data for Scaled 
Earnings variable, whereas data in column B is ‘before the crisis’, or ‘BC’, for the same variable. 
In column E there is the ‘after the crisis’ data, or ‘AC’, or 2008-2011 for Scaled Earnings Change 
variable and in column F, the data ‘before the crisis’, ‘BC’, or 2004-2007 for the same variable. 
After the input of BC and AC data in SPSS, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric tests 
statistics was run with the Monte Carlo simulation with a 95% and a 99% Confidence Interval 
level respectively.   
 
In order to test the EM2 model, this study used an earlier calculation, namely the ‘TA company by 
size - Degeorge model.xlsx’ excel sheet. The calculation of ‘pi’, ‘Δpi’, the mean and standard 
deviation of Δp. and EM2 for Total Assets sizes were earlier carried out. In the ‘TA company by 
size - Degeorge model.xlsx’ excel sheet, the first sheet named ‘PA_by_TAt_1_Large_companies’ 
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in columns BH to BL, there are the EM2 results for large companies for the period after the crisis 
or 2008-2011, and column BN to BR are EM2 results for large companies before the crisis or 
2004-2007. The last sheet in the ‘TA company by size - Degeorge model.xlsx’ file, there is a sheet 
named ‘before and after 2008’, where all the data for large and small companies are shown for 
‘PAT(t) / TAt-1’ split into two distinct periods, i.e. for 2012-2008 in column A, for 2007-2003 in 
column B, the ‘ΔPAT / TAt-2’ for 2012-2008 year in column D and the same for 2007-2003 in 
column E. From the ‘TA company by size - Degeorge model.xlsx’ excel file ‘before and after 
2008’ data is imported to into SPSS Data View and the variables in the Variable View named as 
‘Delta PAT by TA (t-2) 2012-2008’ and ‘Delta PAT by TA (t-2) 2007-2003’. Then, this study 
runs the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics, as explained in the above section. The SPSS file is 
saved as ‘TA before and after 2008 - EM2 model.sav’. Section 2.5 in Appendix describes the 
calculation of the test statistics. 
 
4.7. Chapter 4. Summary 
 
Chapter 4 presents research data, the way it was gathered, and it also highlights its limitations. 
Additionally, it outlines reasons for choosing the three empirical testing approaches; designing 
the four hypotheses and applying histograms and statistics to test Hungarian credit institutions’ 
data in an attempt to answer the research question. The author of this study highlights the models 
of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103); Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540); 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999, p.31), and the accrual testing model that was used to test 
the hypotheses. Benchmark analysis was also included to test the 14 ratios. Additionally, similar 
tests were added, as in Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.54) paper. Furthermore, Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) model was tested. For each empirical part, test statistics 
Chapter 4  
161 
 
was applied. For the first and for the third empirical approach, apart from the statistical tests, this 
study also uses discontinuity tests in order to test the hypotheses of credit institutions’ annual 
financial statements data. 
 
The following Chapter 5 presents the SPSS outputs with results of each hypothesis and 
calculations for each empirical approach. The results are presented in tables and histograms with 
detailed explanations and analyses.  
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Chapter 5  
 
Findings and Interpretation 
 
As presented in Chapter 4, this study outlines the three Empirical Methods, as well as refers to 
Beneish (1999); Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997); Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999); 
Gore, Pope and Singh (2007); Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) and other studies that were used 
to test the four hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents tests results of the three Epirical Testing 
aproaches, namely the Standard Discontinuity method, the Accrual method and the Distribution 
of the Financial Ratio method in an attempt to explain reasons for accepting or rejecting the 
hypotheses, and more importantly, to answer the research question. In Chapter 5, the results are 
evaluated, commented and compared to the already published, relevant studies that were 
critically reviewed in Chapter 2. Each empirical research approach has its own section. 
 
5.1.  Results for the First Empirical Approach – The Standard Discontinuity Method 
5.1.1. Histograms of Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change tested with Earnings 
Management 1 and Earnings Management 2 models 
 
To test the distribution of Scaled Earnings (Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets 
in period (t-1)); and Scaled Earnings Change (Profit After Tax in period (t)-(t-1) divided by Total 
Assets in period (t-2)) ratios, in order to see if earnings are managed to avoid earnings decreases, 
histograms were created with data calculated by Earnings Management 1 and 2 (EM1 and EM2) 
models. The observation sample for the EM1 and EM2 models are between 1 and 2 percent of 
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lower and upper level. Interval widths of histograms are set to best fit visual investigation 
applying the 1 percent interval level:  
 
Figure 5.1.1.: Histogram of Scaled Earnings run with the Earnings Management 1 Model 
 
Histogram of PAT(t) / TA(t-1) run with the EM1 model 
 
Notes: Figure 5.1.1 shows Histogram of Scaled Earnings (Profit after Tax(t) by Total Assets(t-1)) run for the period 
2001 – 2011 with the EM1 model explained in Chapter 4 of this study. The EM1 model applies the same approach as 
the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) study. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.1.2.: Histogram of Scaled Earnings run with the Earnings Management 2 Model 
 
Histogram of PAT(t) / TA(t-1) run with the EM2 model 
 
Notes: Figure 5.1.2 presents Histogram of Scaled Earnings (Profit after Tax divided by Total Assets) run for the 
period 2001 – 2012 with the EM2 model explained in Chapter 4 of this study. The EM2 model applies the same 
approach as the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) study. Source: Own calculation and presentation.  
 
Figures 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 for both Earnings Management 1 and 2 (EM1 and EM2) models, the 
Scaled Earnings have very similar discontinuity, a big jump just before zero and slightly Skewed 
to the right, above the zero, with a right tail distribution.  
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Figure 5.1.3.: Histogram of Scaled Earnings Change run with the Earnings Management 1 Model 
 
Histogram of ΔPAT / TA(t-2) run with the EM1 model 
Notes: Figure 5.1.3 shows Histogram of Scaled Earnings Change (ΔProfit after Tax) divided by Total Assets, or 
ΔPAT / T.A.(t-2) was run for the period 2001 – 2012 with the EM1 model, explained in Chapter 4 of this study. The 
EM1 model applies the same approach as the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) study. Source: Own 
calculation and presentation. 
 
By visually examining Figures 5.1.1 – 5.1.4 it may be concluded that discontinuities have a big 
jump at zero points for both variables. For both earnings management testing models, namely 
number 1 and 2, i.e. the EM1 and EM2, distributions are slightly to the right, positively skewed, 
as Gujarati (1995, p.770) states ‘…lack of symmetry…’. There is a visible higher earnings 
frequency just above the zero in all four histograms, which suggests that earnings changes occur 
‘slightly more’ just above the zero. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) present a similar 
distribution pattern in their study, where the pattern is slightly positively skewed. 
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Figure 5.1.4.: Histogram of Scaled Earnings Change run with the Earnings Management Model 2: 
 
Histogram of ΔPAT / TA(t-2) run with the EM2 model 
Notes: Figure 5.1.4 presents Histogram of Scaled Change in Earnings, (ΔProfit after Tax divided by Total Assets in 
period t-2) ratio was run for the period 2002 – 2012 with the EM2 model, explained in Chapter 4 of this study. The 
EM2 model applies the same approach as the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) study. Source: Own 
calculation and presentation. 
 
The results of this study are very similar to the histograms distributions in Holland and Ramsay’s 
(2003, pp.53-56) study, although the authors tested non-financial companies and applied the 
Mann-Whitney U test, which ranks values from low to high and computes p-values; whereas, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test compares the cumulative distribution of the data and then compares 
the p-values. Furthermore, as this study investigates only one country that has a small data size 
comparing to the US or continental countries’ data, the power of the tests in this study is not the 
same, as for example in Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997); Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s 
(1999); Dichev and Skinner’s (2002); Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) and Shen and Chih’s (2005) 
papers. Similarly to Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) papers, the 
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next section of this study statistically tests the standard discontinuity method with Hungarian 
credit institutions’ data, applying scaled earnings variables.  
 
5.1.2. Results for Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change variables testing 
Hypothesis H0(b): with the Earnings Management Model 1 
 
To test H0(b): hypothesis, calculations were performed with Scaled Earnings (Profit after Tax in 
period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in (t-1)); and Scaled Earnings Change (Delta Profit 
after Tax divided by Total Assets in period (t-2)) ratios by applying earnings management model 
number 1, or the EM1 model. Chapter 4 explains the EM1 and EM2 models. Tested H0(b): 
hypothesis reads as: 
H0(b): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid earnings 
decreases 
 
The EM1 model calculations for Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in 
(t-1); and Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios are in the 
‘Burgstahler calculation method of all variables.xlsx’ excel sheet, with an identical calculation 
for the EM1 model, as all 14 ratios were performed for Empirical testing Approach No. 3. 
Furthermore, the process of inputting and testing Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change 
ratios in SPSS is also identical as it was performed with the rest of the 14 ratios. The purpose of 
testing Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios is to compare results of this study to 
Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) and Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) results. Descriptive statistics 
are presented in Table 5.1.a and Table 5.1.b calculated with the EM1 model for a sample period 
of 2001-2011. The observation was set between 2 percent lower and 2 percent upper bound for 
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each year in order to have more sample data in the range, and not the 1 percent level, as Holland 
and Ramsay (2003) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) applied, who had a higher sample than 
this study does.  Table 5.1.a and Table 5.1.b statistical results: 
 
Table 5.1.a. Descriptive Statistics for Scaled Earnings run by the Earnings 
Management Model 1      
  
 Number 
of Obser- 
vation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percentile 
25 
Median 
Percentile 
75 
2011 37 -.0003 .0095 -.0051 -.0006 .0052 
2010 37 -.0014 .0090 -.0034 -.0001 .0023 
2009 36 .0014 .0072 -,0022
a
 -.0001 .0031 
2008 34 .0002 .0072 -.0023 .0004 .0023 
2007 34 -.0018 .0099 -.0046 -.0001 .0023 
2006 34 .0010 .0081 -.0015 -.0002 .0012 
2005 37 .0007 .0021 -.0003 .0000 .0006 
2004 33 -.0004 .0038 -.0015 .0005 .0018 
2003 33 .0023 .0065 -.0005 .0013 .0035 
2002 33 -.0020 .0081 -.0026 -.0008 .0002 
2001 35 -.0004 .0066 -.0017 -.0001 .0008 
 
Table 5.1.b. Descriptive Statistics for Scaled Earnings Change run by the 
Earnings Management Model 1     
  
Number 
of Obser- 
vation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percentile 
25 
Median 
Percentile 
75 
2011 35 .0003 .0048 -.0018 -.0005 .0024 
2010 32 -.0019 .0070 -.0035 -.0009 .0019 
2009 30 .0027 .0103 -.0016 -.0003 .0045 
2008 30 -.0036 .0123 -.0015 -.0006 .0012 
2007 30 .0022 .0056 .0000 .0011 .0025 
2006 32 -.0005 .0032 -.0014 -.0002 .0005 
2005 31 -.0009 .0047 -.0020 -.0008 .0006 
2004 31 .0000 .0105 -.0030 -.0002 .0012 
2003 31 .0037 .0156 -.0018 .0021 .0055 
2002 31 -.0014 .0184 -.0039 -.0014 .0009 
    
Notes: Table 5.1.a and Table 5.1.b present Descriptive Statistics for the period from 2001 to 2012 on annual base for 
Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1); and Change in Earnings 
divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios results. Test results show both Table 5.1.a and Table 5.1.b with the 
EM1 model a slightly more positive mean, whereas median is slightly more negative, suggesting profit data is 
slightly more negatively skewed, when tested on the annual basis. Standard deviation, or SD, is below 0.00 for 
Scaled Earnings, whereas SD for Scaled Earnings Change is below 0.0. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.104) report 
similar mean and median results and slightly higher SD statistical results. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Low standard deviation, SD, suggests a tall, narrow shape for the variables distribution. Thomas 
(1997, p.13) writes, ‘…the spread or dispersion of a probability distribution and that higher 
values for σ2 imply larger spread…’.  
 
Chapter 2 outlined Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) study, who tested an Australian industry 
sample, with the exclusion of financials, by applying the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) 
model. Comparing Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.51) test results to Table 5.1.b. in this study, 
the length of the sample is identical, which is 10 years, but this study has significantly fewer total 
as well as yearly samples than they are in Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) study. Analysing the 
results in this study in Table 5.1.a for Scaled Earnings (Profit After Tax / Total Assets), it can be 
seen that it has a lower mean and SD than Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.51) results. 
Furthermore, the results in Table 5.1.a of this study show that 25% of the Mean values are all 
small and mostly negative, bellow -0.00, whereas in the Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.51) 
study, the Mean values at 25% percentile are not as low, but are also all negative. Looking at the 
Median (50%) in Table 5.1.a in this study, it can be seen that it has more negative values, 
suggesting ‘negative skewness in the profit data’. The same as in Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, 
p.51) study, Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-
2) ratio has similar results as in Table 5.1.a and Table 5.1.b that show low, slightly more negative 
Mean values and positive but low SD. At 25% values have all zero values bellow 0.00, except for 
2007, and more negative values at Median, suggesting more negative profits per financial years 
for skewness in Scaled Earnings Change.  
 
The results in Table 5.1.a for Scaled Earnings and in Table 5.1.b for Scaled Earnings Change 
ratios are very similar to Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, pp.51-52) results. Despite the fewer 
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samples in this study, the results show lower results for percentiles for 25%, 50%, 75%, Std. Dev. 
and Mean test results than Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.51) results. The test results in Table 
5.1.a and Table 5.1.b of this study are similar to Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.104) test 
results. The differences are as follows: the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) test variables boast a 
higher sample due to the longer length of the sample years, and also, the test was run with 
slightly different variables, with a change in earnings by the market value of common equity. 
Despite the differences in the tested variables, Descriptive statistical results of this study are 
similar to Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.104) results.  
 
5.1.3. Results for Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change variables testing 
Hypothesis H0(b): with the Earnings Management Model 2 
 
Calculations for earnings management testing model number 2, the EM2 model was also 
performed with Scaled Earnings; and Scaled Earnings Change ratios to further test the H0(b): 
hypotheses. Variables Scaled Earnings; and Scaled Earnings Change were calculated in 
‘Degeorge et al - EM2.xlsx’ excel sheet. Testing Approach for the EM2 model is explained in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Results of Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in 
(t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) 
ratios are presented in Table 5.1.c and in Table 5.1.d: 
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Table 5.1.c. Descriptive Statistics for Scaled Earnings run by Earnings 
Management Model 2 
Year 
 Number 
of Obser- 
vation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percentile 
25 
Median 
Percentile 
75 
2012 37 .1294 1.0620 -.3275 -.0165 .6565 
2011 37 .0503 1.2246 -.4917 -.1296 .4053 
2010 38 -.2568 .9074 -.2994 -.0166 .0682 
2009 36 .0168 1.2217 -.2581 -.0544 .0802 
2008 34 .0814 .8769 -.2955 .0036 .4007 
2007 34 -.3037 1.7940 -.1728 .0578 .3321 
2006 37 -.0834 ,2428
a
 -.1286 -.0498 .0481 
2005 37 .0647 .3459 -.0932 -.0213 .1010 
2004 33 -.0550 .7274 -.2553 .1095 .2781 
2003 33 .5010 .9997 .1222 .3173 .6454 
2002 35 .0005 1.0189 -.0372 .0475 .2011 
2001 39 -.1019 .6011 -.1095 .0028 .1196 
       
 
Table 5.1.d. Descriptive Statistics for Scaled Earnings Change run by Earnings 
Management Model 2 
Year 
 Number 
of Obser-
vation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percentile 
25 
Median 
Percentile 
75 
2012 35 .0664 .3999 -.0308 .1032 .2505 
2011 35 .1248 .5007 -.1640 .0377 .3789 
2010 32 -.1576 .8395 -.2401 -.0042 .2038 
2009 30 .2921 1.2340 -.1461 -.0582 .1730 
2008 30 -.3438 1.0463 -.2130 -.1171 .0081 
2007 32 .0397 .2622 -.0661 .0600 .1765 
2006 35 -.0530 .2941 -.1644 .0057 .0661 
2005 31 -.2447 .8236 -.2586 -.1335 -.0065 
2004 31 -.2490 1.2377 -.4983 -.1550 .2000 
2003 31 ,3966
a
 1.7964 .0441 .2265 .5251 
2002 35 .0998 1.3218 -.1021 -.0397 .2596 
 
Notes: Table 5.1.c and Table 5.1.d present negative values in 25% and in Median, for sample period 2001-2012. 
Furthermore, half of the Mean values are negative, which suggest that half of the values are negatively skewed off 
the profit numbers. The results for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled Earnings Change variables run with the EM2 model 
are similar to the EM1 results shown in Table 5.1.a and Table 5.1.b. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.126) report 
similar mean, median results but higher SD statistical results. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
In order to be more robust, additional tests were performed for Scaled Earnings; and Scaled 
Earnings Change ratios with the same sample and the same Earnings Management testing model 
numbers 1 and 2 (EM1 and EM2), as in Tables 5.1.a – d. Sample was tested with the One-Sample 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) non-parametric test, including the Exact significance. Test results 
are presented in Table 5.1.e and in Table 5.1.f:  
Table 5.1.e.  The One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test    
Tested by EM1 model 
Scaled 
Earnings 
Scaled 
 Earnings 
Change  (all samples for each ratio) 
Number of Observation 383 313 
Parameters
a,
 
Mean -.0001 .0000 
Std. Deviation .0075 .0104 
Most Extreme Differences 
Absolute .173 .226 
Positive .159 .209 
Negative -.173 -.226 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.390 4.006 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
Point Probability .000 .000 
 
Table 5.1.f.  The One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test      
Tested by EM2 model 
Scaled 
Earnings 
Scaled 
 Earnings 
Change (all samples for each ratio) 
Number of Observation 430 357 
Parameters
a,
 
Mean .000 .000 
Std. Deviation 1.000 1.000 
Most Extreme Differences 
Absolute .206 .224 
Positive .177 .219 
Negative -.206 -.224 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 4.267 4.235 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
Point Probability .000 .000 
Notes: Table 5.1.e and Table 5.1.f show low p-values at 0.000 are statistically ‘highly significant’ results for both 
Scaled Earnings; and Scaled Earnings Change variables tested with earnings management model 1 and 2, or EM1 
and EM2, for Asymptotic, Exact and Point Probability. Mean values are zero, with very low SD. Source: Own 
calculation and presentation. 
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Low p-values may suggest rejection of hypotheses H0(b): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary 
do not manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases. Test results for the EM1 model in Tables 
5.1.a and 5.1.b, and for model EM2 in Tables 5.1.c. and 5.1.d. show similar statistical results as 
in the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.104) and report evidence of earnings management. 
Similar test results of Holland and Ramsay (2003, pp.51-52) study indicate discontinuity in 
earnings and changes in earnings and confirm the practice of earnings management in Australian 
companies to achieve positive earnings as well as to maintain positive earnings from the previous 
year. The authors also show signs of earnings manipulation within companies of different assets 
sizes. The authors admit that due to their small sample size, the power of their tests is lesser than 
the results of various other papers which tested an all industry sample, for example, in the US.  
  
5.1.4. Summary of the First Empirical Approach – The Standard Discontinuity Method 
 
This study investigates the standard discontinuity method by applying the Earnings Management 
1 and 2 models, or EM1 and EM2, for two ratios, namely Scaled Earnings (Profit after Tax in 
period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in (t-1)); and Scaled Earnings Change (Change in 
Profit after Tax divided by Total Assets in period (t-2)) ratios. Histograms were run for both 
ratios to investigate whether the distribution has a bell-shape symmetry, that is, if histograms 
show a symmetrical frequency distribution. Additionally, Hypothesis H0(b): was tested with 
Scaled Earnings; and Scaled Earnings Change ratios by applying EM1 and EM2 models with 
descriptive statistics and the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric, including the 
Exact significance tests. Histograms of Figures 5.1.1 – 5.1.4 show distinctive jumps at zero point 
to the right, that is, earnings frequencies are just above the zero in all four histograms, suggesting 
that earnings changes occur ‘slightly more’ above the zero. Evidence from histograms suggests 
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rejecting Hypothesis H0(b):. Apart from this study, Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, pp.51-52) 
results show similar descriptive statistical evidence, as well as statistical and frequency 
distribution results of Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.104); and Gore, Pope and Singh’s 
(2007, pp.130-132) study also reports evidence of earnings management. In order to avoid a ‘type 
I error’, a false rejection of the H0(b):, this study also presents ‘statistically highly significant’ 
evidence from the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric test and the Exact 
significance test results, with p-values at 0.000. It may be concluded that hypothesis H0(b): may 
not be accepted:   
 
H0(b): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid   
earnings decreases. 
 
Hypothesis H0(b): was rejected with a significance level of p-values 0.000, which is far lower 
than a p-value of 0.01 as Thomas (1997, p.55) states. The likelihood of wrongly rejecting 
Hypothesis H0(b): is 0.000, which justifies its rejection. In statistical terms, the probability of 
rejecting a true hypothesis with p-values of 0.000 is ‘extremely low’. 
 
5.2. Results of the Second Empirical testing Approach – The Accrual Method 
5.2.1. Regression Model 1 
 
Chapter 4 outlined, under the Second Empirical Approach, the Accrual testing method. The 
accrual approach is one of the most used testing approaches to investigate earnings management 
(EM), irrespective of the industry tested. Chapter 2, the litertaure review of this study highligths 
papers that apply accruals in investigating EM.  
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Regression Model 1 was  run, Et = β1jt (TACCR. jt) + εjt (where Et = Scaled Earnings change in 
period (t); TACCR. = Total Accruals in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1); β1jt = j 
and t are firm and time for the parameter; εt
 
= Error term in period (t)), at 95% and 99% 
confidence interval levels to test Hypothesis H0(a):. Tables 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 present results for 
Model 1:  
 
Table 5.2.1. Coefficients for Regression Model 1 with a 95% Confidence Interval Level 
 
 Model 1. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
t 
 
 
Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 
(Constant) .000 .002  .103 .918 -.003 .003 
TACCR .007 .009 .038 .730 .466 -.012 .026 
a. Dependent Variable: E 
Notes: Table 5.2.1 presents sample for the period 200-2009, run with the Et = β1jt (TACCR.jt) + εjt regression 
Model 1, with a 95% confidence interval level. Et = Scaled Earnings Change in period t; and TACCR.jt = Total 
Accruals in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1). Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Table 5.2.2. Coefficients for Regression Model 1 with a 99% Confidence Interval Level 
 
Model 1. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 
(Constant) .000 .002  .103 .918 -.004 .004 
TACCR .007 .009 .038 .730 .466 -.018 .031 
a. Dependent Variable: E 
Notes: Table 5.2.2 sample for the period 200-2009, run with the Et = β1jt (TACCR.jt) + εjt regression model with a 
99% confidence interval level. Et = Scaled Earnings Change in period (t); and TACCR.jt  = Total Accruals in period 
(t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1). Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
The test results in Table 5.2.1. and 5.2.2 for Model 1 with confidence interval levels at 99% and 
95% have almost identical results. Results for TACCR. (Scaled Total Accruals) in Table 5.2.1. 
and in Table 5.2.2. show statistically insignificant results for both condifence intervals of 95% 
and 99% levels (p < 0.466).  
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The results would suggest accepting Hypothesis H0(a):, however, by doing so, the author of this 
study would make a ‘type II error’, by falsely accepting Hypothesis H0(a):. The main reason for 
this conclusion is that the explanatory variable, the Scaled Total Accruals (TACCR.) consists of 
elements of both non-discretionary and discretionary accruals in Model 1. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure the manager’s action in good or in bad times, that is, the time frame of the 
reversal accruals for both non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the sample 
tested for 2000-2009, the regression Model 1 does not pick up possible reversals for the TACCR. 
This is a typical weakness of an accrual model; the same applies for the accrual model designed 
in this study and the accrual testing models used in the earlier studies that were highlighted in the 
literature review in Chapter 2. Furthermore, in the sample tested, some firms may have more 
‘extreme’ accruals than other firms in one year or in another, which may relate to bad or good 
times, as well as lack of internal control within a firm. Due to the above reasons, the author of 
this study concludes that the regression Model 1 may not be a relaible model to predict the 
dependent variable, the Scaled Change in Earnings (E). Hypothesis H0(a): would be falsely 
accepted. See for example Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010, p.351) Exhibit 1 for strengths and 
weakneses for accruals as earnings quality proxies, and Exhibit 2, Page 359, for summary of the 
widely used accrual models, as well as McNichols’ (2000, p.337) evidence of the Accrual testing 
approach.  
 
The next sextion further analyzes the Accrual testing approach with Model 2, by applying 
multiple regression analysis. 
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5.2.2. Regression Model 2 
 
Contrary to Model 1, Model 2 tests sample per Accrual method, where the accruals are split into 
discretionary (DA) and non-discretionary (NDA) accruals, as explanatory variables; whereas 
Profit After tax (PAT) is the dependent variable and data is tested on the annual base, rather than 
on all samples. The author of this study designed a multiple regression model that reads as: PATt 
= β0jt + β1jt (NDAjt) + β2jt (DAjt) + εjt (where, PAT(t) = Profit After Tax in period(t); NDA(t) = 
Non-Discretionary Accruals(t) = Accrued interest payable(t); DA(t) = Discretionary Accruals(t) = 
Other accruals and other liabilities(t); β0jt, β1jt and β2jt = j and t are firm and time for the 
parameters; and εt
 
= Error term in period(t).  
Model 2 statistical tests results are shown in Table 5.2.3 and in Table 5.2.4 in Appendix 3. Table 
5.2.3 presents evidence for discretionary accruals (DA), or non-obligatory expenses, for 1999 and 
from 2002 to 2009 years, of statistically significance at a p = 0.05 significance level and at a 95% 
confidence interval. The non-discretionary (NDA) accruals show significance for years 2002, 
2007, 2008 and 2012. Years 2000-2001 and 2010-2012 are statistically insignificant at p = 0.05. 
Table 5.2.4 presents test results for discretionary accruals (DA), for 1999 and from 2003 to 2009 
years, of statistically significance with p = 0.01 > 0.00, or lower.  For the rest of the years, i.e. 
2000-2002 and 2010-2012, they are statistically insignificant at p = 0.01. By looking at non-
discretionary accruals (NDA) at a significance level of 0.01, only the 2007 year sample is 
statistically significant, and the rest of the years fail at p = 0.01. Both Tables 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 show 
similar test results for significance levels of p = 0.01 and p = 0.05 and it may be concluded that 
Hypothesis H0(a): fails for discretionary accruals (DA), but holds for non-discretionary accruals 
(NDA). The results are a mix. One explanation may be that bank managers apply non-obligatory 
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expenses, or discretionary accruals (DA), to manage earnings for the statistically significant 
period, the period from 2003-2009; it is the period when the lending of loans on the annual base 
was increasing to households, consumers and to the corporate sector, as presented in Chapter 3, 
Figures 3.1 - 3.3. This leads to a possible conclusion that bank managers engage in EM in order 
to meet analysts’ expectations and/or to meet parent companies’ targets. The results are similar to 
Kasznik’s (1999) study, which finds that managers tend to use positive discretionary accruals 
(DA) to report higher earnings during times their earnings fall below their earlier forecast due to 
overestimation. 
 
5.2.3. Summary of the Second Emprical Approach – The Accrual Method 
 
This study applies the accrual approach that investigates Hypothesis H0(a): with the Accrual 
Model 1 and Model 2, by testing total accruals, as well as discretionary accruals (DA) and non-
discretionary accruals (NDA). Accrual Model 1 tests total accruals (TACCR.) for the entire 
sample, whereas Model 2 tests discretionary accruals (DA) and non-discretionary accruals 
(NDA) on the annual base.  
 
Model 1 runs regression analysis on scaled earnings, as a dependent variable, and scaled total 
accruals as an independent variable for the period 2000-2009. Tests results for Model 1 show p-
values that fail to reject Hypothesis H0(a):. However, the author of this study is cautious of the 
Model 1 test results, even though p-values suggest accepting Hypothesis, H0(a):. Knowing that 
the testing variables consist of both DA and NDA, and the assumption that the reversals of the 
accruals are constant, it is simply unrealistic and it makes almost impossible to correctly run tests 
due to the timing effect of the reversal accruals. By assuming constant reversals of accruals, we 
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create a possible scenario for a ‘type I error’ or a ‘type II error’. Timing of the reversal accruals 
is crucial for the correct estimation; however, lack of an accrual reversal working model, thus 
estimates, the accrual testing approach of this study for Model 1 is rather weak. Chapter 2, the 
literature review, evaluated Baber, Kang and Li (2011); Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010); and 
Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012) studies that investigated reversal accruals and their impact on 
testing accuracy. 
Accrual testing Model 2 tests samples differently from Model 1. In Model 2, accruals were split 
into non-discretionary (NDA) or ‘Accrued interest payable’; and discretionary accruals (DA) or 
‘Other accruals and other liabilities’. Tests were performed on an annual basis, instead on all 
samples. The benefit of this separation is that the Accrual Model 2 test statistics shows a slightly 
better evidence of EM. This is due mainly to the fact that DA and NDA were tested individually 
and on an annual basis rather than on all samples. Test results for DA, that is, for ‘Other accruals 
and other liabilities’, are statistically significant for 9 out of 14 years at a 95% confidence level 
and at a 0.05 significance level, and 7 out of 14 years at a 99% confidence level for 0.01 
significance levels. From the statistical results this study concludes that Hypothesis H0(a): does 
not hold and ‘may be rejected’. One possible explanation for this, i.e. for evidence of EM, is that 
bank managers used ‘Other accruals and other liabilities’ to achieve their own personal goals, or 
parent company objectives, or to meet analysts’ predictions. The author of this study assumes that 
the most likely reason for EM, by Hungarian credit institutions, was to meet annual targets which 
were set by foreign parent companies. Despite the rejection of H0(a): it was acknowledged and 
concluded that the testing powers of both Accrual Model 1 and Model 2 could have been 
influenced by timing of the reversal accruals, which is the main weakness of the accruals testing 
models. 
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Gore, Pope and Singh’s (2007) testing model has a similar accrual testing approach as this study. 
The authors also report similar statistical results, i.e. evidence of earnings management, as this 
study does. However, Gore, Pope and Singh (2007) do not refer to a possible impact of the 
testing power due to the reversal accruals effect.  
 
This study conlcudes that the accrual testing approach has been used to test evidence of earnings 
management (EM) in the past three decades; however, as it was pointed out in the Second 
Empirical Approach, accruals testing methods are rather weak, unrealibale (see for example 
McNichols’s, 2000 study), outdated, and should be exluded from the research design(s) that seek 
evidence of earnings management until the accrual testing models are redesigned with the 
inclusion of all elements of the reversal accruals. A new testing approach is required.  
 
The next section explores a new way to investigate evidence of earnings management. 
 
5.3. Results from the Third Empirical testing Approach – The Distribution of Ratios 
Method  
5.3.1.1. Visual Investigation  
 
Section 5.1 and 5.2 of Chapter 5 presented test results from the first, the Standard Discontinuity 
Method and the second, the Accrual Method testing approaches. The Third, the Distribution of 
the Ratios Method tests the Hungarian credit institutions sample with a new approach.  
To start with, this study visually investigates the 14 ratios frequency distribution from the base 
sample calculation in search of an evidence of skewness and peakedness within the ratios’ 
histograms. Once all necessary data was imported from financial statements for each financial 
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year, base ratios were calculated in Excel for the period 1999-2012. Then, histograms were run in 
SPSS from the base results. Once histograms were created for all ratios in SPSS, the distribution 
of each histogram was visually examined as shown in Figures 5.3.1 – 5.3.14 without statistical 
testing. Gujarati (1995, p.770) shows graphical examples of distribution histograms and their 
skewness or ‘…lack of symmetry…’, i.e. right skewed or left skewed. Skewness shows 
‘…symmetry of a distribution…’, whereas Kurtosis measures ‘…peakedness’, Thomas (1997, 
p.371). The vertical line presents zero on the horizontal axis.  
 
The figures below represent the output of the 14 histograms without any modelling and testing: 
 
Figure 5.3.1. Histogram of Debt to Equity (DTE) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.1 presents histogram of Debt to Equity (DTE) ratio, with a huge increase after zero threshold point, 
which points towards the company’s inability to finance its operations from own assets. The histogram is not a bell-
shaped curve, there a visible shift to the right, a positive skew within the histogram. Watts and Zimmerman (1990, 
p.139) write, ‘companies with higher debt to equity ratio have higher probability to engage in EM’. Source: Own 
calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.2. Histogram of Equity to Loans (ETL) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.2 presents the histogram of Equity to Loans (ETL) ratio. It does not have a bell-shape curve, but a 
positive skew to the right within the histogram. It has a visible jump at zero threshold point with the majority of low 
ratios. A low ratio indicates higher outstanding loans than equity. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.3. Histogram of Loans to Deposits (LTD) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.3 shows the histogram of Loans to Deposits (LTD) ratio, the histogram shows discontinuity, i.e. 
there is a positive skew within the histogram. The ratio is increasing, which confirms/indicates more dependence on 
borrowed money. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.4. Histogram of Loans to Total Assets (LTA) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.4 presents the histogram of Loans to Total Assets (LTA) with a huge increase from zero points 
indicating that banks have too many outstanding loans, which result in poor liquidity. Source: Own calculation and 
presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.5. Histogram of Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.5 presents the histogram of Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), the histogram shows 
discontinuity, and it does not have a bell-shaped curve but a positive skew within the histogram. It indicates low 
sales from earnings assets. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.6. Histogram of Rate Paid on Funds (RPF) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.6 presents the histogram of Rate Paid on Funds (RPF). RPF histogram distribution is the highest at 
zero point and shifts to the right, a positive skew within the histogram. This indicates an increase in interest 
expenses, and a decrease in total earning assets. Rates payable on funds became more expensive, a clear sign of the 
company’s financial troubles. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.7. Histogram of Sales Growth Index (SGI) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.7 shows the histogram of Sales Growth Index (SGI). The SGI histogram shows a positive skew 
within the distribution. A clear sign of low sales and poor growth increase, hence suggesting smoothing. Beneish 
(1999, p.27) writes: ‘Growth does not imply manipulation, but growth companies are viewed by professionals as 
more likely than other companies to commit financial statement fraud, because their financial positions and capital 
needs put pressure on managers to achieve earnings targets’. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
Chapter 5  
185 
 
Figure 5.3.8. Histogram of Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.8 presents the histogram of Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI). IRI histogram shows a 
positive skew. A big increase in receivables in sales would suggest that IRI is out of balance, hence confirming the 
smoothing of earnings. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.9. Histogram of Gross Margin Index (GMI) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.9 presents the histogram of Gross Margin Index (GMI). It shows discontinuity, there is a big jump 
at and above 1, thus giving a signal of the company’s bad performance and indicating earnings smoothing. Source: 
Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.10. Histogram of Net interest Margin (NIM) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.10 presents the histogram of Net interest Margin (NIM), and shows a positive skew. As it has 
negative values, it indicates that interest expenses were higher. There is also a visible big jump around zero points. It 
indicates a lower interest income and higher interest expenses, suggesting that companies are poorly managing their 
assets and are, in fact, losing money. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.11. Histogram of Profit After Tax Margin (PATM) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.11 shows Profit After Tax Margin (PATM), or Earnings, the histogram distribution has a dramatic 
jump just before and after the zero point. Skewness is slightly more negative from the zero point, indicating a decline 
in sales and inefficiencies in controlling costs. A big positive jump at the zero point in the PATM distribution is 
similar to the one in Figure 3. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.109), and in Figure 1.B to Shen and Chih (2005, 
p.2677). Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.12. Histogram of Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.12 presents the Return on Equity (ROE) histogram. It has negative values and a big jump before 
and after the zero point, which is an overall ‘indicator of low’ i.e. poor profitability. Source: Own calculation and 
presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.13. Histogram of Return on Asset (ROA) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.13 shows the Return on Asset (ROA) the histogram distribution. It shows slightly more negative 
discontinuity and has a big jump at, before and after zero points. It indicates difficulties and poor ability to generate 
profits from assets. Low % value shows that less money is made from company assets. In Chapter 3, section 3.2, it 
was pointed out that in 1999, Hungarian banks ROA was 0.49%, in 2001 ROA was 1.6%, in 2005 ROA increased to 
2.5%, and in 2008 ROA declined to 1%, whereas in December 2011, it was in the region of 0.3% and increased to 
0.5% in 2012. Source: The Central Bank of Hungary, MNB. Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.14. Histogram of Equity to Total Assets (ETA) 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.14 presents Equity to Total Assets (ETA), the histogram has a big jump immediately at zero points, 
showing the overall poor capital adequacy of the companies. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
The above analysis of each ratio’s histogram in Figures 5.3.1 – 5.3.14 show that the distributions 
of the mean values are asymmetrical, that is, they do not have a bell-shaped curve. The presence 
of discontinuities in the 14 histograms can be linked to the ROE and the ROA ratios of the banks’ 
operations between 2003 and 2012, as in Chapter 3, Section 3.2. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the 
banks’ aggressive lending policy to households, where the trend starts in 2003 and ends in (Q3) 
quarter three, 2011. Figure 3.2 presents banks’ lending to consumers indicating a gradual increase 
of loans from 2003 to Q1 2009. The Same trend of lending is also visible in Figure 3.3 that shows 
lending to the corporate sector. Várhegyi (2008) points out that in 2001, loans to households, as a 
percentage of the GDP, represented 4%, and while in 2007, they added up to 21%.  
 
Shen and Chih (2005) similarly investigate distributions of net income of banks in 48 countries 
and show similar results of asymmetric distribution as this study for the PATM (Profit After Tax 
Margin) ratio. Furthermore, Shen and Chih (2005, p.2678) point out that banks are highly 
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regulated firms and argue that ‘… in order to keep depositors from losing confidence in banks, 
banks have strong incentive to prevent their earnings from being negative.’, and, ‘… earnings 
management is one of the management skills that banks adopt to avoid violating regulations’.  
 
The results presented in Figures 5.3.1 – 5.3.14 suggest further investigation of the 14 ratios by 
applying the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, pp.103) earnings management testing Model 1, or 
EM1, as it was explained in Chapter 4, subsection 4.4.2, and by applying the Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) earnings management testing Model 2, or EM2, as explained in 
Chapter 4, subsection 4.4.3. However, prior to statistical testing, this study makes a Benchmark 
comparison of the 14 ratios, as discussed in the next section. 
 
5.3.1.2.  Benchmark Comparison 
 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010, p.351) show benchmark as part of ‘earnings quality proxies’. 
This study examined not only earnings as a quality proxy, but a total of 14 ratios to test evidence 
of earnings management. Due to specifics of the Hungarian Accounting Standards, benchmark 
comparisons cannot be made to foreign countries’ credit institutions. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that the benchmarks for the ratios tested in this study had ever been investigated prior to 
this study for financials, and/or for credit institutions. In fact, there is no evidence of a published 
quality research paper that examines ratios for credit institutions of a foreign country, or credit 
institutions in Hungary. Section 4.6.1.5, in Chapter 4 outlines the benchmark calculation 
approach. 
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This study calculates benchmark for the 14 ratios, namely Interest (Sales) Receivables Index 
(IRI), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit 
after Tax Margin (PATM), Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Rate Paid on 
Funds (RPF), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Equity to Loans (ETL), 
Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Equity to total Assets (EtA) and Debt to Equity (DTE). 
For each benchmark ratio, histogram and descriptive statistics were run, and they were compared 
to each base ratio histograms, as shown and analyzed in Figures 5.3.1 – 5.3.14.  
 
For benchmark comparisons Figures 5.3.1.a – 5.3.14.a present the Hungarian credit institutions’ 
Base ratio histograms on the left side, and the Benchmark ratio histograms on the right side of the 
table: 
 
Figure 5.3.1.a.  Debt to Equity (DTE) Base histogram (Left) vs. DTE Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.1.a presents the Base histogram of the Debt to Equity (DTE) ratio on the left side and the 
Benchmark ratio histogram on the right side of the table. By examining the Base and the Benchmark for the Debt to 
Equity (DTE) ratio, it may be concluded, that the Base ratio histogram significantly differs from the Benchmark ratio 
histogram. One possible reason may be that under Benchmark, companies have lower debt and higher equity, which 
means, companies are able to finance themselves, from their own operations, which is not the case for the Base DTE 
ratio.  Source: Own calculation and presentation.  
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Figure 5.3.2.a. Equity to Loans (ETL) Base histogram (Left) vs. ETL Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.2.a presents the Base ratio histogram for Equity to Loans (ETL) on the left side and the Benchmark 
ratio histogram of ETL on the right side of the table. The ETL Base ratio histogram has a visible huge jump just after 
the zero, whereas from 0.50, low frequency distributions occur. Low ratio suggests more outstanding loans than 
equity. Examining the ETL for Benchmark shows a contrast, where frequency distributions are not as low as for the 
base ETL histogram, that is, the benchmark ETL histogram shows a more balanced, higher frequency distribution 
just after zero, than the base ETL ratio. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.3.a. Loans to Deposit (LTD) Base histogram (Left) vs. LTD Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.3.a shows the Base ratio histogram for Loans to Deposit (LTD) on the left side and the Benchmark 
LTD ratio histogram on the right side of the table. The Base Loans to Deposit (LTD) histogram has similar 
frequency distribution as the Benchmark LTD histogram. This would suggest a general trend of dependence on 
borrowed money in the banking industry. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.4.a. Loans to Total Assets (LTA) Base histogram (Left) vs. LTA Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.4.a presents the Base ratio histogram for Loans to Total Assets (LTA) on the left side and the 
Benchmark LTA ratio histogram on the right side of the table. The Base LTA histogram has a slightly higher 
frequency jump just after the zero point, compared to the Benchmark LTA ratio histogram, suggesting higher 
outstanding loans and poorer liquidity. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.5.a. Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA) Base histogram (Left) vs. GYEA Benchmark histogram 
(Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.5.a shows the Base ratio histogram for Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA) on the left side and 
the GYEA Benchmark histogram on right side of the table. The Base GYEA ratio histogram shows low yield on 
returning assets, that is, the Base GYEA histogram shows low sales in connection to funds on loan. That is, loans are 
not performing in a profitable way. Base GYEA low yield on returning assets indicates low income, which is the 
result of poor investment policies, and a high risk of insolvency. The Benchmark GYEA ratio shows a more 
balanced histogram than the Base GYEA histogram. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.6.a. Rate Paid on Funds (RPF) Base histogram (Left) vs. RPF Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.6.a histogram presents the Base histogram for Rate Paid on Funds (RPF) on the left side and the 
RPF Benchmark histogram on the right side of the table. A Base RPF histogram frequency distribution has a small 
negative frequency distribution just before the zero and a huge jump from the zero. The Base RPF histogram shows 
negative rates and a huge jump from the zero, suggesting unfavourable rates and financial difficulties for banks. The 
Benchmark RPF has a similar frequency distribution, without negative rates though. Source: Own calculation and 
presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.7.a. Sales Growth Index (SGI) Base histogram (Left) vs. SGI Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.7.a presents the Base ratio histogram for Sales Growth Index (SGI) on the left side and the SGI 
Benchmark histogram on the right side of the table. The Base ratio SGI histogram frequency distribution has a huge 
jump just after the zero, an indication of low sales. The Benchmark SGI histogram shows a similar distribution. 
Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5  
194 
 
Figure 5.3.8.a. Interest Receivables Index (IRI) Base histogram (Left) vs. IRI Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.8.a shows the Base ratio histogram for Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI) on the left of the 
table shows a big jump at zero point with a gradual distribution frequency decrease. Frequency distribution on the 
right of the table, for the IRI Benchmark histogram shows gradual increase from the zero point, an opposite 
frequency distribution than for the IRI Base histogram. This would suggest that the Base IRI ratio is not in balance. 
Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.9.a. Gross Margin Index (GMI) Base histogram (Left) vs. GMI Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.9.a. presents the Base ratio for Gross Margin Index (GMI) on the left side and the GMI Benchmark 
histogram on the right side of the table. Comparing the Base and the Benchmark histograms, there is a visible 
difference between the two, where the Base GMI histogram is narrower with a big jump at 1, as well as negative 
frequency distributions. The Benchmark GMI histogram on the other hand shows distributions at and around 1 and 
its distribution is not as spread as the Base GMI histogram. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.10.a. Net interest Margin (NIM) Base histogram (Left) vs. NIM Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.10.a presents the Base ratio histogram for the Net interest Margin (NIM) on the left and the NIM 
Benchmark histogram on right side of the table. The Base NIM histogram shows a negative frequency distribution, a 
sign of losing money due to higher expenses. Additionally, the Base NIM histogram has a larger spread of the 
frequency distribution at and from zero point than the Benchmark NIM histogram. The Benchmark NIM shows a 
max of 0.40 on the horizontal axis of the histogram, whereas the Base NIM histogram has frequencies above 1.5 on 
the horizontal axis. This would suggest that banks’ NIM dramatically changed and displays a significant difference 
compared to the Benchmark NIM histogram. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.11.a. Profit After Tax (PATM) Base histogram (Left) vs. PATM Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.11.a shows the Profit After Tax Margin (PATM) Base ratio histogram on the left and the PATM 
Benchmark ratio histogram on the right side of the table. Both PATM histograms show similar patterns, except that 
the Benchmark PATM frequency distribution is not spread as widely as the Base PATM ratio, that is, the Benchmark 
PATM does not indicate inefficiency in controlling costs. The Base PATM histogram, however, does suggest decline 
of sales and lack of control in costs. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Figure 5.3.12.a. Return on Equity (ROE) Base histogram (Left) vs. ROE Benchmark histogram (Right)  
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.12.a presents the Return on Equity (ROE) Base histogram on the left and the ROE Benchmark 
histogram on the right of the table. The Base ROE histogram shows higher frequency distribution below zero than 
the Benchmark ROE histogram. Low Base ROE suggests low profitability, whereas negative Base ROE ratio should 
be interpreted with caution. Negative ROE should not be interpreted nor compared without taking into account the 
cash flow level of a company. By comparing the Base ROE to the Benchmark ROE, we might come to an erroneous 
conclusion. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.13.a. Return on Assets (ROA) Base histogram (Left) vs. ROA Benchmark histogram (Right)  
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.13.a shows the Return on Assets (ROA) Base histogram on the left and the ROA Benchmark 
histogram on the right of the table. The Base ROA has higher negative frequency distribution than the Benchmark 
ROA, which would suggest that the number of companies from the sample do not create profits from their assets; in 
other words, the higher the ROA the better. The Base ROA’s overall performance is below the Benchmark ROA. As 
banks’ Return on Assets (ROA) performance varies by year, detailed reasons for banks’ poor ROA performance was 
explained in Chapter 3, section 3.2. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
 
Chapter 5  
197 
 
Figure 5.3.14.a. Equity to Total Assets (ETA) Base histogram (Left) vs. ETA Benchmark histogram (Right) 
  
Notes: Figure 5.3.14.a presents the Equity to Total Assets (ETA) Base histogram on the left and the ETA Benchmark 
histogram on the right of the table. The Base ETA ratio histogram shows higher a concentration of frequency 
distribution just after the zero point, suggesting that companies are risky and that investors are unwilling to finance 
companies. The Histogram highlights the financial difficulties the banks had from 2008, as outlined in Chapter 3. 
The higher the ETA ratio, the better it is. Higher ETA ratios are indicative of the willingness of investors to finance a 
company. The Benchmark ETA ratio shows similar histogram patterns and this is because benchmark data was 
calculated from the same sample as the Base ratios were. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Chapter 4 outlined that there is no evidence of benchmark industry standards for Hungarian credit 
institutions. This study calculates benchmark from the Hungarian credit institutions’ sample 
period of 1999-2012, which is the same sample as the one used for the calculation of the 14 base 
ratios. Therefore, it is probable that some benchmark ratio histograms show very similar or even 
identical frequency distributions as the base ratio histograms, namely the Equity to Total Assets 
(ETA), the Rate Paid on Funds (RPF) and the Loans to Deposit (LTD) ratios.  
 
Apart from histogram analysis, descriptive statistics were also run for the Base ratios for the 
sample period 1999-2012, as well as for the Benchmark ratios on an annual basis for the period 
of 1999-2012. Tables 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 present descriptive statistics for the Base and for the 
Benchmark ratios respectively: 
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Table 5.3.1. Descriptive Statistics of Base Ratios 
 Number of 
Observation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
DTE 447 .12 152260.00 1602.82 388.17 8206.91 14.93 .12 260.62 .23 
ETL 398 .00 9.34 .12 .04 .72 10.32 .12 116.52 .24 
LTD 457 .00 72149.00 262.32 162.61 3476.27 19.60 .11 403.57 .23 
LTA 541 .00 53.06 .66 .10 2.27 22.77 .11 526.00 .21 
GYEA 554 .01 13.63 .50 .03 .70 12.32 .10 220.35 .21 
RPF 536 -.02 19.12 .08 .04 .83 22.82 .11 525.25 .21 
SGI 474 .00 25.56 2.14 .15 3.27 4.00 .11 17.83 .22 
IRI 467 .01 84.31 1.23 .18 3.93 20.34 .11 429.48 .23 
GMI 471 -2.37 5.38 1.01 .02 .52 .86 .11 24.90 .22 
NIM 474 -.03 3.30 .29 .01 .31 3.47 .11 20.97 .22 
PATM 545 -118.70 324.49 .16 .64 14.94 17.95 .10 417.27 .21 
ROE 400 -2062.00 1098.67 1.09 6.76 135.12 -8.36 .12 152.27 .24 
ROA 474 -.32 .12 .00 .00 .04 -3.42 .11 24.31 .22 
ETA 389 .00 5.89 .03 .02 .30 19.31 .12 377.82 .25 
       Notes: Descriptive Statistics of Base Ratios calculated for all sample period (1999-2012). Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Table 5.3.2. Descriptive Statistics of Benchmark Ratios 
 Number of 
Observation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
DTE 14 419.44 6023.57 1644.81 375.55 1405.19 2.60 .60 7.90 1.15 
ETL 13 .02 .32 .12 .03 .10 1.12 .62 .09 1.19 
LTD 14 1.41 1807.57 228.22 125.20 468.44 3.37 .60 12.02 1.15 
LTA 14 .45 1.85 .64 .09 .35 3.64 .60 13.48 1.15 
GYEA 14 .07 .96 .50 .08 .29 -.58 .60 -.93 1.15 
RPF 14 .00 .53 .07 .04 .13 3.50 .60 12.69 1.15 
SGI 13 .92 12.51 2.26 .86 3.12 3.46 .62 12.21 1.19 
IRI 13 .19 3.04 1.16 .18 .64 2.15 .62 7.31 1.19 
GMI 13 .78 1.25 .99 .04 .13 .21 .62 -.09 1.19 
NIM 13 .05 .40 .29 .04 .13 -1.28 .62 -.12 1.19 
PATM 14 -3.54 8.87 .26 .73 2.72 2.55 .60 9.02 1.15 
ROE 13 -19.87 23.54 1.00 3.33 11.99 .25 .62 -.28 1.19 
ROA 13 -.01 .02 .00 .00 .01 .38 .62 -1.54 1.19 
ETA 13 .01 .22 .03 .02 .06 3.54 .62 12.66 1.19 
      Notes: Descriptive Statistics of Benchmark Ratios calculated on annual base, for period (1999-2012),. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
Comparing Descritptives for the Base ratios in Table 5.3.1 to Table 5.3.2 for the Benchmark ratios, it may be concluded, that the
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Base ratio statistics for all ratios differ from the Benchmark ratios, especially Skewness and 
Kurtosis, as well as the Mean and Std. Deviation. The results are in line with the expectations. 
However, Benchmark ratio histograms and statistical results should be interpreted with caution. 
Benchmark, as a proxy, has its own  weaknesses as Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010, p.351) 
argue, ‘In addition to statistical validity issues, evidence that kinks represent opportunistic 
earnings management is mixed, with credible alternative explanations including non-accounting 
issues. It is difficult to distinguish firms that are at kinks by chance versus those that have 
manipulated their way into the benchmark bins’. 
 
Furthermore, Sun and Rath (2012); or Gore, Pope and Singh (2007) looked at earnings 
benchmark only in respect to earnings management. It can be argued that researching only one 
variable Benchmark instead of investigating a larger number of benchmark ratios is not robust 
enough for identifying earnings management. 
It may be concluded that there is a shortage of quality research papers on Benchmark 
comparisons in the financial sector, and no evidence of Benchmark ever being used for credit 
institutions in Hungary. It is probable, though, that credit institutions have benchmark data, but 
they treat them as internal confidential information. There is, however, a very basic statistical 
material overview published by the European Central Bank (www.ecb.europa.eu), which is 
applicable only for general, informational purposes, and it is irrelevant for this research study. 
Due to the lack of quality research papers on benchmark for financials, an opportunity to research 
Benchmark for credit institutions, as well as for non-financials, is literally presenting itself to 
researchers. 
 
The following section investigates the ratio analyses with statistical modeling. 
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5.3.1.3. Statistical Testing of the Base Ratios with the Earnings Management 1 and 
Earnings Managamenet 2 models 
 
Due to limited information from the Hungarian Financial Authority’s ‘Golden Book’, which 
serves as the main source of data for the financial statements of credit institutions, it is unclear 
how reversal accruals influenced ratios if part of the formula contained total assets, or ‘other 
accruals and other assets’ and ‘accrued interest receivables’. Some ratios contain total assets, 
such as Return on Assets (ROA), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Net Interest Margin (NIM), 
Interest Receivable Index (IRI), Equity to Total Assets (EtA), Gross Yield on Earning Assets 
(GYEA), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Scaled Earnings, or Profit After Tax (t) divided by Total 
Assets in period (t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or change in earnings divided by total assets 
in the period (t-2). Baber, Kang and Li (2011) argue that earnings management level depends on 
the speed reversal of (discretionary) accruals, whereas Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012) point out 
that reversal accruals should not be omitted when testing variables as it may reduce the testing 
power as well as influence the test results; when accruals are booked in a period, they should be 
reversed to the next. This study acknowledges that reversal accruals could not have been 
identified in the sample used in this study; therefore, it is probable that for ratios containing 
accruals as components (for example in Total Assets), the power of the test, and thus its results, 
might have suffered to an extent.  
 
Due to the inconsistencies between the results of the Debt to Equity (DTE) ratio, in the standard 
deviation of the difference and the results of Earnings Management model 1, or the EM1 formula, 
formula, DTE was excluded from EM1 testing. The recalculation of the 13 ratios with the EM1 
formula with the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model, and with the Earnings 
Chapter 5  
201 
 
Management model 2, or the EM2, with the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) 
model applying the Non-parametric One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test with Monte 
Carlo simulation. Statistical tests were run at 95% and 99% confidence interval levels with p–
value(s) of 5% and 1% respectively. The results for both models, Model 1 and Model 2, are very 
similar. The p-value was defined in Appendix 2.1. Applying the testing approach with EM1 and 
EM2 methods was earlier done by Shen and Chih (2005, p.2684), who also tested Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997, p.103) and Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) model, but with a 
different statistical approach. Shen and Chih (2005, p.2684) use multiple regression analysis, 
hypothesizing that ‘…there is no earnings management in the banking industry…’.  
 
Table 5.3.3 presents the test statistics of the Earnings Management model 1, or the EM1, of the 
Non-parametric One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test with Monte Carlo simulation, run 
for each of the 13 ratios with a 99% confidence interval level. Table 5.3.3 shows Asymp. Sig (2-
tailed); p-values are below 0.01 for all ratios, except the Loan to Total Asset (LTA) p–value with 
0.025 holds to H0(a): at a 99% confidence interval level. It can be concluded that LTA is 
normally distributed, but has a weak result of 0.025 that is greater than p = 0.01 (p < 0.025), but 
inferior to p = 0.05 (p > 0.025). Apart from Loans to Total Assets (LTA), the rest of the 12 
ratios’ p-values are lower than 0.01 (p < 0.01). They are statistically significant at a 99% 
confidence interval level.  
Chapter 5  
202 
 
Table 5.3.3. One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Test of Base ratios run with EM1 model at 99% Confidence Interval Level 
  ETL LTD LTA GYEA RPF SGI IRI GMI NIM PATM ROE ROA ETA 
Number of Observation   320 327 394 421 404 374 367 373 372 402 218 379 305 
Mean .002 .026 .002 .003 .005 .079 .001 .002 .002 .022 -.653 .000 .001 
Std. Deviation .144 .430 .048 .151 .232 .887 .130 .097 .056 .325 4.870 .006 .077 
Absolute .407 .223 .074 .273 .463 .306 .095 .148 .179 .252 .321 .186 .441 
Positive .407 .223 .056 .273 .463 .306 .095 .148 .179 .252 .268 .153 .441 
Negative -.390 -.163 -.074 -.248 -.450 -.177 -.079 -.140 -.141 -.236 -.321 -.186 -.422 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z   7.287 4.038 1.479 5.596 9.314 5.915 1.828 2.861 3.454 5.054 4.735 3.618 7.699 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 0.000 .025 0.000 0.000 0.000 .002 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .023 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 0.000 0.000 .017 0.000 0.000 0.000 .001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Upper Bound .001 .001 .028 .001 .001 .001 .005 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
               
Notes: Table 5.3.3 presents One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test statistics of the Base ratios, namely for Equity to Loans (ETL), Loans to Deposits 
(LTD), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Interest (Sales) Receivables 
Index (IRI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit After Tax Margin (PATM), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Equity 
to Total Assets (ETA) ratios run with the EM1 model at 99% Confidence Interval Level. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
By analysing Table 5.3.3, it can be concluded that ‘p-values’ or ‘Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)’ values for all variables results are 0.000. Apart 
from the Loan to Asset (LTA), the two-tailed probability value, Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed), is 0.025 and for the Interest (Sales) 
Receivables Index (IRI), it is 0.002. Part of the K-S test is the Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. test. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. test 
calculates Lower and Upper Bounds, at a 99% confidence interval. For the 13 ratios, the result are 0.000, except for the LTA ratio for 
the Upper Bound level which is 0.028 and for the Lower Bound level, it is 0.017. As for the IRI, the Upper Bound is 0.005 and the 
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Lower Bound is 0.001, still below the 0.01 significance level. In Table 5.3.3 low mean values 
suggest that in a set of values, they are next to the central point, i.e. next to the axis. A slightly 
higher but still low Standard Deviation values indicate that they are not widely spread, in other 
words, they are spread around the mean (Abbott, 2014). When results are ‘… highly statistically 
significant…’, ‘By this they usually mean that when they reject the null hypothesis, the 
probability of committing a Type I error (i.e., α) is a small number, usually 1 percent.’ – Gujarati 
(1995, p.123). Gujarati (1995, p.123) also points out that researchers make the decision ‘whether 
a statistical finding is significant, moderately significant or highly significant’.  
 
Table 5.3.4 presents Descriptive statistics results for the 13 ratios calculated with the EM1 model 
for all sample, at a 99% confidence interval for the mean. Table 5.3.4 is shown in Appendix 4. 
The results confirm that low p-values equal, or are below 1%, and it may be concluded that the 
results are statistically highly significant. Part of Table 5.3.4 shows the Skewness and Kurtosis 
results in column two and three, and they are not equal or approximate to zero for all ratios. 
Column two presents the Statistics of Skewness and Kurtosis where all the ratios are higher than 
1 except for Loan to Asset (LTA), its Statistics of Skewness is 0.036 and its Kurtosis is 0.873, 
which indicates that only the LTA test has a normal distribution.  
 
The third column in Table 5.3.4 shows the results for Standard Error or ‘Std. Error’ of each ratio 
for Mean, as well as for Skewness and Kurtosis. For all ratios, Std Error is below 0.0 whereas Std 
Error for Mean for ROE is 0.32985. Std error for all ratios for Skewness is 0.165 and for Kurtosis 
it is 0.328. Std. Error results show the ‘accuracy’ of the statistical sample. ‘Std Error’ is ‘… a 
distribution of the set of values of the estimator obtained from all possible samples of the same 
size from a given population.’, Gujarati (1995, pp.70-71).  
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The results from Tables 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, at a 99% confidence interval, were calculated per EM1 
model, for hypothesis, H0(a): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings, 
‘may’ be rejected. The ‘may’ term is taken from Gujarati (1995, p.129) who is suggesting, ‘... in 
accepting a null hypothesis we should always be aware that another null hypothesis may be 
equally compatible with the data. It is therefore preferable to say that we may accept the null 
hypothesis rather than we (do) accept it.’  
 
Same as for the 99% Confidence level, Table 5.3.5 presents test statistics of the earnings 
management (EM1) model of the Non-parametric One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test 
with Monte Carlo simulation, run for each of the 13 ratios with a 95% confidence interval level:  
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Table 5.3.5. One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Test of Base ratios run with the EM1 model at 95% Confidence Interval Level  
    ETL LTD LTA GYEA RPF SGI IRI GMI NIM PATM ROE ROA ETA 
Number of Observation   320 327 394 421 404 374 367 373 372 402 218 379 305 
Mean .002 .026 .002 .003 .005 .079 .001 .002 .002 .022 -.653 .000 .001 
Std. Deviation .144 .430 .048 .151 .232 .887 .130 .097 .056 .325 4.870 .006 .077 
Absolute .407 .223 .074 .273 .463 .306 .095 .148 .179 .252 .321 .186 .441 
Positive .407 .223 .056 .273 .463 .306 .095 .148 .179 .252 .268 .153 .441 
Negative   -.390 -.163 -.074 -.248 -.450 -.177 -.079 -.140 -.141 -.236 -.321 -.186 -.422 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z   7.287 4.038 1.479 5.596 9.314 5.915 1.828 2.861 3.454 5.054 4.735 3.618 7.699 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 0.000 .025 0.000 0.000 0.000 .002 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .000 .023 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound .000 .000 .020 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  Upper Bound .000 .000 .026 .000 .000 .000 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
               
Notes: Table 5.3.5 shows Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test statistics at 95% confidence interval level for Equity to Loans (ETL), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Loans 
to Total Assets (LTA), Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI), 
Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit After Tax Margin (PATM), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Equity to Total 
Assets (ETA) ratios. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 Examining the Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) results in Table 5.3.5 Lower and Upper Bound for 95% Confidence Interval level for all 11 
ratios p-values are 0.000. As for the LTA for the Upper Bound level, the p-value is 0.026 and for the Lower Bound level, the p-value is 
0.020. As for the Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI) Upper Bound Confidence Interval, the p-value of 0.004 is below 0.05 and 
Lower Bound of the 95% Confidence Interval, the p-value of 0.002 is also bellow 0.05. Monte Carlo simulation tests results are 
statistically significant at a 95% Confidence Interval for both Lower and Upper Bound levels. It may be concluded that the results in 
Table 5.3.5 at a 95% Confidence Interval of the 13 ratios are not normally distributed. In Table 5.3.5, the mean values for all ratios 
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are low, below zero values, suggesting that in a set of values they are next to the central point, i.e. 
next to the axis. A slightly higher, but still low Standard Deviation values indicate that they are 
not widely spread, that is, they are spread around the mean. Analysing Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed), a 
two-tailed probability value or p–value, in Table 5.3.5., only the Loan to Asset (LTA), out of the 
13 ratios, has a p–value of 0.025 and the IRI has a p–value of 0.002 and fails H0(a): the 
hypothesis at a 95% confidence interval. The Loan to Assets (LTA) and the Interest (Sales) 
Receivables Index (IRI) are not normally distributed, as both the LTA and the IRI are inferior to 
p = 0.05 value, and are in the critical or rejection region. The rest of the 11 ratio p-values are 
0.000 and lower than 0.05 (p < 0.05) and are statistically significant at a 95% Confidence 
Interval. It may be concluded that in Table 5.3.5, all the 13 ratios are statistically significant at a 
95% Confidence Interval Level.  
 
Table 5.3.6 shown in Appendix 4, presents Descriptive statistics calculated for all ratios, for all 
sample, tested with earnings management model 1, EM1, at a 95% Confidence Interval to 
examine ‘Skewness and Kurtosis’ as well as the ‘Std. Error’. In Table 5.3.6, column two shows 
the Statistics of Skewness and Kurtosis, where all ratios are higher than 1 except the Loan to 
Total Assets (LTA), where LTA has a Skewness of 0.036 and a Kurtosis of 0.873, which 
suggests that the ‘Skewness and Kurtosis’ results for the LTA test have a normal distribution. 
The third column shows results for Standard Error or ‘Std. Error’ of each ratio for Mean, as well 
as for Skewness and Kurtosis. For all ratios, the Mean Std. Error is below 0.0 whereas the Std. 
Error of the Mean for the ROE is 0.32985. Std error for all ratios for Skewness is 0.165 and for 
Kurtosis, it is 0.328. The standard error of the mean is ‘… a distribution of a set of values of the 
estimator obtained from all possible samples of the same size from a given population.’ - Gujarati 
(1995, p.70). Table 5.3.6 presents the 95% Confidence Interval that yields the same results for 
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Std Error as well as for ‘Skewness and Kurtosis’ as in case of the 99% Confidence Interval, see 
Table 5.3.4. Therefore ‘accuracy’ of the statistical sample for the 95% Confidence Interval is the 
same as for the 99% Confidence Interval.  
 
Thomas (1997, p.55) writes …smaller the level of significance at which we can reject H0, the 
stronger is the rejection. For example, a rejection of H0 at the 0.01 level of significance is a 
stronger rejection than one at only the 0.05 level, because the chance of error is smaller’. For 
example rejecting H0: when it is actually true, is referred to as a ‘Type I error’ and when 
accepting H0: when it is false, is referred to as a ‘Type II error’, see Thomas (1997, p.58).  
 
It may be concluded from the test results for Earnings Management testing Model 1, EM1, which 
was run at a 95% and a 99% Confidence Interval and Significance levels of 5% and 1% 
respectively, that the hypothesis:  
H0(a): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings 
‘may’ be rejected. 
 
The same as in the case of EM1 model, test statistics were run for the Earnings Management 
model 2, or EM2, with 99% and 95% confidence internal levels. Chapter 4, Subsection 4.4.3 
explains the EM2 model and the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) formula. 
 
Table 5.3.7 presents test statistics of the EM2 model for each of the 14 ratios with a 99% 
confidence interval for Monte Carlo Sig. run under the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
test. The results are as follows: 
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Table 5.3.7. One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov(K-S) Test of Base ratios run with EM2 model at 99% Confidence Interval Level 
    DTE ETL LTD LTA GYEA RPF SGI IRI GMI NIM PATM ROE ROA ETA 
Number of Observation   408 356 402 492 507 489 422 414 420 420 492 359 424 343 
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. Deviation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Absolute .380 .406 .256 .086 .258 .452 .291 .368 .158 .171 .192 .359 .196 .431 
Positive .372 .398 .256 .086 .238 .451 .267 .368 .158 .170 .188 .350 .185 .419 
Negative -.380 -.406 -.225 -.086 -.258 -.452 -.291 -.367 -.157 -.171 -.192 -.359 -.196 -.431 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z   7.685 7.664 5.129 1.914 5.815 9.994 5.988 7.493 3.229 3.494 4.256 6.799 4.034 7.990 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
99% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Upper Bound .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Notes: Table 5.3.7. presents K-S test statistics for EM2 model, for all sample, for Debt to Equity (DTE), Equity to Loans (ETL), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Loans 
to Total Assets (LTA), Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI), 
Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit After Tax Margin (PATM), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Equity to Total 
Assets (ETA) ratios. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
After examining Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed), a two-tailed probability value, or p-value, it can be concluded that all ratios have p-values 
lower than 0.000, except the Loan to Total Assets (LTA) ratio, which has a p-value of 0.001. These results are much lower than the 
significance level of 0.01, which means that they are not normally distributed; therefore, p-values show test results of statistically high 
significance. Analysing the Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) results, this study concludes that all ratios have lower p-values of 0.000, except 
the Loan to Total Assets (LTA) ratio which has a 0.000 p-value at Lower Bound and a 0.002 p-values at Upper Bound. The Monte 
Carlo results confirm the Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) results. 
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Table 5.3.8, shown in Appendix 4, presents the Descriptive statistics output for EM2 at a 99% 
confidence interval level, run in SPSS to examine each ratios Std. Error of Skewness and 
Kurtosis. The statistical results for Skewness and Kurtosis are shown in column two, and are not 
equal or approximate to zero for all ratios. Loan to Total Assets (LTA) shows a Skewness of 
0.084 and a Kurtosis of 0.379 suggesting that it is normally distributed. The rest of the ratios do 
not have normal distribution values. The third column in Table 5.3.8 shows the results of each 
ratio. Standard Error or ‘Std. Error’ for all ratios is at a 99% confidence interval for Mean. For all 
ratios, Std Error is below 0.0, which confirms the ‘accuracy’ of the statistical sample.  
 
After examining descriptive and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test statistics at the 99% confidence 
interval level, the next table, Table 5.3.9, analyzes K-S statistics at a 95% confidence interval 
level in combination with Monte Carlo tests with the EM2 model. The output of the K-S test is 
shown in Table 5.3.9: 
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Table 5.3.9. One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Test of Base ratios run with EM2 model at 95% Confidence Interval Level 
  DTE ETL LTD LTA GYEA RPF SGI IRI GMI NIM PATM ROE ROA ETA 
Number of Observation   408 356 402 492 507 489 422 414 420 420 492 359 424 343 
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. Deviation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Absolute .380 .406 .256 .086 .258 .452 .291 .368 .158 .171 .192 .359 .196 .431 
Positive .372 .398 .256 .086 .238 .451 .267 .368 .158 .170 .188 .350 .185 .419 
Negative -.380 -.406 -.225 -.086 -.258 -.452 -.291 -.367 -.157 -.171 -.192 -.359 -.196 -.431 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z   7.685 7.664 5.129 1.914 5.815 9.994 5.988 7.493 3.229 3.494 4.256 6.799 4.034 7.990 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Upper Bound 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Table 5.3.9 presents K-S test statistics, for all sample, for Debt to Equity (DTE), Equity to Loans (ETL), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Loans to Total Assets 
(LTA), Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI), Gross Margin 
Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit After Tax Margin (PATM), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Equity to Total Assets (ETA) 
ratios. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
By examining Asymp. Sig. (2tailed), a two-tailed probability value in Table 5.3.9, it was noticed that only Loan to Total Assets (LTA) 
has probability values, p-value of 0.001, whereas for the rest of the ratios, p-values are 0.000 or lower. The p-value results would 
suggest that the K-S test at a 95% confidence interval is lower than the 0.05 significance level, that is 0.05 > 0.001 and 0.05 > 0.000, 
which suggests a conclusion that p-values are highly significant. In other words, test statistics are in the critical region. By analyzing 
Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) it can be shown that low mean values of 0.000 suggest that in a set of values, and that they are next 
to the central point, i.e. next to the axis. SD values of 1 for all ratios, while slightly higher, they are still low values for Standard 
Deviation indicating that they are not widely spread, but spread around the mean. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) p-values with
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Upper and Lower Bound, the p-value for Loans to Total Assets (LTA) is 0.002, still below 
significance level of 0.05 that is, 0.05 > 0.002 for LTA. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) p-values 
with Upper and Lower Bound are 0.000, except for LTA, which has p-values between 0.001 
for Lower and 0.003 for Upper Bound. The Monte Carlo Experiment p-values confirm the 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) result. It may be concluded that the Kolmogorov- Smirnov (K-S) test 
results for a 95% Confidence Interval are highly significant with p-values of 0.000, Loan to 
Total Assets (LTA) being an exception with a p-value of 0.001, but still within statistically 
highly significant result. 
 
Descriptive Statistics for all ratios were tested with EM2 model, ratios for Skewness and 
Kurtosis at a 95% Confidence Interval level, and results are presented in Table 5.3.10 in 
Appendix 4. Skewness and Kurtosis results are in column two, and they are not equal or 
approximate to zero for all ratios. The same as in the case of the 99% Confidence Interval 
level, the results are presented in Table 5.3.8. The Loan to Total Assets (LTA) shows 
Skewness of 0.084 and Kurtosis of 0.379 values and a normal distribution at a 95% 
Confidence Interval level in Table 5.3.10. The rest of the ratios do not display normal 
distribution values. The third column shows the results of each ratio’s Standard Error or ‘Std. 
Error’ for all ratios at a 95% confidence interval for Mean. For all ratios, Std Error is below 
0.0. This confirms the ‘accuracy’ of the statistical sample at a 95% Confidence Level.  
 
5.3.1.4. Summary of the Visual Investigation of the 14 Ratios and Statistical testing 
with the Earnings Management 1 and Earnings Management 2 models 
 
Section 5.3.1 outlined Testing Approach 3.1, which consists of both visual and additional 
statistical test results of the 14 ratios: Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI), Sales Growth 
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Index (SGI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit After Tax Margin 
(PATM), Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), 
Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Equity to Loans (ETL), Gross Yield 
on Earning Assets (GYEA) and Debt to Equity (DTE) with Earnings Management testing 
Model 1 and Model 2, EM1 and EM2. Tests were run in SPSS with Kolmogorov-Smirnov, 
and comprised Descriptive tests at a 95% and a 99% confidence interval levels, in order to 
test Hypothesis, H0(a):.  
 
Section 5.3.1.3 outlines the results of the 14 ratios and they are presented in Tables 5.3.3 to 
5.3.10 all being tested per EM1 and EM2 models. In Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed), a two-tailed 
probability value, p-values, tested per EM1 and EM2 models, for all 13 ratios p-value results 
are 0.00 or lower, with p-values significance level of 0.01 or 0.05 and Confidence Interval 
levels of 99% and 95%. The results confirm that they are statistically significant. Monte 
Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) results also show p-values of 0.00 or lower. Thomas, (1997, p.6) states, 
‘Monte Carlo Experiment reinforces the results’. However, the only ratio out of 14, namely 
the Loans to Total Assets (LTA) ratio, calculated with the EM1 model, LTA with a p–value 
of 0.025 holds to H0(a): at a 99% confidence interval level. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that LTA is normally distributed, but with weak results of 0.025 that are greater than p = 0.01 
(p < 0.025). The LTA results fail at the 95% confidence interval level, as a p–value of 0.025 
is smaller than the significance level of p = 0.05, or p > 0.025 as calculated under the EM1 
model. However, Loan to Total Assets, LTA, ratio p–value results of 0.001, calculated with 
the EM2 model, fails both the 99% and the 95% Confidence Interval levels, for both 0.01 and 
0.05 significance levels. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) results also show p-values of 0.00 or 
lower, thus reinforcing the statistical results. Test results confirm the banks’ corporate 
dealings. For example, by examining their lending policy for years from 2003 to 2013 as 
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shown in Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3, this study concludes that there was 
an increasing and continuous aggressive lending policy in place. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, 
Figure 3.4 analyzes Changes in Credit Conditions and Figure 3.5 presents outstanding 
corporate loans. Both Figures 3.4 and 3.5 from Chapter 3 show that changes in credit 
conditions and a decline in corporate loans from 2008 were gradually altered but were not 
eliminated, due to the worldwide financial crisis that began in 2008. This might explain why 
the Loan to Total Assets (LTA) ratio has normal distribution results for the EM1 model and 
only at a 99% Confidence Interval level. 
 
The significance level is the probability of committing true or false hypothesis acceptance. 
Gujarati, (1995, pp.132-133) writes that The Exact Level of Significance: The p-value, also 
known as ‘… the observed or exact level of significance or the exact probability of 
committing a Type 1 error’. Thomas (1997, p.55) writes ‘…smaller the level of significance 
at which we can reject H0, the stronger is the rejection. For example, a rejection of H0 at the 
0.01 level of significance is stronger rejection than one at only the 0.05 level, because the 
chance of error is smaller’. For example rejecting an H0: when it is actually true, it is called a 
‘Type I error’ and when accepting H0:, when it is false, it is called a ‘Type II error’, Thomas 
(1997, p.58). It was concluded that from the 14 tested ratio results for EM1 and EM2 models, 
for a 95% and a 99% Confidence Interval testing levels, and with 0.05 and 0.01 significance 
levels, hypothesis H0(a):: Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings, 
‘may’ be rejected.  
Similarly to this study, earnings management was investigated by Shen and Chih (2005), and 
the authors report earnings management in their banking sample for nearly all sampled 
countries, a total of 48, including European banks, but excluding Eastern European banks. 
The authors find evidence of earnings management almost in all sampled countries. The 
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authors tested banking data with a risk-return model of Fiegenbaum (1990), and also applied 
Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model, and additionally tested Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) model too. Shen and Chih (2005, p.2696) conclude, ‘… it is 
striking that stricter law enforcement contrarily results in more earnings management, since 
managers feel the need to avoid earnings decreases; thus possibly lowering the quality of 
financial reports of the banking industry’. 
 
5.3.2. Results of Testing Approach 3.2  
 
It was highlighted that Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007) investigate income tax and 
special items effect in connection with discontinuity of earnings around and at zero point. It is 
of interest to test Hypothesis H0(b): with earnings management 1 model, or EM1, of this 
study with Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) model, applying Hungarian credit 
institutions data of this study, and to see if there is a significant difference in test results as 
well as in the distribution of histograms. Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) 
modify the last part of the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) model, and argue that 
Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model standard deviation of the difference ‘SDi’ 
model is overstated and the EM1 is understated. Furthermore, Beaver, McNichols and Nelson 
(2007, p.526) claim that, ‘…income tax and special items contribute to a discontinuity at zero 
in the distribution earnings’.  
 
Calculations under the Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) model were done in 
‘Burgstahler calculation method of all variables - with Beaver - Mcnichols model of sd.xlsx’ 
excel sheet for both scaled earnings, and scaled earnings change variables. To test the model 
of Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, pp.535-536), only the modified part of the standard 
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deviation of the difference formula was applied in this study, as it is stated in the footnote of 
the Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) study. The reason for doing this was to 
verify whether the formula modification makes a significant difference in the test statistics. 
This study does not exclude tax and special items for testing discontinuity.  
 
Test statistics was performed in SPSS for Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) 
divided by Total Assets in period in (t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or change in earnings 
divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios, applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
statistics with a 95% and a 99% confidence interval level. Descriptive test statistics was also 
calculated with 25, 50 and 75 percentile values for EM1 under the modified Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) standard deviation of the difference ‘SDi’ model. 
Histograms for both scaled earnings, and scaled earnings change variables are, as expected, 
asymmetric.  
 
The One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics tables for the 95% and the 99% 
Confidence intervals, with the modified Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) 
Standard Deviation of the difference formula for scaled earnings are presented below: 
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Table 5.3.11. Test statistics of Scaled Earnings run with modified Beaver et al. 2007 
model 
 
Scaled 
Earnings 
Number of Observation 383 
Normal Parameters Mean -.0001 
Std. Deviation .0075 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .174 
Positive .160 
Negative -.174 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.399 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. .000 
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 0.000 
Upper Bound .008 
Notes: 5.3.11 presents test statistics of Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax divided by Total Assets(t-1) run with 
EM1 model, with modified Beaver et al. 2007 model, with One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and with 
95% Confidence Interval level, for the period 2001-2011. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Table 5.3.12. Test statistics of Scaled Earnings run with modified Beaver et al. 2007 
model 
 
Scaled 
Earnings 
Number of Observation 383 
Normal Parameters Mean -.0001 
Std. Deviation .0075 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .174 
Positive .160 
Negative -.174 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.399 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. .000 
99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 0.000 
Upper Bound .012 
Notes: Table 5.3.12 shows test statistics of Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax divided by Total Assets(t-1) run 
with the modified Beaver et al. 2007 model and with the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a 99% 
Confidence Interval level, for the period 2001-2011. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
By examining Table 5.3.11 and Table 5.3.12 for the Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed), we see that a 
two-tailed probability value, or p-values are 0.000, which are ‘highly’ significant results and 
are far below the 0.01 or 0.05 and even 0.001 p-values. The lower the p-values, the lower the 
probability to ‘commit a Type I error – a probability of rejecting the true H0: hypothesis’, 
Gujarati (1995, p.787). In both tables the Standard deviation, SD, is 0.0075, a low value, 
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which would suggest that the SD does not ‘deviate’ from the mean, or in other words, 
distribution with a low SD would suggest a tall, narrow shape. See Thomas (1997, p.13).  
 
The following tables, Table 5.3.13 and Table 5.3.14 show test statistics of the One-Sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics tables for the 95% and 99% Confidence intervals, with a 
modified Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) Standard Deviation of the difference 
formula for the scaled earnings change: 
 
Table 5.3.13. Test statistics of Scaled Earnings Change run with the modified Beaver et 
al. 2007 model 
 
Scaled Earnings 
Change 
Number of Observation 313 
Normal Parameters Mean .0001 
Std. Deviation .0104 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .226 
Positive .210 
Negative -.226 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.997 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. .000 
99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 0.000 
Upper Bound .015 
Notes: Table 5.3.13 presents test statistics of Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided by Total 
Assets(t-2) run with the modified Beaver et al. 2007 model and with the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
with a 99% Confidence Interval level, for the period 2002-2011. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
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Table 5.3.14. Test statistics of Scaled Earnings Change run with the modified Beaver et 
al. 2007 model 
 
Scaled Earnings 
Change 
Number of Observation 313 
Normal Parameters Mean .000059 
Std. Deviation .0103874 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .226 
Positive .210 
Negative -.226 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.997 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. .000 
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 0.000 
Upper Bound .010 
Notes: Table 5.3.14 shows test statistics of Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided by Total 
Assets(t-2) run with modified Beaver et al. 2007 model and with the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with 
a 95% Confidence Interval level, for the period 2002-2011. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
By comparing test statistics in Table 5.3.13 and in Table 5.3.14, with both Confidence 
Interval levels, it can be seen that they have similar results for scaled earnings change to 
Table 5.3.11 and Table 5.3.12 for scaled earnings ratio results. Tables 5.3.11 to 5.3.14 with 
Confidence Interval levels of 99% and 95% have very low Mean and low Standard 
deviations, in both cases bellow 0.0, whereas p-values for Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) for both 
95% and 99% confidence interval levels is below 0.000, a statistically highly significant 
result. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) test results of Sig. p-values of 0.000 confirm the statistical 
results for Tables 5.3.11 to 5.3.14. 
 
Apart from statistical tests, histograms were created to investigate the distribution and the 
shape of Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in 
(t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period 
(t-2) ratios.  
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Figure 5.3.2.1. Histogram of Scaled Earnings run with the Beaver et al. modified model 
 
 
Figure 5.3.2.2. Histogram of Scaled Earnings Change run with the Beaver et al. modified 
model
 
Notes: Figure 5.3.2.1 and Figure 5.3.2.2 show histograms for Scaled Earnings for the period of 2001-2011, and 
Scaled Earnings Change for the period of 2002-2011. Both histograms bin size were set to 0.01 with -0.02 
minimum and 0.02 maximum scales. Histogram distributions have an asymmetrical shape, a huge jump just 
before and at zero and are slightly skewed to the right with visibly high peakedness. Source: Own calculation 
and presentation. 
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Skewness and Kurtosis for Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change variables are 
confirmed in test statistics and are shown in Table 5.3.15: 
 
Table 5.3.15. Descriptive test statistics run with the Beaver et al. 2007 model 
 
Scaled Earnings 
Scaled Earnings 
Change 
Number of Observation  383 313 
Mean -.0001 .0001 
Std. Deviation .0075 .0104 
Skewness -.8791 .9332 
Std. Error of Skewness .1247 .1378 
Kurtosis 10.33 14.60 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .2487 .2747 
Percentiles 25 -.0018 -.0020 
50 -.0001 -.0002 
75 .0019 .0020 
Notes: Table 5.3.15 presents Descriptive Statistics run for the Beaver et al. 2007 model for the period of 2001-
2011.  Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) modified Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, 
p.103) model of the modified standard deviation of the difference ‘SDi’ model fails to uphold 
the H0(b): with the EM1 model with Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) modified 
Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model. Comparison is made between Scaled 
Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in (t-1); and 
Scaled Earnings Change, or change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios 
histograms from Figure 5.3.2.1 and Figure 5.3.2.2 that were run with Beaver, McNichols and 
Nelson’s (2007, p.540) model, to Figure 5.1.1 and Figure 5.1.3 histograms that were run with 
the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model. It was observed that distributions of 
histograms show discontinuity and are almost identical in Figures 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 with the 
modified and also with Figures 5.1.1 and 5.1.3 with the non-modified Burgstahler and 
Dichev’s (1997, p.103) models. Histograms also confirm test statistics results for both the 
modified and the non-modified models. Tests results and histograms of this study for Beaver, 
Chapter 5 
221 
 
McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) model fail to reject the Burgstahler and Dichev’s 
(1997, p.103) model test results in respect to the modified standard deviation of difference, or 
‘SDi’. Burgstahler and Chuck (2015, p.10) point out with regard to special items that, ‘… 
evidence that removing a component of earnings eliminates the discontinuity in earnings 
distribution is not evidence of unique role for that component, but rather evidence that the 
component plays a role similar to other non-trivial components of earnings’. Burgstahler and 
Chuck (2015, p.10) argue, ‘…differential tax rate explanation is limited strictly to 
discontinuities where the tax rate for earnings immediately above the benchmark is 
substantially higher than the tax rate immediately below the benchmark’. (Differential tax 
rate refers to different tax rates, for example, preference to Capital gain tax rather than to 
dividend tax rate). Additionally, Burgstahler and Chuck (2015, p.11) outline,  ‘… there is no 
reason to believe that tax rates are markedly higher for increase in earnings than for 
decreases in earnings or for positive earnings surprises than for negative earnings 
surprises…’. 
 
It may be concluded that statistical tests and histogram results in this study run with the 
modified ‘SDi’ for Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios with the Hungarian 
credit institution data do not support Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) tests 
results, which support the claim that income tax and special items influence discontinuity for 
zero earnings. The results of this study reject Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.526) 
claim that ‘…income tax and special items contribute to a discontinuity at zero in the 
distribution earnings’. It is, however, a fact that Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, 
p.540) tested the same variables and the same sample industries as Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997). It should additionally be pointed out that Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007) use 
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different approaches to statistical testing, including regression analysis, from the ones applied 
in this study. 
 
5.4. Results of Testing Approach 3.3 
 
In the search for earnings manipulation, Hungarian credit institutions’ data was further tested 
per asset size. For testing purposes, the Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) 
divided by Total Assets in period in (t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in 
Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios were tested, for both large (LC) and 
small companies (SC). The tests were performed per Earnings Management testing model 
number 1 and 2, namely the EM1 and EM2 models. Holland and Ramsay (2003, p.54) test 
data on assets size with the same variables as it was done in this study. 
 
5.4.1. Results of Testing Approach 3.3 –  Tested with the Earnings Management 1 
model 
 
Calculation of Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in 
period in (t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets 
in period (t-2) ratios were performed for large and small companies with the Burgstahler and 
Dichev’s (1997, p.103) Earnings Management testing model 1, or the EM1 model and the 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) Earnings Management testing model 2, i.e. 
the EM2 model. Test statistics of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test statistics (K-S) 
were run in SPSS to test the H0(c): hypothesis which reads as: H0(c): Large and Small Credit 
institutions (Banks) scaled by median of Total Assets in Hungary do not manage earnings to 
avoid earnings decreases.  
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Test results of K-S for Testing Approach 3.3 are presented in Table 5.4.1 with a 99% 
Confidence Interval level and Table 5.4.2 with a 95% Confidence Interval level:  
 
Table 5.4.1. Total Assets (TA) scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies with EM1 model  
 
Scaled Earnings  Scaled Earnings 
Change  
L.C.  S.C. L.C. S.C. 
Number of Observation 198 179 179 129 
Normal Parameters Mean -.0001 -.0002 -.0002 .0007 
Std. Deviation .0067 .0177 .0133 .0167 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .213 .203 .279 .193 
Positive .213 .192 .272 .193 
Negative -.210 -.203 -.279 -.162 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 2.992 2.716 3.737 2.193 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 0.000 .000 
Monte Carlo Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Sig. ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
99% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound .000 .000 .000 .000 
Upper Bound .007 .007 .007 .007 
Notes: Table 5.4.1 presents Total Assets (TA) scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies tested with EM1 
model, with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics with a 99% Confidence Interval level for Scaled Earnings 
and Scaled Earnings Change ratios for the period 2002-2011. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Table 5.4.2. Total Assets (TA) scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies with EM1 model 
 
Scaled Earnings  Scaled Earnings 
Change  
L.C. S.C. L.C. S.C. 
Number of Observation 198 179 179 129 
Normal Parameters Mean -.0001 -.0002 -.0002 .0007 
Std. Deviation .0067 .0177 .0133 .0167 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .213 .203 .279 .193 
Positive .213 .192 .272 .193 
Negative -.210 -.203 -.279 -.162 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 2.992 2.716 3.737 2.193 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 0.000 .000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Sig. ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound .000 .000 .000 .000 
Upper Bound .004 .004 .004 .004 
Notes: Table 5.4.2 shows Total Assets (TA) scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies tested with EM1 
model, with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test with a 95% Confidence Interval level for the period 2011-2002 for 
Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
By examining Table 5.4.1, Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed), it can be seen that they are 0.000 for p-
values for both Scaled Earnings; and for Scaled Earnings Change ratios for both large (LC) 
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and small (SC) companies. The same p-values of 0.000 are shown under Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed). Lower and Upper level of the p-values, at a 99% Confidence Interval level, are lower 
than p-value = 0.01. Upper level p-values of the Monte Carlo test statistics are 0.007 for all 
four ratios, which is still below 0.01, or 0.01 > 0.007. The Monte Carlo test results confirm 
the statistical tests.  
 
Test results in Table 5.4.2 show almost identical p-values at a 95% Confidence Interval as in 
Table 5.4.1. Only a slight difference is at the Monte Carlo Upper Bound level, where p-
values are 0.004 for all four ratios, but still below 0.05, even below 0.01. Therefore p-values 
at a 95% Confidence Interval are 0.05 > 0.004 and 0.05 > 0.000, that is, they are ‘statistically 
highly significant’. The sample period is 10 years for large (LC) and small (SC) companies, 
the same as in Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.50) study. In both tables, the results of Mean 
are negative with less than -0.000 values for large companies (LC) and small companies (SC) 
for both variables. Except for Scaled earnings Change, Mean has a positive value with the 
lesser amount of 0.00, but still very low. Std. Deviation values are lower than 0.0 in both 
tables for both variables and for both LC and SC, suggesting that distribution is not 
‘dispersed’. 
 
Table 5.4.3 shows descriptive statistics for total assets (TA) scaled by large (LC) and small 
(SC) companies of Mean, Sd. Deviation, and percentiles with 25%, 50% and 75% of the 
sample observation: 
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Table 5.4.3. Descriptive Statistics of Total Assets scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies 
EM1 model 
Number of 
Observation 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Percentiles 
25th 
50th 
(Median) 
75th 
Scaled Earnings. Large Companies    198 -.0001 .0067 -.0016 .0000 .0015 
Scaled Earnings. Small Companies   179 -.0002 .0177 -.0037 -.0002 .0040 
Scaled Earnings Change. Large Comp.  179 -.0002 .0133 -.0020 -.0001 .0021 
Scaled Earnings Change. Small Comp.  129 .0007 .0167 -.0046 -.0005 .0045 
Notes: Table 5.4.3 presents Descriptive Statistics of Total Assets (TA) scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) 
companies for Scaled Earnings for the period 2001-2011; and Scaled Earnings Change for period 2002-2011, 
run with the EM1 model. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
 
Table 5.4.3 results for Mean are negative for all ratios, except for the Scaled Earnings Change 
ratio for Small Companies (SC). Percentiles for 25% and 50% show negative zero values for 
all large companies (LC) and small companies alike (SC) for both ratios. In the case of small 
companies (SC), Scaled Earnings ratio and large companies (LC) for Scaled Earnings Change 
show a small loss. The results in Table 5.4.3 of this study show overall small negative profits 
for Scaled Earnings; and Scaled Earnings Change ratios for both large (LC) and small 
companies (SC), for 25% and 50% Percentiles. Only at 75% percentiles, they show a small 
profit for both ratios for both SC and LC. Furthermore, the tested sample size in this study is 
low comparing to Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) study. Holland and Ramsay (2003, p.54) test 
results show that large companies (LC) are ‘on average profitable’, whereas in this study 
companies report a small loss.   
Results from Tables 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 present p-values of 0.000 for a 95% and a 99% 
Confidence Interval level, that is, p-values of 0.000 are lower than the 0.01 significance level, 
i.e. 0.01 > 0.000. Statistical results from Tables 5.4.1 to 5.4.3 were tested with the EM1 
model, and confirm that hypothesis, H0(c): ‘Large and small Credit institutions (Banks) 
scaled by median of Total Assets in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid earnings 
decreases’, ‘may’ be rejected. 
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5.4.2. Results of Testing Approach 3.3 – Tested with the Earnings Management 2 
model 
 
Testing Approach 3.3 for Total Assets (TA) scaled by large (LC) and small companies (SC) 
was also run for the EM2 model. Table 5.4.4 presents the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics 
at a 99% Confidence Interval level for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled Earnings Change ratios 
with LC and SC with the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999, p.31), with the earnings 
management model 2, or EM2. The test results are as follows:   
 
Table 5.4.4. Total Assets (TA) scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies with the EM2 model 
  Scaled Earnings 
Scaled Earnings 
Change 
      L.C. S.C.  L.C. S.C.  
Number of Observation 223 204 199 152 
Normal Parameters Mean .000 .000 .000 .000 
Std. Deviation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .209 .194 .280 .193 
Positive .207 .194 .267 .193 
Negative -.209 -.184 -.280 -.186 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.115 2.774 3.949 2.375 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
99% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound .000 .000 .000 .000 
Upper Bound .006 .006 .006 .006 
Notes: Table 5.4.4 presents Total Assets scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies tested with EM2 
model, with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics for the period 2001-2012 for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled 
Earnings Change ratios with a 99% Confidence Interval level. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Examining Table 5.4.4 i.e. p-values of Scaled Earnings, and Scaled Earnings Change ratios 
for two-tailed probability values, or Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed), it can be seen that they are 0.000 
for both Large (LC) and Small companies (SC). The values are lower than the 0.01 
significance level, i.e. 0.01 > 0.000. The same p-values of 0.000 are for Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed) Sig. Only Upper Bound of the 99% Confidence Interval is 0.006 for all LC and SC 
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ratios, but still below the 0.01 significance level. Mean values for LC and SC are 0.000 with 
Std. Deviation of 1. Despite the low sample, the results are statistically highly significant.  
 
Table 5.4.5 presents the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results with the EM2 model at a 95% 
Confidence Interval for Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios for all LC and 
SC companies: 
 
Table 5.4.5. Total Assets (TA) scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies with EM2 model 
  Scaled Earnings 
Scaled Earnings 
Change 
      L.C. S.C.  L.C. S.C.  
Number of Observation 223 204 199 152 
Normal Parameters Mean .000 .000 .000 .000 
Std. Deviation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .209 .194 .280 .193 
Positive .207 .194 .267 .193 
Negative -.209 -.184 -.280 -.186 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.115 2.774 3.949 2.375 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound .000 .000 .000 .000 
Upper Bound .004 .004 .004 .004 
Notes: Table 5.4.5 shows Total Assets (TA) scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies tested with EM2 
model, with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics for the period 2001-2012 for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled 
Earnings Change, with a 95% Confidence Interval level. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Table 5.4.5 statistical results show almost identical p-values as in Table 5.4.4. The only 
difference being that Table 5.4.5 is under Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) 95% Confidence 
Interval Upper Bound, for all ratios for both Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies, where p-
values are 0.004. P-values in Table 5.4.4 are 0.000 for Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) and Monte 
Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Mean has a value of 0.000 while Std. Deviation has a value of 1 for 
LC and SC ratios. Table 5.4.5 test results for Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) as well as for Monte 
Carlo are below p-values of 0.05 for given significance levels, i.e. 0.05 > 0.000. It may be 
concluded that the statistical results in Table 5.4.5 are statistically highly significant. 
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Table 5.4.6 shows Descriptive Statistics for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled Earnings Change, or 
ratios with large companies (LC) and small companies (SC): 
 
Table 5.4.6. Descriptive Statistics of Total Assets scaled by Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies    
EM2 model 
Number of 
Observation 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Percentiles 
25th 
50th 
(Median) 
75th 
Scaled Earnings. Large Companies    223 .000 1.000 -.1820 .0012 .2106 
Scaled Earnings. Small Companies   204 .000 1.000 -.1992 .0268 .2486 
Scaled Earnings Change. Large Comp.  199 .000 1.000 -.1391 -.0187 .1046 
Scaled Earnings Change. Small Comp.  152 .000 1.000 -.2437 -.0175 .2537 
Notes: Table 5.4.6 presents Descriptive Statistics, run with the EM2 model, for Total Assets (TA) scaled by 
Large (LC) and Small (SC) companies for scaled earnings, and for scaled earnings change ratios, for the period 
2001-2012. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
Mean values are 0.000 for all 4 ratios with Std. Deviation of 1. Percentiles of the 25
th
, 50
th
 
and 75
th
 show mixed results. Results for scaled profits for SC and LC at the 25
th
 percentile 
are almost identical and show a small loss, whereas at 50% and 75% percentile they show 
small profits. For changes in scaled profits for small (SC) and large companies (LC), results 
at 25% and 50% show a small loss and at 75% Percentiles show a small profit. SC sample for 
scaled profits shows a significant 2.6% discontinuity at zero earnings. The results are 
significant at 0.01 as well as at the 0.05 level.  
 
Tables 5.4.4 to 5.4.6 present results of testing with the earnings management model 2 (EM2) 
and they confirm that hypothesis, H0(c): Large and small Credit institutions (Banks) scaled 
by median of Total Assets in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases, 
‘may’ be rejected. The results in this study for Testing Approach 3.3 are similar to Holland 
and Ramsay’s (2003, p.54) with the difference that the sample data used in this study 
represent merely 1/10 of Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) sample for both variables for both 
large (LC) and small (SC) companies. 
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5.4.3. Summary of Results of Testing Approach 3.3 - Tested with the Earnings 
Management 1 and Earnings Management 2 models 
 
In section 5.4 Testing Approach 3.3 was used in order to rank each year’s data on asset size to 
test whether Hungarian credit institutions manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases. As in 
Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.54) study, Total Assets (TA) were split into large (LC) and 
small (SC) companies based on the sample median of the total assets and then, Scaled 
Earnings, and Scaled Earnings Change ratios were calculated with Burgstahler and Dichev’s 
(1997, p.103) EM1 model and with Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) EM2 
model. Additionally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) one sample test statistics was used to 
test H0(c):. The K-S tests were run with 95% and 99% Confidence Interval levels, and with a 
Monte Carlo simulation, plus Descriptive Statistics were run to test the hypothesis H0(c):. The 
results are shown in Tables 5.4.1 to 5.4.6 and present statistically highly significant results of 
a two-tailed probability value, or Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. and Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) 
Sig. p-values of 0.000 for both Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by 
Total Assets in period in (t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided 
by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios for both large (LC) and small companies (SC).  
Furthermore, by examining year-end profit after tax results in the ‘Credit Inst (banks) BASE 
variables calculation 2012_1999.xlsx’ excel sheet, the company results for both small and 
large banks are in line with the statistical results in section 5.4. In other words, Hungarian 
banks on average report small losses and small profits in the year-end financial statements. 
This would suggest, as outlined in Chapter 3, that the presence of foreign banks in Hungary 
serves only one purpose, namely, to generate wealth for the parent company’s. For example, 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) percentage of the banks trading in 
Hungary were almost twice as high as those of their foreign counterparts, as the Central bank 
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of Hungary reports (August 2013). However, this study also reports, in Chapter 3, that ROA 
was on the rise from 1.6% in 2001 to 2.5% in 2005, and then gradually dropped to 1% in 
2008 and to 0.5% in 2012. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 
show a visible uptrend of banks’ lending policy from 2003 to 2008, and from 2008 to 2013 
there is an obviously continuous lending policy. One explanation could be that banks tend to 
maintain their lending policy in order to avoid earnings decreases for both LC and SC. 
 
The results of this study are similar to Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.54) results. It should 
also be mentioned that Holland and Ramsay (2003) tested a larger sample, and they used a 
sample made up of all the Australian companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, 
with the exclusion of financials. From the results in section 5.4, it was concluded that 
hypothesis, H0(c): Large and small Credit institutions (Banks) scaled by median of Total 
Assets in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases, ‘may’ be rejected. 
 
5.5. Results of Testing Approach 3.4 
5.5.1. Results of Testing Approach 3.4 – Tested with the Earnings Management 1 
model  
 
This study further investigates if there is evidence of earnings management ‘Prior to’ and 
‘After’ the 2008 financial crisis. A sample of Total Assets (TA) was split into two parts, 
namely, ‘prior to’ and ‘after’ 2008, when the financial crisis started. The purpose of this split 
was to test the data with the EM1 and EM2 models in order to answer the hypothesis H0(d):, 
that reads: 
H0(d): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings ‘prior to’ and 
‘after’ 2008, when the financial crisis starts. 
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Monte Carlo Simulation a with a 95% and a 99% 
Confidence Interval test statistics were run, for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled Earnings Change 
ratios for the EM1 model so as to test H0(d):. Table 5.5.1 and Table 5.5.2 represent total 
assets scaled ‘Prior to’ (for years 2004-2007) and ‘After’ 2008 (for years 2008-2011) when 
the worldwide financial crisis started. Table 5.5.1 and Table 5.5.2 show test statistics of K-S 
with a Monte Carlo simulation at 95% and 99% Confidence Interval levels for the EM1 
model: 
 
Table 5.5.1. Prior to and After the 2008 financial crisis tested with a 95% Confidence Interval level 
 
EM1 model 
 
Scaled Earnings 
Scaled Earnings 
Change 
 2004-
2007 
2008-
2011 
2004-
2007 
2008-
2011 
Number of Observation 136 141 121 127 
Normal Parameters Mean .0001 -.0001 .0002 -.0009 
Std. Deviation .0135 .0146 .0096 .0126 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .261 .219 .225 .228 
Positive .239 .219 .225 .183 
Negative -.261 -.209 -.193 -.228 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.043 2.604 2.480 2.566 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound .000 .000 .000 .000 
Upper Bound .006 .006 .006 .006 
Notes: Table 5.5.1 shows ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ the 2008 financial crisis, tested with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test statistics with a 95% Confidence Interval level with EM1 model for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled Earnings 
Change. Tested periods consist of equal 4 years for ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ 2008. Source: Own calculation and 
presentation. 
 
Test results in Table 5.5.1 show that p-values are 0.000 for the two-tailed probability value, 
or Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed), for all four tested variables and they also show that there is a 
visible similarity in results for both Scaled Earnings ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ 2008, and for 
Scaled Earnings Change, ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ 2008. Mean values are very low, with 
negative values of -0.0001 for Scaled Earnings ratio. For Scaled Earnings Change ratio, Mean 
values are -0.0009 for ‘After’ 2008, whereas Prior to’ 2008 they are positive and equal 
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0.0002. Std. Deviation values for all four variables are also small, bellow 0.0. The Monte 
Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. with the 95% Confidence Interval p-values also has a value of 
0.000. The Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Lower Bound has p-values 0.000 and Upper 
Bound 0.006. Upper Bound is still below 0.05, i.e. 0.05 > 0.006. It may be concluded that the 
p-values in Table 5.5.1 are ‘statistically highly significant’.  
Next Table 5.5.2 presents K-S test statistics with a 99% confidence interval level. 
 
Table 5.5.2. Prior to and After the 2008 financial crisis tested with a 99% Confidence Interval level 
      Scaled Earnings 
Scaled Earnings 
Change 
EM1 model 2004-
2007 
2008-
2011 
2004-
2007 
2008-
2011 
Number of Observation 136 141 121 127 
Normal Parameters Mean .0001 -.0001 .0002 -.0009 
Std. Deviation .0135 .0146 .0096 .0126 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .261 .219 .225 .228 
Positive .239 .219 .225 .183 
Negative -.261 -.209 -.193 -.228 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.043 2.604 2.480 2.566 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
99% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound .000 .000 .000 .000 
Upper Bound .009 .009 .009 .009 
Notes: Table 5.5.2 presents ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ the 2008 financial crisis, tested with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test and with a 99% Confidence Interval level for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled Earnings Change ratios, with 
EM1 model. Tested periods consist of 4 equal years for ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ 2008. Source: Own calculation 
and presentation. 
 
Table 5.5.2 shows test results for Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. and the Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed) Sig. at a 99% Confidence Interval level, including for Lower Bound level, and they are 
low at 0.000, which is ‘statistically highly significant’. In the case of the Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed) Sig. at a 99% Confidence Interval level for Upper Bound level, p-values are 0.009 for 
all four ratios, which are still below 0.01, i.e. 0.01 > 0.009. Both Tables 5.5.1and 5.5.2 show 
that p-values are ‘statistically highly significant’.  
 
The next section presents test results calculated with the earnings management model 2, or 
EM2. 
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5.5.2. Results of Testing Approach 3.4 – Tested with the Earnings Management 2 
model 
 
Data divided into ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ the 2008 financial crisis were tested with the EM2 
model for the same variables as for Earnings Management 1 model, the EM1, for Scaled 
Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in (t-1), and 
Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios. 
Test results for a 99% and 95% Confidence Interval levels are shown in Table 5.5.3 and in 
Table 5.5.4 respectively: 
Table 5.5.3. Prior to and After the 2008 financial crisis tested with a 99% Confidence Interval level 
EM2 model  
Scaled Earnings 
Scaled Earnings 
Change 
 2003-
2007 
2008-
2012 
 2003-
2007 
2008-
2012 
Number of Observation 171 180 154 162 
Normal Parameters Mean .0703 -.0393 -.0105 -.0038 
Std. Deviation .9945 .9781 1.1057 .8019 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .210 .162 .274 .198 
Positive .199 .162 .274 .190 
Negative -.210 -.147 -.241 -.198 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 2.741 2.167 3.399 2.523 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
99% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound .000 .000 .000 .000 
Upper Bound .007 .007 .007 .007 
Notes: Table 5.5.3 shows ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ the 2008 financial crisis, tested with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test and with a 99% Confidence Interval level for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled Earnings Change ratios, with the 
EM2 model. Tested periods consist of 5 equal years for ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ 2008. Source: Source: Own 
calculation and presentation. 
 
Test results show p-values for Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. and the Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) 
Sig. at a 99% Confidence Interval level, including for Lower Bound level and they are 
identical for Table 5.5.1., and it is low at 0.000, which is a ‘statistically highly significant’ 
result. Only Upper Bound under Monte Carlo Sig. p-values are 0.007 for all four ratios, and 
are still below the 0.01 significance level, i.e. 0.01 > 0.007. Mean values are low and negative 
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for all ratios, they are positive only for Scaled Earnings for ‘prior to 2008’, but still lower in 
value to 0.0. Std. Deviation is low at around 1, indicating that they are not widely spread, but 
spread around the mean.  
 
Table 5.5.4. Prior to and After the 2008 financial crisis tested with a 95% Confidence Interval level 
EM2 model 
Scaled Earnings 
Scaled Earnings 
Change 
 2003-
2007 
2008-
2012 
2003-
2007 
2008-
2012 
Number of Observation 171 180 154 162 
Normal Parameters Mean .0703 -.0393 -.0105 -.0038 
Std. Deviation .9945 .9781 1.1057 .8019 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .210 .162 .274 .198 
Positive .199 .162 .274 .190 
Negative -.210 -.147 -.241 -.198 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 2.741 2.167 3.399 2.523 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound .000 .000 .000 .000 
Upper Bound .004 .004 .004 .004 
Notes: Table 5.5.4 presents ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ the 2008 financial crisis, tested with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test and with a  95% Confidence Interval level for Scaled Earnings, and Scaled Earnings Change ratios, with 
the EM2 model. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
The tests results for the EM2 model with a 95% Confidence Interval level for Monte Carlo 
Sig., and the results for Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. show the same p-values as Table 5.5.3. 
Only Monte Carlo Sig. Upper Bound level p-values are 0.004 for all ratios, but still below the 
0.01 significance level. Mean and Std. Deviation results are also very similar to the ones in 
Table 5.5.3. Upon examining Tables 5.5.3 and 5.5.4, it was decided that the p-values are 
‘statistically highly significant’.  
 
5.5.3. Summary of Results of Testing Approach 3.4 – Tested with the Earnings 
Management 1 and Earnings Management 2 models 
 
Section 5.5 presents evidence of the EM1 and EM2 models ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ the 2008 
financial crisis, with a split of the sample of Total Assets into prior to and after 2008, when 
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the financial crisis started. All Tables 5.5.1 to 5.5.4 in section 5.5 present p-values of 0.000 
that are below 0.01 and below the 0.05 significance level.  
 
In Chapter 3, section 3.2.2, it was pointed out that Return on Asset (ROA) shows gradual 
increase in 1999 from 0.49% to 1.6% in 2001 and to 2.5% in 2005, and when the economic 
crisis started in 2008, ROA dropped to 1%, whereas at the end of 2011 ROA was below 
0.3%, while in 2012 ROA increased above 0.5%. Banks trading in Hungary had one of the 
highest, almost double the ROA in the region in 2005, but certainly the highest comparing to 
banks trading in Germany, Belgium, Austria or Italy (Banai, Király and Nagy, 2010). One 
possible explanation for earnings management (EM) prior to and after the 2008 financial 
crisis is that as the banks’ earnings and liquidity was in decline between 2001 and 2009, that 
is, banks enjoyed strong growth until 2005 while after 2006, and especially after 2008, the 
banks’ earnings were in decline. It is also probable that, due to the fact that banks could not 
generate profits from their assets after the financial crisis began, bank managers engaged in 
EM, for example as Banai, Király and Nagy (2010) show, ROE and ROA for banks was in an 
uptrend from 1999 to 2007, and then in a downtrend up till 2009. Another explanation for 
why bank managers engaged in EM was to meet their foreign parent companies’ targets set 
for Hungarian entities before and after the financial crisis. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, Figure 
3.5 of this study shows a change in outstanding corporate loans for the period from 2008 to 
2013. It can be seen that in Hungary corporate lending did not drop dramatically, only around 
13% which suggests that banks were trying to maintain their lending policy so as to avoid a 
liquidity trap, as Banai, Király and Nagy (2010) write. Additionally, Figure 3.6 in Chapter 3 
of this study shows that credit conditions slightly tightened in the first half of 2008, but banks 
started to ease their lending conditions from the second half of 2008. Easing and tightening 
lending conditions are also forms of earnings management in the interest of higher profits.  
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Shen and Chih (2005) point out that banks might have become illiquid, or had liquidity 
difficulties in performing their banking operations. In order to maintain confidence in their 
operations without losing customers, ‘…banks have strong incentives to prevent their 
earnings from being negative’. – Shen and Chih (2005, p.3) 
 
The conclusion which can be drawn from the results of section 5.5 is that hypothesis, H0(d): 
Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings prior to and after 2008, when 
the financial crisis starts, ‘may’ be rejected. 
 
5.6. Summary of Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the three main empirical testing approaches, which were 
used to test the Standard Discontinuity method, the Accrual method and the Distribution of 
Ratios method from the financial statements obtained from the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority, or the HFSA/MNB. As part of the Distribution of Ratios method, this 
study applies a non-conventional approach, a more hands-on analysis, due to its practicality. 
Earlier related papers used only a handful, no more than four variables to test data for any 
earnings anomalies, whereas this study presents test results of 14 ratios, a new approach in 
researching Earnings Management. 
With the Standard Discontinuity method this study tested hypothesis H0(b):, with ratios of 
scaled earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in (t-1); and 
scaled change earnings, or change in earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2), by 
applying Earnings Management testing model number 1 and 2, the EM1 and EM2 models. 
Descriptive Statistics were run to test percentiles for 25%, 50% and 75% with Mean and SD. 
The results are presented in Tables 5.1.a to 5.1.d; Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings 
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Change ratios show low, negative Mean and low SD. Comparing the results in Table 5.1.a 
and 5.1.b to Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) and to the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) 
results, it was concluded that the results are very similar. Both Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) 
and Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) results were based on non-financials and on a much 
larger sample. The One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric test was applied to test 
scaled earnings and scaled earnings change ratios with the EM1 and EM2 models. The results 
are presented in Tables 5.1.e and 5.1..f showing low p-values of 0.000, statistically ‘highly 
significant’ results for both variables, for Asymptotic, Exact and Point Probability. Such low 
p-values suggest the rejection of the hypotheses H0(b): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary 
do not manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases. Histograms for Scaled Earnings and 
Scaled Earnings Change ratios were created, and are shown in Figures 5.1.1 to 5.1.4 where 
there can be seen visible discontinuities of the distributions slightly to the right, i.e. positively 
skewed, with big jumps at zero points, for both variables. For all four histograms there is a 
visible higher earnings frequency just above the zero in Figures 5.1.1 to 5.1.4, which would 
suggest earnings occurrence just above the zero. This pattern of the frequency distribution in 
all four histograms, as well as the statistical test results suggest avoidance of earnings 
decreases, and thus confirm the rejection of H0(b):. The results of this study are similar to the 
Holland and Ramsay’s (2003), and to the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) results, despite 
testing different variables in non-financial industries. 
 
With the Second Empirical testing Approach, this study applies the widely used Accrual 
Method to investigate Earnings Management. Two regression models test Hypothesis H0(a):, 
with all sample, with 95% and 99% confidence interval levels. Test results with the accrual 
method are rather conflicting. Regression Model 1 results for both 95% and 99% confidence 
interval levels would suggest accepting Hypothesis H0(a):. However, Regression Model 1 
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consists of Scaled Total Accruals (TACCR.) which have elements of both non-discretionary 
and discretionary accruals that also contain reversal accruals. There is no evidence, as of 
writing this study, of a working model that would precisely measure the timing of the reversal 
accruals within non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Therefore, by accepting 
Hypothesis H0(a):, this study would make a ‘type II error’. This is the main weakness of the 
regression Model 1, or of a similar accrual testing model for that matter. Regression Model 2 
however splits accruals between discretionary (DA) and the non-discretionary (NDA) 
accruals, as explanatory variables and tests the sample on an annual basis. The multiple 
regrresion Accrual Model 2 test results are mix, as statistical signifiance values differ on 
annual bases. Discretionary accruals (DA) are overall statistically significant for 9 out of 14 
years at a 95% confidence level and at a 0.05 significance level, and 7 out of 14 years at a 
99% confidence level for 0.01 significance levels, whereas non-discretionary accruals (NDA) 
overall are statistically insignificant. It may be concluded that Hypothesis H0(a): fails for 
discretionary accruals (DA), but holds for non-discretionary accruals (NDA). From the test 
results of this study, and from the prior research papers, this study concludes that the Accrual 
testing method should not be applied to test Earnings Management due to its severe 
weaknesses, namely the timing of the reversal accruals which has a significant impact on 
testing accuracy. See for example the studies of Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010); McNichols 
(2000); Baber, Kang and Li (2011) and Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012). 
This study discussed the Standard Discontinuity Method and the Accrual Method test results, 
previously applied by various research papers discussed earlier in this study. 
 
The Third Empirical testing method, the Distribution of Ratios Method, is a new appraoch in 
investigating Earnings Management (EM). The Distribution of Ratios Method investigates 14 
ratios with four testing approaches, namely, visual, statistical, per asset size and ‘Prior to’ and 
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‘After’ the 2008 financial crisis. This study also performs benchmark comparisons of the 14 
base ratios. Under Testing Approach 3.1, at first, the 14 ratios were calculated from the 
audited financial statements of the Hungarian credit institutions in order to visually 
investigate distributions of each ratio’s histogram, as shown in Figures 5.3.1 – 5.3.14. The 
purpose of visual investigation was to analyse how each ratio distribution behaves from only 
a ratio point of view, without applying any statistical modelling. Therefore, with Testing 
Approach 3.1, the 14 histograms in question were not tested at all, their sole purpose was to 
visually investigate their curve, shapes, and to visually examine if there was any discontinuity 
in evidence, or whether histograms had bell-shaped forms, as presented in Thomas (1997, 
p.22), the shape of a Standard Normal Distribution.  
By visually investigating all 14 histograms, an asymmetric behaviour of each histogram’s 
mean value was evident, that is, none of the histograms showed a bell shape, i.e. they were 
not normally distributed. A similar visual investigation was done of the earnings 
distributions’ histograms, but only for the net income variable, by Shen and Chih (2005). 
Taking 48 countries into account, Shen and Chih (2005) show similar results for earnings to 
this study’s results, namely the Profit After Tax Margin or PATM results in Figure 5.3.11. 
The 14 histograms’ results in Figure 5.3.1 – 5.3.14 prompted further statistical testing with 
the EM1 and EM2 models. However, prior to statistical testing of the 14 ratios, this study 
performed benchmark comparisons of the 14 base ratios. Comparison was conducted without 
any statistical testing, that is, at first, 14 Benchmark ratio histograms were run and then 
compared to the 14 Base ratios’ histograms, as shown under Figures 5.3.1.a – 5.3.14.a. The 
differences between the 14 Base ratios’ histograms to Benchmark ratios’ histograms were 
analyzed in detail in section 5.3.1.2. Benchmark comparison was also conducted with 
descriptive statistics. Table 5.3.1 with Table 5.3.2 present the statistics for the Base and 
Benchmark ratios. However, benchmark comparisons should be interpreted with caution. It is 
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probable that bank managers engage in manipulation to beat, or to meet analysts’ or parent 
companies’ expectations as well as to meet benchmarks, as Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) 
point out. Following visual investigation and benchmark comparison, this study statistically 
tests 13 ratios that comprise the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model, the EM1 
model, and the EM2 model, with the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) model. 
In terms of test statistics, the Non-parametric One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with 
Monte Carlo simulation was used with a 99% and a 95% confidence interval, as shown in 
Tables 5.3.3 and in Table 5.3.5, it was tested with 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels in order 
to achieve more rigorous testing. Test results are highly significant with p-values that are 
lower than 0.01 (p < 0.01) and are statistically significant at a 99% confidence interval level. 
Only Loan to Assets, the LTA ratio, at a 99% confidence interval has a p–value of 0.025, and 
it is greater than p = 0.01 (p < 0.025), but fails at p = 0.05, (p > 0.025). Tests result for all 
ratios gave an indication that bank managements engaged in earnings management.  
It was also of relevant interest to inspect the Skewness and Kurtosis test results of the 13 
ratios. The reader will find that evidence in Table 5.3.4 and in Table 5.3.6 at 99% and 95% 
confidence interval levels and they confirm earlier results. The results for the earnings 
management model 1, or the EM1, for Testing Approach 3.1, 13 ratios were tested with 95% 
and 99% confidence interval levels, and they present evidence supporting the rejection of 
H0(a): which states that ‘Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings’.  
In order to test the hypothesis with the earnings management model 2, or the EM2, calculated 
per Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) model, statistical tests were created to test 
H0(a):, the same as for the EM1 model, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Descriptive tests were 
run in SPSS at a 95% and a 99% confidence interval. The results are presented in Tables 
5.3.7 and 5.3.9 and show highly significant p-values of 0.00 for all ratios, which is smaller 
than the 0.01 level of significance. Based on the EM2 model results, it was decided to reject 
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H0(a): which states that ‘Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings’. 
The EM2 model results confirm the EM1 results; therefore, for both testing models EM1 and 
EM2 for H0(a): it was decided that there was a small possibility of p-values being lower than 
0.00 and that the true hypothesis might be wrongly rejected and a Type I error made. It was 
concluded that hypothesis H0(a): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage 
earnings, ‘may’ be rejected.  
 
Additionally, Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007, p.540) investigate Burgstahler and 
Dichev’s (1997, p.103) model, but the authors also modify the Burgstahler and Dichev’s 
(1997, p.103) model, the standard deviation of the difference, SDi, which is the last section of 
the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) SDi formula. This study tests only the modified 
part of the standard deviation of the difference formula that Beaver, McNichols and Nelson 
(2007, p.540) apply. This study does not remove special items or tax to test discontinuity with 
the EM1 model with Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets 
in period in (t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided by Total 
Assets in period (t-2) ratios with the Hungarian credit institutions sample. This study sought 
to compare whether the modified SDi part of the formula had an effect on test results with 
respect to the non-modified version of the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) model. 
Tests were run with Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change variables with the One-
Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics tables for 95% and 99% Confidence intervals. 
Tables 5.3.11 and 5.3.12 present test statistics with Mean below -0.000, SD below 0.00 and 
p-values for Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) for both confidence interval levels which are also below 
0.000 for Scaled Earnings ratio. Tables 5.3.11 and 5.3.12 show positive low Mean of 0.0001, 
SD 0.01 and p-values of 0.000 for Scaled Earnings ratio for both confidence interval levels. 
The results show similar test statistics for both ratios for both confidence intervals. Apart 
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from test statistics, histograms were also created for both ratios. Figure 5.3.2.1 and Figure 
5.3.2.2 show asymmetrical distributions skewed to the right for both variables. The results 
from Tables 5.3.11 to 5.3.15, as well as from Figure 5.3.2.1 and Figure 5.3.2.2 present clear 
evidence that Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) modified Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997, p.103) SDi formula fails to uphold the H0(b): hypothesis. Beaver, McNichols 
and Nelson (2007) argue that income tax and special items influence discontinuity for zero 
earnings; notwithstanding, statistical results of his study do not confirm Beaver, McNichols 
and Nelson’s (2007, p.526) claim, ‘…income tax and special items contribute to a 
discontinuity at zero in the distribution earnings’.  
It was concluded that Testing Approach 3.2 with the Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax in 
period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in (t-1); and Scaled Earnings Change, or Change 
in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios, applying Earnings Management 
testing model 1, or EM1, and Earnings Management testing model 2, or the EM2 model, with 
evidence of statistical tests and histograms, hypothesis, H0(b): ‘may’ be rejected with 
significance level p-values of 0.000. P-values of 0.000 are lower than the 0.01 testing 
significance level with a 99% and a 95% confidence interval level. Furthermore, distribution 
of the scaled earnings and scaled earnings change variables are asymmetrical in all cases, 
which confirms discontinuity. 
 
As part of Testing Approach 3.3, companies were split by asset size based on the sample 
median of their total assets. With the help of this division, small (SC) and large (LC) 
company assets sizes were created. Scaled Earnings and Scaled Earnings Change ratios were 
applied to statistically test SC and LC with EM1 and EM2 models in order to test the H0(c): 
hypothesis. Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.54) study also tested the Australian data per 
assets size, but excluding financial firms. For statistical testing, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-
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S) test statistics was applied with 95% and 99% Confidence Interval levels. Additionally, a 
Monte Carlo simulation was performed to confirm the statistical test results, and also 
Descriptive Statistics was applied in order to test H0(c):. The tests results are presented in 
Tables 5.4.1 to 5.4.6 and show statistically highly significant results of Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Sig. and Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. p-values of 0.000 for both Scaled Earnings and 
Scaled Earnings Change variables for LC and SC. The results of this study are very similar to 
Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, p.54) results, who use the same testing approach and show 
evidence of discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings. From the tests results of this 
study, it was concluded that hypothesis, H0(c): Large and small Credit institutions (Banks) 
scaled by a median of Total Assets in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid earnings 
decreases, ‘may’ be rejected. 
 
Testing Approach 3.4 tests H0(d): hypothesis, examining whether earnings management was 
present ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ the 2008 financial crisis. The hypothesis was tested with Scaled 
Earnings, or Profit after Tax in period (t) divided by Total Assets in period in (t-1); and 
Scaled Earnings Change, or change in earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2) ratios 
for the EM1 and EM2 models. A sample of Total Assets was split into ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ 
2008 when the financial crisis started. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov One-Sample with Monte 
Carlo Simulation tests statistics were performed with a 95% and a 99% Confidence Interval 
to tests both ratios, namely, ‘Prior to’ and ‘After’ 2008. The results show the two-tailed 
probability value, the Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Sig., with p-values of 0.000 in all Tables 5.5.1 to 
5.5.4. After 2008, Mean is negative and very low for both ratios, with low SD and p-values 
bellow 0.01, suggesting that bank managers engaged in earnings smoothing to maintain 
previous years’ earnings. From the statistical tests results, it was concluded that bank 
managers engaged in earnings smoothing, both prior to and after 2008; therefore, it may be 
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concluded that hypothesis, H0(d): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage 
earnings prior to and after 2008, when the financial crisis starts, ‘may’ be rejected. 
 
This study statistically tested four hypotheses in an attempt to answer the research question: 
 
‘Did credit institutions trading in Hungary avoid earnings decreases for the period 
of 1999-2012?’ 
 
Apart from statistical tests, histograms were created to investigate discontinuity of 
distribution of reported earnings, and distribution comparisons were drawn between this and 
other studies, namely, studies by Burgstahler and Chuck (2015), Holland and Ramsey (2003), 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). However, as 
Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012) argue, accruals booked in a period should be reversed to the 
next. The effect of reversal accruals is not unambiguous in this study due to limited 
information from the ‘Golden Book’, the main source of data for the credit institutions’ 
financial statements, specifically ‘other accruals and other assets’, or ‘accrued interest 
receivables’. However, despite significant limitations of the accrual testing methods, as 
highlighted earlier, this study tested the 14 ratios with two accrual regression models.   
In this study, it is assumed that reversal accruals are part of the total assets. Therefore, it is 
probable that some ratios’ results, which comprise ‘other accruals and other assets’, or 
‘accrued interest receivables’ in the formula, for example, Loans to Assets, Interest 
Receivables Index, Return on Asset, Equity to total Assets, Profit after Tax by Total Assets in 
period t-1 and Change in Earnings by Total Assets in t-2 period, may have lower testing 
power. Earlier studies on accruals (for example Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; Beatty, 
Chamberlain and Magliolo, 1995; Sloan, 1996; Charitou and Vafeas, 1998; Gore, Pope and 
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Singh, 2007 and others) do not refer to the impact of reversal accruals, nor to the possible 
lower power of their tests results. The first study that presents a testing model for reversal 
(discretionary) accruals is by Baber, Kang and Li (2011).  
Based on the evidence presented in this study, all four hypotheses were rejected, which leads 
us to a conclusion that properly answers the research question, ‘Did credit institutions trading 
in Hungary avoid earnings decreases for the period of 1999-2012?’, and the conclusion is 
yes. Substantial evidence in this study confirms that ‘Credit institutions trading in Hungary 
avoided earnings decreases for the period of 1999-2012’.  
 
The percentage level of Return on Assets (ROA) also confirms this conclusion. In 
comparison with western banking counterparts, Hungary had the highest ROA percentage in 
the region for the period of 1998-2008, (Banai, Király and Nagy, 2010). Another possible 
explanation for high ROA is that bank managers engaged in an earnings smoothing strategy 
with Loan Loss Provision (LLP) to fulfil their parent companies’ earnings expectations. In 
other words, with low LLP, expenses are also lower, hence, earnings are increasing. 
However, when positive earnings are no longer possible, managers engage in the ‘big bath’ 
effect, that is, they report losses all at once. The same technique was also pointed out by 
Cohen, Cornett, et al. (2014) in their study of USA banks, and they additionally concluded 
that earnings management was higher before the financial crisis than during the crisis. The 
author’s evidence of earnings management before the financial crisis is similar to the 
evidence put forth in this study. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 6 outlines the conclusion, as well as the limitations and strengths 
of this study. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 concludes this study with the main findings that were arrived at on the basis of 
empirical results derived from the hypotheses which attempted to answer the research 
question. Additionally, apart from its strengths, its limitations were also considered, and 
propositions were made for further research on a comparable academic level.  
 
The aim of this study was to investigate credit institutions in Hungary in search of evidence 
supporting the presence (or absence) of earnings management. Evidence on earnings 
management is widely available for western European and Asian countries as well as for 
companies in the USA, for example, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Holland and Ramsey 
(2003), Shen and Chih (2005), Gore, Pope and Singh (2007), Burgstahler and Chuck (2015), 
have all investigated the banking and other industries, which was reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Evidence suggests that foreign and domestic banks trading in Hungary were not investigated 
for their earnings anomalies, most notably, their engagement in earnings management. 
Therefore, this study set to answer the research question: 
 
‘Did credit institutions trading in Hungary avoid earnings decreases for the 
period of 1999-2012?’ 
 
In an attempt to answer the research question, four hypotheses were formulated: 
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H0(a): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings. 
H0(b): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings to 
avoid earnings decreases 
H0(c):  Large and small Credit institutions (Banks) scaled by median of Total 
Assets in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid earnings 
decreases. 
H0(d):  Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings before 
and after 2008 when the financial crisis starts. 
 
6.2. Empirical findings 
 
The main empirical scrutiny and its subsequent findings were presented in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5. Prior to statistical tests, a specific and characteristic form of each of the 14 ratios 
distribution was examined, and it was concluded that ratios show discontinuities with left or 
right skewed distributions, which provided a basis for further statistical testing’s of the four 
hypotheses. This evidence of discontinuity is shown in Figures 5.1.1 to 5.1.4, and in Figures 
5.3.1 to 5.3.14. 
Section 6.2 combines empirical findings for each of the four hypotheses that were tested in an 
attempt to answer the research question: 
 
A) H0(a): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings.  
 
Hypothesis H0(a): was investigated with two empirical approaches, namely the Accrual 
Method and the Distribution of Ratios Method. The Second Empirical Testing Approach - 
The Accrual Method described in Chapter 5, Section 5.2 presents mixed results of the 
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Regression Model 1 and the Multiple Regression Model 2. The Regression Accrual Model 1 
suggests accepting H0(a): however, by accepting it, this study would make a ‘type II error’ 
due to the timing effect of the reversal accruals and the lack of a workable reversal accrual 
model. The Multiple Regression Model 2 results reject H0(a):. Despite this cautious rejection 
of H0(a): with Accrual Models 1 and 2, this study could have made a ‘type I error’ or a ‘type 
II error’. Baber, Kang and Li (2011) and Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012) studies investigated 
reversal accruals and their testing accuracy. Due to the accrual models’ low testing power, 
this study argues that the accrual testing approach should be avoided while investigating 
evidence of earnings management. A new approach is recommended instead, as outlined 
under The Third Empirical Testing Approach, in Chapter 4. 
 
The Third Empirical Testing Approach, Testing Approach 3.1, the distribution and statistical 
testing of 14 ratios in Chapter 5 presents results of the earnings management model 1, EM1, 
and earnings management model 2, EM2, with a 95% and a 99% confidence interval level 
with a significance p-value level of 0.00 and with confirmation of p-values of 0.00 or lower 
for Monte Carlo Sig. (2-tailed), which altogether represent significant evidence confirming 
the presence of earnings management in credit institutions trading in Hungary. Chapter 3 of 
this study points out that Hungarian banks were generally engaged in aggressive lending 
practices. Following a period of gradual growth, from 1999 to 2005, banks confronted a trend 
shift. Histograms in Figures 5.3.1 to 5.3.14 of the 14 ratios confirm that Hungarian banks 
faced financial difficulties during the tested period with heavy dependence on borrowed 
money, outstanding loans, low sales, higher costs, low profitability and poor capital 
adequacy, which ‘may’ have led to smoothing, and thus to earnings management. 
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Additionally, this study makes benchmark comparisons of the 14 ratios. Fourteen histograms 
were run and comparisons were made between base and benchmark histograms. Additionally, 
descriptive statistics were run for both base and benchmark ratios. The Base ratio statistics 
for all 14 ratios differ from the Benchmark ratios, namely in the Skewness and Kurtosis, as 
well as in the Mean and the Std. Deviation. However, as Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010, 
p.351) point out that benchmark analyses should be used with caution; they emphasize the 
fact that as it is difficult to separate managers’ intentional action from a genuine good 
business performance, it is clear that either of the two may lead to the attainment of the 
desired benchmark level. 
 
B) H0(b): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid 
earnings decreases. 
 
Hungarian banks’ yearly earnings were both increasing and decreasing, as Chapter 3 of this 
study highlights. Evidence of this decrease and increase is presented in the First Empirical 
Approach – The Standard Discontinuity Method (Chapter 5, Subsection 5.1). Figures 5.1.1 to 
5.1.4 show distributions for ratios of Scaled Earnings, or Profit after Tax (t) divided by Total 
Assets in period (t-1), and Scaled Earnings Change, or Change in Earnings divided by Total 
Assets in period (t-2), a visible discontinuity with a slightly more positive high-frequency 
distribution for the earnings management 1 and 2 models. These changes occur when 
earnings are managed to avoid earnings decreases. The One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) test statistics, with significance p-value level of 0.000, confirms the 
evidence of earnings management for the earnings management 1 and 2 models. Hypothesis, 
H0(b):, the results of this study are consistent with Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, pp.103-
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105) and Holland and Ramsay’s (2003, pp.51-52) work, whose studies report on engagement 
in earnings management in order to avoid earnings decreases. 
 
Additionally, under the Third Empirical Approach, the Distribution of Ratios Method with 
the Testing Approach 3.2 (Chapter 5, Subsection 5.3.2), this study tests the Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson’s (2007, p.540) modified Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) 
model. Statistical and distributional results do not confirm evidence that special items and tax 
contribute to discontinuity in earnings with the modified SDi (standard deviation of 
difference). The One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests statistics provide evidence whit p-
values of 0.000 in favour of rejecting Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s (2007) claim. In 
addition, Burgstahler and Chuck (2015) test and reject Beaver, McNichols and Nelson’s 
(2007) evidence of special items and taxes.  
 
C) H0(c): Large and small Credit institutions (Banks) scaled by median of Total Assets in 
Hungary do not manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases. 
 
By applying Testing Approach 3.3, which is part of the Third Empirical Approach, namely 
the Distribution of Ratios Method, this study also tests banks per asset sizes, for both large 
and small banks. Similarly to this study, Holland and Ramsay (2003, p.54) investigated large 
and small companies in their study. The results of the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Descriptive tests statistics for the earnings management 1 and 2 models of this study show 
that the large companies are slightly more profitable than the small companies.  
One explanation for this small profit for the sample period of 2001-2012 is that the 
profitability of large companies was influenced by the financial crisis arising in 2008. Despite 
the crisis, statistical evidence stemming from the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
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confirms that banks engaged in avoiding earnings decreases by perpetuating their lending 
policy (as Chapter 3 outlines), thus engaging in earnings management. Holland and Ramsay’s 
(2003) study reports similar test results as this study, for both large and small companies. 
Detailed analysis of H0(c): is shown in Chapter 5, Section 5.4. 
 
D) H0(d): Credit institutions (Banks) in Hungary do not manage earnings prior to and 
after 2008, when the financial crisis starts. 
 
Hungarian banks were also impacted by the 2008 financial crisis. Prior to 2008, banks 
enjoyed relatively high-level earnings, especially from 2001-2005. The banks’ earnings level 
after 2005 started to decline, especially after 2008, amidst the financial crisis. The banks tried 
to maintain their earnings level by restricting and easing their lending policy, as Figures 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3 in Chapter 3 suggest. Under the Third Empirical Approach, Testing Approach 3.4 
of the Distribution of Ratios Method, tests were performed with the earnings management 
models 1 and 2 with the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Monte Carlo Sig. test 
statistics. Test results confirmed evidence of earnings management with 0.000 p-values 
significance for both the 95% and the 99% confidence interval. A detailed explanation of 
H0(d): hypothesis is shown in Chapter 5, Section 5.5. 
 
6.3.  Limitations and strengths of the study 
 
This study has its own limitation; due to the lack of cash flow analysis, the power of tests is 
not the same as in the case of comparable EU, USA and AUS studies. One limitation of this 
study is that it suffers from the same lack of cash flow testing as Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser’s (1999) study. Furthermore, this study points out that it could not differentiate 
Chapter 6 
252 
 
reversal accruals from the banks’ yearly balance sheets. Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012) state 
that reversal accruals might hold in the testing and thus limiting testing power. This study 
takes into account that reversal accruals might have influenced the power of tests results for 
ratios such as Return on Asset (ROA), Net interest Margin (NIM), Interest Receivable Index 
(IRI), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Rate Paid on 
Funds (RPF), Equity to total Assets (EtA), Profit After Tax in period (t) divided by Total 
Assets in period (t-1); and Change in Earnings divided by Total Assets in period (t-2). That is 
9 out of the 16 ratios’ power of testing might be somewhat lower.  
 
Nevertheless, this study has its strengths. Earlier studies tested two to five variables, namely: 
Earnings; Return on Asset; Loan Loss Provisions; Return on Equity and Discretionary 
Accruals by applying the Accrual or the Standard Discontinuity method. This study cross-
examined the credit institutions’ financial statements and statistically tested a total of 16 
ratios in a search of earnings management by applying The Standard Discontinuity Method, 
The Accrual Method and The Distribution of Ratios Method. Additionally, as part of The 
Distribution of Ratios Method, tests were performed for benchmarks, by the banks’ asset size, 
and prior to and after the 2008 financial crisis in order to examine whether there was 
evidence of earnings management in Hungarian credit institutions’ financial statements. If I 
were to do the thesis again, I would use the same testing approaches, with the addition of 
cash flow analysis, providing data were available. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
253 
 
6.4. Conceptual conclusions and contribution to knowledge  
6.4.1. Conceptual conclusions 
 
This study attempted to fill a research gap by investigating earnings management of credit 
institutions trading in Hungary for the period from 1999 to 2012. This study applies three 
empirical testing approaches, namely, The Standard Discontinuity Method, The Accrual 
Method and The Distribution of Ratios Method which are different from the previous studies 
that tested Earnings Management of credit institutions or financials. Earlier studies also 
applied the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) and/or the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 
(1999, p.31) models of financials and non-financial industries and investigated evidence of 
earnings management (EM). However, these studies, for example Holland and Ramsay’s 
(2003); Shen and Chih’s (2005); Gore, Pope and Singh’s (2007); Charoenwong and 
Jiraporn’s (2008); Amar and Abaoub’s (2010); and Hamdi and Zarai’s (2012) applied a 
different statistical testing approach in combination with 2-5 variables. Additionally, studies 
investigating EM of financial companies by applying the Loan Loss Provision (LLP) 
variable, and they were conducted, for example, by Kwak, Lee and Eldridge (2009), by 
Wang, Chen, et al. (2012), by Balboa, López-Espionosa and Rubia (2013), by Norden and 
Stoian (2014) and by Cohen, Cornett, et al. (2014). The outlined studies in financials and 
non-financials industries, despite applying both the Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997, p.103) 
and the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s (1999, p.31) models, or either one of the two, did 
not apply additionally The Distribution of Ratios research design as this study did, that is, 
none of the earlier studies tested the same or a similar number of ratios in combination with 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov One-Sample (K-S) non-parametric, Monte-Carlo Method and 
distributional tests. For comparability, this study applies benchmark comparisons of the 14 
ratios to the base ratios.  
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Furthermore, 9 out of 16 ratios might suffer from the effect of the reversal accruals, as the 9 
ratios that contain accruals might also contain reversal accruals. As Dechow, Hutton, et al. 
(2012) point out, reversal accruals may reduce testing power as well as the power of test 
results. The 9 banks-specific ratios that might contain reversal accruals are Return on Assets 
(ROA), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Interest Receivable Index (IRI), Equity to Total Assets 
(EtA), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Gross Yield on Earning Assets 
(GYEA), Profit After Tax (t) divided by Total Assets in period (t-1); and Change in Earnings 
divided by Total Assets in period (t-2). These 9 ratios show statistically significant evidence 
of earnings management. However, it is unclear to what extent do reversal accruals influence 
the testing power of these 9 variables. Reversal accruals and their effect on testing powers 
within earnings management studies are relatively new in the body of literature and there is 
limited evidence of their influence on the power of tests. The rest of the 7 ratios are exempt 
from the possible accruals and reversal accruals effect and all the 16 ratios provide 
statistically significant evidence of earnings management, as shown and explained in detail in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3. 
 
Apart from this study, there is no evidence of any other study in Eastern or Western Europe, 
or elsewhere, applied specifically to the bank industry, with the same or a similar number of 
ratio analyses and with the combination of statistical and distributional approaches. This 
study extends the body of knowledge and contributes to the literature in four ways:  
 
1. By applying banking industry specific data, a total of 16 ratios in combination with 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) One Sample non-parametric, Monte-Carlo Method 
and distributional tests, this study ventures to suggest the Distribution of Ratios 
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Method, a new method of approach to investigating the earnings management 
phenomena in the banking industry.  
2. Additionally, 7 out of the 16 tested ratios do not contain total assets (including 
accruals) in their formula, thus, they do not suffer from a possible reversal accruals 
effect. By applying non-accruals base ratios for testing, we may improve the testing 
power. However, all 16 ratios show statistically significant evidence of earnings 
management. A further study may encompass reversal accruals and their impact on 
the power of tests. 
3. This study confirms the low testing power of the Accrual method and highlights the 
limitations of benchmarks comparisons. 
4. This study argues that the Accrual approach for testing earnings management should 
be avoided. 
 
6.4.2. Contribution to knowledge 
 
Chapter 6 presented empirical findings, the limitations and the strengths of this study, as well 
as recommendations for future research, with possible implications for the Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Authority, or HFSA/MNB. Additionally, conceptual conclusions 
having been outlined, we come to the final part of this chapter, in which it is stated why this 
study has contributed to the current state of knowledge and where it actually stands in 
contemporary research literature in Hungary or on an international level no less. 
 
This study differs from earlier studies published in Hungary, or elsewhere. Earlier studies 
were mainly investigating USA, Western European and Asian banks, predominantly testing 
on Loan Loss Provisions, Return on Assets and Net Earnings. These studies are different 
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from this study, as there is no evidence, as of writing this study that a similar study was, or is 
being researched in post-communist European countries or elsewhere, on the subject of 
earnings management of credit institutions trading in Hungary. Existing contemporary studies 
published in Hungary mainly deal with mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, as Neale and Bozsik 
(2001) write, or analyse the Macroeconomic performance of banks, as Várhegyi (2008) 
points out. Chapter 3 outlines these and similar studies on the earnings performance of banks, 
but none of these studies specifically investigated earnings management of the credit 
institutions in Hungary. In fact, there is no evidence of a similar study ever being published 
highlighting earnings management practices of Hungarian banks, either in Hungary, or 
elsewhere.  
This study fills this gap in contemporary literature as it provides explanations for statistical 
findings, as well as explanations justifying the rejection of certain hypotheses, and possible 
reasons why Hungarian banks managed earnings as pointed out in Section 6.4.1 in Chapter 6. 
An earlier study by Shen and Chih (2005) investigated investor protection, prospect theory 
and earnings management in the banking industry in 48 countries, but excluding Hungary and 
other Eastern European countries. The authors applied the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
the Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) models. However, Shen and Chih’s (2005) 
statistical design substantially differs from the one adopted in this study. Hamdi and Zarai 
(2012) also applied the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and the Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1999) model for testing earnings management in the banking industry, and they 
investigated earnings management specifically in Islamic banks, and reported evidence of 
earnings management. Hamdi and Zarai’s (2012) study differs from this study as the authors 
tested countries where Islamic banks conducted business applying the  rules of Sharia’ah, the 
Islamic ‘jurisprudence’, and neither the number of ratios nor the statistical tests were as 
rigorous as the ones presented in this study. Cohen, Cornett, et al. (2014) point out that most 
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studies on earnings management (for example, Healy, 1985; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny, 
1995; and others) were based on manipulating accruals. Additionally, Beatty, Ke and 
Petroni’s (2002); Kwak, Lee and Eldridge’s (2009); Wang, Chen, et al.’s (2012); Norden and 
Stoian’s (2014) and Cohen, Cornett, et al.’s (2014) studies investigated earnings management 
of banks on a specific country level, and applied the Loan Loss Provision or the Net Earnings 
or the Return on Assets variables for testing.  
 
This study’s research design differs from the design of the above mentioned studies by the 
three main empirical testing approaches, by the types of variables tested, by the statistical 
tests applied, and also by the types of data and the countries that were being investigated. The 
highlighted studies which investigated Earnings Management in the banking industry have 
only one thing in common with this study; namely, all of them come to the same conclusion 
that there is earnings management in the banking industry.  
Additionally, investigation of non-financials companies on a country level is mainly based on 
the accruals approach, as for example, Gore, Pop and Singh (2007), who study UK data, 
while Holland and Ramsay (2003) study Australian data with reported earnings. Amar and 
Abaoub (2010) study Tunisian data and report similar test results to the results of this study. 
All three studies apply the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) model applying the statistical and 
distributional approach, and they report evidence of earnings management. Earlier studies 
examining banking industries all have unique testing approaches and all are different from 
the one applied in this study. As outlined in Chapter 6, by comparing evidence from this 
study to existing published studies on an international level, it may be concluded that this 
study contributes new evidence to the existing literature and extends existing knowledge on 
earnings management.  
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This study presents results, as well as an explanation why and in what way it fills the gap in 
contemporary literature. This study makes a claim that it constitutes a significant contribution 
to knowledge, that: 
 
1. There is no evidence that earnings management of credit institutions trading in 
Hungary had ever been investigated prior to this study.  
2. There is no evidence that a similar study, either in Hungary or internationally, 
applying the same testing approaches and using Hungarian credit institutions’ data, 
had investigated the presence of earnings management in Hungary for the period of 
1999-2012, or for other periods. 
3. There is no evidence that a similar study of the banking industry of a certain country 
had been undertaken with either a similar or with a larger number and type of ratio 
analyses, in combination with the same or similar statistical and discontinuity testing 
approaches.   
4. It provides evidence of statistically significant test results and detailed arguments why 
the hypotheses were rejected, which paired the original research question with an 
alternative answer. 
5. In contrast with earlier research papers, this study acknowledges the possible impact 
of reversal accruals on 9 out of the 16 ratios, and their possible impact on testing 
power, as it was highlighted in Chapter 5, Section 5.6.  
 
This study makes an attempt to fill a research gap by investigating the subject in question and 
by answering the research question that reads:  
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‘Did credit institutions trading in Hungary avoid earnings decreases for the period 
of 1999-2012?’  
 
Statistical and distributional results provide evidence which do not support the four 
hypotheses and claims an alternative answer to the research question, that: 
 
‘Credit institutions trading in Hungary avoided earnings decreases for the period of 
1999-2012.’ 
 
This study fills the gap in knowledge by presenting new evidence of earnings management by 
credit institutions trading in Hungary, an ex-communist country in Eastern Europe, and a 
transitional economy, thus adding new evidence to the existing literature on earnings 
management. 
 
6.5. Implications 
 
The findings of this study have shown statistical and discontinuity evidence of earnings 
management of credit institution trading in Hungary for the period 1999-2012, as well as 
evidence of earnings management prior to and after the 2008 financial crisis, including 
evidence per assets size. In accordance with the evidence presented in this study, the author 
wishes to prompt the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA/MNB) to revise 
their controlling approaches and to take into account the testing approaches of this study in 
the interest of a more rigorous control of credit institutions’ trading practices in Hungary. 
This way, the HFSA/MNB would have an early warning mechanism enabling it to act in a 
timely manner and to prevent credit institutions from managing earnings, and hence, to stop 
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any possible financial crises of credit institutions in the future. The implications of this 
study’s research design would highlight credit institutions, if any, which engage in earnings 
management, and prompt possible action from the side of the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority, or HFSA/MNB, to hold credit institution(s) as well as their managers 
accountable for their actions. 
 
6.6. Recommendation for future research 
 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen’s (2005); Gore, Pope and Singh’s (2007); Sun and Rath’s (2009); 
Abed, Al-Attar and Suwaidan’s (2012) studies apply the accrual based model for testing, 
such as Jones’s (1991) model, but only two studies took into account the reversal accrual 
effect in their tests, namely Baber, Kang and Li (2011) and Dechow, Hutton, et al. (2012). 
This study argues that the past accrual based models (see for example Jones, 1991; Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney 1995; McNichols, 2000) should be avoided for testing until a working 
model of the reversal accruals is incorporated into the accrual model(s). Reversal accruals are 
still new and still an unexplored way of examining evidence of earnings management. 
Additionally, benchmark comparisons should be further researched in Hungary as well on an 
international level within the financial industry. Despite the benchmark calculations’ 
simplicity and their weaknesses (see Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010), benchmarks are of 
significant importance for comparisons in the case of financials, or for any industry. 
 
Beatty and Harris (2001) published one of the first studies investigating earnings 
management in the financial industry. Research studies in the financial industry are relatively 
recent, compared to studies that investigated all industries with the exclusion of financials, 
such as credit institutions, investment funds, insurance companies and others. A further 
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examination of the Hungarian financial industry, and additionally, an all industry study with 
the addition of cash flow analysis in both cases, would be of great interest conducted with 
research methods applied in this study.  
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Appendix 
 
1. Additional explanation for SPSS input 
 
The input of variables in SPSS for histogram creation comes first. For example, for DTE for 
the 1999-2012 period samples, the calculated results were inserted into the SPSS 20 Data 
Editor. The first column in SPSS was allocated a name, as a DTE variable. The same 
procedure was performed for all ratios while importing the ratios’ results into SPSS. Once the 
naming of the columns with the ratios’ variable names was completed the Graphs tab in 
SPSSS was pressed and the Chart builder was run. In the Chart Builder, by highlighting all 
the ratios’ names in the Variables box and also under the Gallery tab; then, by selecting the 
Histogram option and pressing the ‘OK’, this study ran the Chart Builder. Separate SPSS 
windows pop up with the ratios’ Histogram diagrams. 
 
2.1. Explanation of Earnings Management 1 model  calculation in Excel 
 
Chapter 4 presented Earnings Management Model 1, (EM1), which is equal to the actual 
observation (AO) in period (i) minus the expected observation (EO) in period (i). The result 
of the actual observation minus the expected observation is then divided by the standard 
deviation (SD) of the difference in period (i). The Standard deviation of the difference (SDi) 
reads as: 
  SDi = [Np i  (1– p i ) + ¼ N (p i-1  + p i+1 ) (1– p i-1  – p i+1 )] ½ 
 
The SDi is the difference between the actual and the expected observation in interval (i), 
where Npi is the total number of pi (estimated) observations in interval (i); N is the number of 
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total samples; pi is the proportion of the actual observation that falls within the interval (i), 
also called the Estimated probability observation; pi-1 is the estimate in interval i-1; pi+1 is 
the estimate in interval i+1. SD is the Standard Deviation and it is defined as ‘…of a 
probability distribution as the positive square root of the variance’. (Thomas, 1997, p.13)  
Calculations were performed for each base variable, then the results of each variable were 
imported in the ‘Burgstahler calculation method of all variables.xlsx’ excel sheet. The input 
of results follows, for each column representing a particular fiscal year for the 1999-2012 
period, and each variable obtained from the base ratio (ratios were calculated for the same 
companies for a year (t) for the sample period in question, namely, from 1999 to 2012. For 
example, the formula consists of a company ‘z’ in the year (t) and then, it is calculated for the 
same company ‘z’ in the year (t-1) or in (t-2)). These are the actual observations, or ‘AO’. 
For example for Equity to Loans, or ETL, the data was imported from the BASE file ratio 
calculation, the ETL ratio variables for each company, and this way we got a total of 33 ratio 
variables for the 2012 year, 30 variables for the 2011 year, and so on. In this way, a table of 
variables per periods was formed for ETL, where the columns represent specific years 
comprise the total of periods from 2000 to 2012. For every column (Year) this study 
calculates the number of total variables per year, using the formula ‘=COUNT(B5:B48)’. The 
results are shown at the bottom of each year. For example, for 2012 there are 33 ratio 
variables, while for the year 2011, there are 30 variables, as stated above. Additionally, the 
total number of variables was calculated for the sample period of 2000-2012, with the 
formula ‘=COUNT(B5:N48)’. For Equity to Loan, or ETL, the total number of variables is 
402. As earlier pointed out, this table is the actual observation or ‘AO’. 
In the same ETL sheet, next to the AO table, the expected observation calculations were 
prepared in a separate table. The same procedure was applied as for the ‘AO’, the next table 
was for expected observation, or (EO), where the columns were labelled as years with the 
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results of each column referring to a particular year. The Expected observation (EO) formula 
is (ni-1 + ni+1) / 2, where (ni-1) stands for the previous year from the base year and (ni+1) 
stands for the following year from the base or actual observation. For example, if the base 
year is 2011, then for the (ni-1), it is 2010, and for (ni+1), it is 2012. By adding the 2010 and 
2012 variables and dividing the result by 2, we get the average or the expected observation 
for the ETL variable. For the rest of the years, EO is calculated for 2011 – 2001 periods, the 
same as for 2011. In case data is missing in AO in (ni-1) or in (ni+1), then, the calculation is 
omitted, leading to the elimination of false results. For example, for the year 2011 taken as a 
base year, there are 37 expected observations for ETL ratio, whereas for the 2010 base year, 
there are 36 observations. 
After the input of the actual observation (AO) data and the calculation of the expected 
observation (EO), the next step is to calculate the estimated probabilities of the observation in 
the year (i) or the (SD). In order to calculate these, the first number of the actual observation 
(AO) variable in the interval (i), or year (i), is divided it by the total number of variables 
(observation) in the year (i). For example, in the ‘Burghstahler method of calculation of all 
variables.xlsx’ excel workbook, in the ETL sheet, for the year 2012, the total number of 
observations is 33 and it is displayed in cell B49 in the ETL sheet. The first actual 
observation (variable) is in the B5 cell. Therefore, the first AO observation in cell B5 is 
divided by the total number of AO observations in cell B49. The second AO observation is in 
cell B6, divided by the total number of AO observation in B49, and so on for every number 
of observation in 2012 or in the year (i).The results of SDi for the first sample for the 2012 
year are in cell AD5. In order to make sure that for 2012, it uses the total number of 
observations in cell B49, clicking on the AD5 cell and highlighting the B49 and then pressing 
F4. In this way, B49 will have the dollar sign ‘$’ next to letter B and 49. In this way, the total 
number of observations for a year (i) becomes an absolute reference, i.e. it is ‘locked’ in the 
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formula. The same is done for another total number of observations for a year (i) when 
calculating the SDi for each observation in the year (i). Once the Estimated (SD) probabilities 
observation variables in the year (i) have been calculated, the next step is to calculate the total 
number of observations per year (i). For example, for the year 2012, which is in column AD 
for the ETL ratio, specifically in cell AD49, writing the formula =COUNT(AD5:AD47), 
which counts the number of frequencies in column AD. For the 2012 period, for example, 
NPi adds up to 33 observations. Similarly, for the 2011 period, which is in column AE, NPi is 
calculated by applying the same method that is described above for the year 2012. In the 
same way, for 2011, the Npi is 30. For the rest of the periods, this study follows suit to 
calculate the Npi. 
As the Estimated (SD) probabilities observations were calculated, the next step is to calculate 
the Standard deviation of the difference by applying the formula SDi = [Np i  (1– p i ) + ¼ N 
(p i-1  + p i+1 ) (1– p i-1  – p i+1 )] 
½.
 using the previously mentioned file, the ‘Burghstahler 
method of calculation of all variables excel’ workbook, in the ETL sheet, in which we can 
find all the elements of the SDi formula that were calculated earlier and where ni-1 = number 
in base year – 1 year, and ni+1= number in base year + 1 year. For example, if the base year 
is 2011, the interval i+1 is the next year, or for the 2012, the interval i-1 is the previous year, 
i.e. 2010. Npi equals the total number of estimated SDs in interval (i). In order to calculate 
the SD of the difference bearing in mind that the data for testing is for the period 1999-2012, 
the first year that can be calculated is 2011, which is the base year, or n2011+1 is 2012 year and 
n2011-1 is 2010. At first, the calculation was performed by applying the first part of the 
formula: Npi (1– p i), which is for example, for the ETL ratio, and the base year of 2011 in 
column AE and AE49 and represent the sum of the numbers for the year 2011. The results are 
multiplied by the difference, or 1 minus the first number in the AE column, for the year 2011, 
in this case, the cell AE5, or $AE$49*(1-AE5). The second part of the formula is ¼ N (p i-1 + 
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p i+1 ) (1– p i-1  – p i+1 )], for the base year of 2011, or the total sample N multiplied by the 
total sum of numbers of the years 2010+2012 and then multiplied with the results of 1 minus 
number of 2010 minus the 2012 number, or 0.25*$C$52*(AF5+AD5)*(1-AF5-AD5). The 
complete formula, for the ETL ratio, for the first SDi number calculation, for the base year 
2011 is:  
SD2011 = [Np2011 * (1– p2011 ) + ¼ N * (p2010 + p2012 ) * (1– p2010  – p2012 )] 
½
    
or  
=SQRT($AE$49*(1-AE5)+0.25*$C$52*(AF5+AD5)*(1-AF5-AD5)).  
 
The ¼ term arises because of the ½ in front of the sum of the numbers of observations in 
intervals i-1 and i+1, where the ½ is there to compute the average. The SDi is calculated for 
the rest of the data for all periods.  
Once the Estimated (SD) probabilities observations have been calculated, the next step is to 
calculate the EM1 = (AOi - EOi) / SDi. These are given in a separate table (i.e. is the ETL 
ratio), the columns representing the periods, for example, in the first column we have the 
results for the year 2011 results. Specifically, in cell BD5, the EM1 is calculated as: 
EM1 = (AOi - EOi) / SDi or EM12011 = (AO2011 – EO2011) / SD2011 or the formula in question 
is as follows: EM12011=(C5-P5)/AR5. The same approach was applied to calculate all the 
variables for the 2011 period, as well as for all the periods from 2001 to 2011. Once EM1 
was calculated for ETL, the EM1 results were copied and pasted in a separate table, without 
formulas, for the SPSS calculation. For example, for the EM1 SPSS analysis, a table was 
designed for the ETL ratio on a yearly basis, as well as for the whole sample period of 2001-
2011. Apart from the ETL ratio, the EM1 model approach was performed for all ratios. Then, 
the results are entered into the SPSS for a p-values analysis. Gujarati (1995, p.132) writes, 
‘… the p-value (i.e. probability value) also known as the observed or exact level of 
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significance or the exact probability of committing a Type I error.’, and, ‘… the p-value is 
defined as the lowest significance level at which a null hypothesis can be rejected’. 
 
2.1.1. Explanation of Earnings Management 1 model  calculation in SPSS 
 
The input variables in SPSS for statistical testing follows. For example, for the ETL ratios, 
data from column CD in excel were copied and pasted in the SPSS in the Data View sheet 
under the VAR00001 column. After pasting data in SPSS in the Data Sheet, the VAR00001 
was labelled as ETL in the Variable View sheet, as it represents the ETL ratio. The same 
method of copying and pasting from Excel to SPSS was performed for all the ratios, as it was 
for the ETL. For example, VAR00002 is the second column in the DATA View (SPSS), 
while in the Variable View sheet (SPSS), it was labelled as an LTD variable. The same 
procedure as for the LTD in the EM1 in the excel calculations, in the ‘Burghstahler method 
of calculation of all variables excel’ workbook.  
Once all the ratios are in SPSS and properly labelled, analysis was performed by choosing in 
SPSS under the Analyze tab the Non-Parametric test, then the Legacy Dialogs and then 
selecting the ‘1-Sample-KS…’, which refers to the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. 
Once the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test was selected, a separate box pops up and 
enabling the selection of all the variables on the left so as to move them into the ‘Test 
Variable List’. This is required in order to perform test statistics. After moving the ratios into 
the test Variable list, the next step is to select the Exact button in order to open the exact test 
box and thus to choose the Monte Carlo method with a Confidence level of 99%. After 
pressing the Continue button, it puts me back to the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
box, and by choosing the Options button, it leads to the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Options box and by selecting the descriptive box in order to use the Descriptive test statistics. 
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Once the Options are selected and the OK button pressed in the One-Sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test box, a separate SPSS output displays the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test with all the ratios results. The One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test result shows such 
parameters such parameters as Mean, Std Deviation Extreme Differences, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov, Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) and Mote Carlo Sig.  for all the ratios for the EM1 model.  
 
2.2. Earnings Management Model 2  
 
In the ‘Degeorge et al – EM2.xlsx’ excel sheet, for each year for the DTE variable, data is 
processed for a number of variables with the formula: ‘=COUNT(B3:B42)’. The other years 
in question are also calculated in the same way, by using the same formula. The results are at 
the bottom of each year’s column. For example, for the DTE ratio, for the year 2012, a total 
number of observations is 32, and it is shown in cell B43. For the year 2011, the number is 32 
shown in cell C42, for the year 2010, it is 29 in cell D29, and so on.  
The next step is to calculate the ‘pi’. ‘pi’ is the ratio of the sample of the year i. For example, 
for the DTE ratio, for the year 2012, ‘pi’ is calculated by dividing the first sample number in 
the year 2012 by the total amount of samples in 2012. The formula reads as ‘=B3/$B$43’, 
where B3= is the first data in the year 2012 and the $B$43 is the total number of samples in 
the year 2012. The dollar sign refers to absolute values, for all sample numbers for that year 
are used in the formula. When calculating the second sample number ‘pi’ for the year 2012, 
the number in B4 is applied and then, it is by $B$43. The third sample number, which is in 
B5, is divided by $B$43, and so on. The same applies for the year 2011, where the first 
sample number, in C3, is divided by $C$43. The second sample number, in cell C4, is 
divided by $C$43, and so on. In this way, the calculation is performed for all sample years 
from 2012 to 1999. 
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Once all the calculations for ‘pi’ for all sample years have been finished, the next step is to 
calculate the Δpi, which represents the difference of ‘pi’ – ‘p i – 1’, or the difference of ‘pi’ 
between the years 2012 and 2011. For example, to calculate the Δp2012 as the first ‘pi’ 
number, we take ‘pi’ in the year 2012 minus first ‘pi’ number in 2011 or p i – 1. The formula 
reads as: Δp2012=Q3-R3, where Q3 is the first ‘pi’ number in 2012 minus R3 being the first 
‘pi’ number in 2011, which is actually the p i – 1 element in the formula. In order to obtain the 
second Δp2012 sample number, this study calculates the second ‘pi’ number in 2012 minus p i – 
1 or ‘pi’ in 2011. The formula for the second sample number for Δp2012 is ‘=Q4-R4’. The 
same calculation method is implemented for each Δp2012 sample year. For the following year 
Δp2011, the ‘pi’ is 2011 and ‘p i – 1’ is 2010. For the Δp2011, first variable number formula reads 
as =R3-S3, the second =R4-S4 and son on. The same method is used for Δp2010, for Δp2009 up 
to Δp2000. As the formula for Δpi is Δpi = pi - p i – 1, the last sample year is the year 2000 
where p i – 1 is 1999, as data is available until 1999.  
The following step is to calculate EM2, or EM2 = (Δpi – Mean (Δp)) / SD (Δp). After Δpi for 
each sample years has been calculated, the next step is to calculate the Mean (Δ p) or the 
average of Δp2012-2000 and standard deviation or SD (Δ p) of Δp2012-2000. Mean (Δ p) is 
calculated in the same ‘Degeorge et al – EM2.xlsx’ excel sheet, at the bottom of the Δpi table, 
in cell AG46, by writing the mean formula for the whole sample between 2012 and 2000. The 
Mean Δp2012-2000 formula reads: ‘=AVERAGE(AF3:AR42)’. By selecting all samples for all 
years for Δp data, this study calculates the mean. The same is done for standard deviation or 
SD (Δp), for which the formula reads: ‘=STDEV(AF3:AR36)’. The calculations of Mean and 
SD were also performed in SPSS as a cross check and the results were the same. Once Mean 
and SD calculations completed, the next step is to calculate the EM2 formula: EM2 = (Δpi – 
Mean (Δp)) / SD (Δp). For the EM2 calculation, this study creates a table for the EM2 
calculation. In the first column (column AT for DTE variable) in cell AT3, this study selects 
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a cell in the Δpi table for the year 2012, the first number less the Mean Δp2012-2000 and all 
divided by the SD Δp2012-2000. Or as per formula: ‘=(AF3-$AG$46)/$AG$47’, where the 
dollar sign ‘$’ refers to an absolute value. The same procedure for the second number in the 
year 2012, where the formula reads ‘=(AF4-$AG$46)/$AG$47’, and so on. The same is 
performed for all the numbers for the year 2012 as well as for all the sample years. Once the 
results for EM2 calculated for each sample years, the EM2 results are copied into another 
table, which is next to the EM2 table and where the copied data represent only numbers 
without formulas, in order to import the EM2 data into SPSS for further statistical analysis. 
The EM2 data without formulas table is between columns BN and BZ for the DTE ratio. This 
study also creates all sample data from the EM2 table by simply copying and pasting each 
sample year into one column, in the CC column, as the all sample for EM2 data for the DTE 
ratio will be needed for a further SPSS analysis. The same method is applied for the 
calculations of the EM2 model for all the ratios, i.e. ETL, LTD, LTA, GYEA, and the same 
procedure for the rest of the ratios for the purpose of performing the One-Sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in SPSS. 
 
2.3. Testing Approach No. 3.2 – Earnings Management 1 model 
 
The EM1 calculations of the modified Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p.103) model in SPSS 
follows. In the ‘Data View’ PAT(t) by TA(t-1) and ΔPAT by TA(t-2) data were imported and 
named under the ‘Variable View’ tab. After saving the SPSS data file as ‘Delta PAT by 
T.A..sav’ file, this study ran, in SPSS, the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for both 
ratios and also select the Monte Carlo simulation for a 95 and a 99% Confidence Interval. 
Apart from the K-S test, this study also ran Descriptive tests selected from the Analyse tab 
from the ‘Delta PAT by T.A..sav’ file. After selecting the Analyse tab, by selecting 
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Descriptive Statistics, then Frequencies and then the Frequencies box pops up. In the 
Frequencies box, this study selects the variables on the left and moves it into the right box. 
Then by pressing the Statistics button and under ‘Central Tendency’ selecting Mean, while in 
the ‘Dispersion’ this study selects SD, and under ‘Percentile Values’ selecting ‘Percentiles’ 
and add the ‘5, 50 and 75’ values for the percentiles. By pressing Continue under the ‘Chart’ 
button, and selecting Chart type ‘None’. For the Frequencies format choosing Ascending 
values and under the Multiple Variables, choosing ‘Compare variables’, and then selecting 
the continue button. The ‘Bootstrap’ button is left untouched. By un-clicking the ‘Display 
Frequency tables’ and pressing the OK button, a separate SPSS window opens with the 
descriptive statistics results. Tests were done for both ratios for Mean, SD and also for 
percentiles of 25%, 50% and 75% on a yearly base. 
In order to calculate histograms, the EM1 results for scaled earnings, or PAT(t) / TA(t-1) and 
scaled earnings change, or ΔPAT / TA(t-2) variables for all sample period were imported into a 
‘Data View’ sheet in SPSS. Variables were named in the ‘Variable View’ tab. Then, by 
pressing the Graphs button (or the Graphs tab), and selecting the ‘Chart Builder’, followed by 
the Histogram from the ‘Choose from:’, then selecting the first option of Histogram type, 
which is ‘Simple Histogram’, this study dragged it to ‘Chart preview uses example data’. 
From the ‘Variables:’ by selecting one variable i.e. Profit After Tax divided by Total Assets 
in period (t-1), or PAT / TA(t-1) and pull it to the ‘Chart preview uses example data’. In the 
‘Edit Properties of:’ choosing ‘Display normal curve’, and then pressing ‘Apply’ and then 
‘OK’, at which point a separate SPSS window pops up with the Histogram Graph result. By 
double clicking the histogram graph, the ‘Chart Editor’ pops up. In the Chart Editor, pressing 
the ‘Add a reference line to the X axis’ button, to add the line at the 0, on the X axis. After 
double clicking the Chart Editor on the histogram and the ‘Properties’ box pops up, selecting 
the ‘Scale’ tab and setting the Range from -0.02 for Minimum and to 0.02 for Maximum. The 
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purpose of this pre-set range is to investigate the histogram just before and after the zero 
point. The Same approach is applied to create a histogram for change in earnings divided by 
Total Assets in period (t-2), or ΔPAT / TA(t-2) ratio.  
 
2.4. Calculations of Median of Total Assets in SPSS for Earnings Management 1 model 
 
After all the numbers were imported into SPSS, in the Data View sheet, labelling each 
variable name with reference to its related year in the Variable View sheet. For example, 
VAR00001 is labelled as 2012, which refers to year: 2012. After this, by pressing ‘Analyse’, 
then by pressing ‘Descriptive Statistics’ and then selecting frequencies, at which point a 
Frequencies box pops up; this study selects all the variables and import them into the 
‘Variable(s)’ box. The ‘Display frequencies tables’ needs to be unchecked, as only the 
median of the yearly sample is calculated, and then, by pressing the ‘Statistics’ button and 
under which the ‘Frequencies:, a statistics’ box pops up, and under the ‘Central Tendency’ 
option, the Median box is checked. Then by pressing ‘Continue’ and clicking OK, an output 
is presented with the median for Total Assets for each year.  
In order to run the K-S test in SPSS, under the Data View sheet pressing the Analyse tab, 
then selecting ‘Nonparametric Tests’, then ‘Legacy Dialogs’ and the ‘1-Sample K-S’. A 
‘One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test’ box pops up, where this study selects all four 
variables and moves them to the ‘Test Variable List’. The next step is to press the ‘Exact 
Tests’ and select ‘Exact’ then check the ‘Time limit per test box with a value of 5 minutes’. 
The reason for this 5 minute limit is to make sure the test is performed within a 5 minutes’ 
time frame. Then, by pressing the ‘Continue’ button, the ‘One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test’ box reapers, where by selecting ‘Options’ and under ‘Statistics’ choosing the 
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‘Descriptive’ box. After pressing continue, in the ‘One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test’ 
box and then by pressing the OK button, a separate SPSS Viewer pops up with the results.  
 
2.4.1. Calculations of Median of Total Assets in SPSS for Earnings Management 2 model 
 
Calculations of Mean and SD in SPSS were done in the following way: by selecting all the 
numbers in the Δpi table, for example, for the DTE ratio, and after that this study imports 
them into SPSS the ‘Data View’, while all of them are named in the ‘Variable View’ as DTE. 
The same procedure is done for all variables. Once all the variables have been imported into 
SPSS and named, then, under the ‘Analyze tab’, choosing ‘Descriptive Statistics’, then 
selecting ‘Frequencies’, then the DTE ratio into the Variable(s) box, and finally selecting 
‘Statistics’. In the ‘Statistics’ box, this study selects Mean and SD, then Continue and finally 
pressing the OK button to run the analysis. In a separate SPSS Viewer, the Mean and SD 
results are shown for the DTE variable. The same process is done for all the ratios. Once all 
Mean and SD calculations have been performed, the next step is to compare the obtained 
results to the ones calculated in excel. They all match. 
 
2.5. Testing Approach No. 3.4 
 
Importing these four columns into SPSS into the Data View and in the Variable View and 
labelling the variables as ‘PAT(t) by TA(t-1) AC’, ‘PAT(t) by TA(t-1) BC’, ‘Delta PAT / TA(t-2) 
AC’ and ‘ΔPAT / TA(t-2) BC’ are the first steps. As mentioned above, ‘AC’ and ‘BC’ refers to 
after and before the crisis. This study performs the analysis by selecting in SPSS the 
‘Analyse’ tab then ‘Nonparametric test’ then ‘Legacy Dialogs’ at which point the 1-Sample 
K-S test and the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test boxes pop up. All four variables are 
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moved into the Test variables List, then selecting the ‘Exact Test’ and limit the time frame 
for each test to 5 minutes. By pressing the Options and by selecting the Descriptive Statistics, 
as well as the Exclude cases test–by test option and pressing the OK button, this study runs 
the test. A separate box, namely, the SPSS viewer, pops up with the results. 
 
3. Accrual Model 2 Test Statistics of Table 5.2.3 and Table 5.2.4  
 
  Table 5.2.3 For Profit After Tax, Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Accruals. Coefficients
a
 
  Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2012 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -2632.67 4917.53   -.535 .596 -12587.68 7322.34 
  NDA -4.533 1.981 -.484 -2.288 .028 -8.544 -.522 
  DA .526 .415 .268 1.267 .213 -.314 1.367 
  
  Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2011 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -5044.75 7318.83   -.689 .495 -19860.94 9771.45 
  NDA .630 3.984 .032 .158 .875 -7.436 8.696 
  DA -.301 .594 -.104 -.506 .615 -1.504 .902 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2010 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -5243.65 4692.61   -1.117 .271 -14751.79 4264.48 
  NDA 3.484 2.498 .258 1.395 .171 -1.577 8.544 
  DA .254 .381 .123 .667 .509 -.517 1.025 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2009 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -1856.79 2228.86   -.833 .410 -6372.89 2659.30 
  NDA .040 .181 .052 .222 .826 -.327 .407 
  DA .331 .116 .673 2.870 .007 .097 .566 
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Table 5.2.3 Cont. 
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2008 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) 1005.41 1297.91   .775 .443 -1622.08 3632.90 
  NDA .138 .057 .318 2.412 .021 .022 .254 
  DA .099 .024 .536 4.058 .000 .050 .149 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2007 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -318.99 3086.81   -.103 .918 -6573.46 5935.47 
  NDA .651 .242 .374 2.696 .010 .162 1.141 
  DA .170 .062 .382 2.749 .009 .045 .296 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2006 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -3133.89 4544.28   -.690 .495 -12341.48 6073.70 
  NDA .422 .460 .124 .916 .366 -.511 1.354 
  DA .424 .098 .585 4.326 .000 .225 .622 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2005 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -2631.99 2263.13   -1.163 .253 -7231.21 1967.24 
  NDA -.188 .163 -.098 -1.156 .256 -.519 .143 
  DA .733 .070 .896 10.517 .000 .592 .875 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2004 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -545.45 1680.19   -.325 .747 -3956.43 2865.52 
  NDA -.242 .146 -.150 -1.654 .107 -.539 .055 
  DA .717 .070 .931 10.262 .000 .576 .859 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2003 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -637.05 1064.08   -.599 .553 -2797.24 1523.14 
  NDA -.291 .184 -.133 -1.585 .122 -.664 .082 
  DA .718 .063 .962 11.477 .000 .591 .846 
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Notes: Table 5.2.3 presents test resulst for Accrual Model 2 with a 95% Confidence Interval level, for formula 
PATt = β0jt + β1jt (NDA jt) + β2jt (DA jt) + εjt, where PATtj = Profit After Tax in period (t), NDA t = Non-
Discretionary Accruals (t) = Accrued interest payable (t), DA t = Discretionary Accruals (t) = Other accruals and 
other liabilities (t), for the period 1999-2012. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
  Table 5.2.4. For Profit After Tax, Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Accruals. Coefficients
a 
 
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2012 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -2632.67 4917.53   -.535 .596 -15966.83 10701.48 
  DA .526 .415 .268 1.267 .213 -.600 1.653 
  NDA -4.533 1.981 -.484 -2.288 .028 -9.906 .839 
 
Table 5.2.3 Cont.        
 
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2002 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -207.74 2612.98   -.080 .937 -5517.95 5102.46 
  NDA -2.944 1.176 -.604 -2.503 .017 -5.335 -.554 
  DA .410 .199 .498 2.063 .047 .006 .814 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2001 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -206.30 578.68   -.357 .723 -1378.83 966.22 
  NDA -.402 .344 -.282 -1.169 .250 -1.099 .295 
  DA -.001 .045 -.003 -.011 .991 -.092 .091 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2000 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -214.77 166.19   -1.292 .204 -550.93 121.39 
  NDA -.030 .111 -.076 -.272 .787 -.255 .194 
  DA -.009 .022 -.111 -.396 .695 -.053 .035 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
1999 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -375.12 234.76   -1.598 .118 -849.59 99.35 
  NDA .138 .110 .284 1.259 .215 -.084 .360 
  DA -.084 .029 -.650 -2.879 .006 -.143 -.025 
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Table 5.2.4 Cont. 
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2011 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -5044.75 7318.83   -.689 .495 -24890.17 14800.68 
  NDA .630 3.984 .032 .158 .875 -10.174 11.434 
  DA -.301 .594 -.104 -.506 .615 -1.912 1.310 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2010 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -5243.65 4692.61   -1.117 .271 -17986.01 7498.70 
  NDA 3.484 2.498 .258 1.395 .171 -3.298 10.266 
  DA .254 .381 .123 .667 .509 -.780 1.288 
  
  
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2009 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -1856.79 2228.86   -.833 .410 -7909.05 4195.47 
  NDA .040 .181 .052 .222 .826 -.451 .532 
  DA .331 .116 .673 2.870 .007 .018 .645 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2008 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) 1005.41 1297.91   .775 .443 -2513.95 4524.78 
  NDA .138 .057 .318 2.412 .021 -.017 .293 
  DA .099 .024 .536 4.058 .000 .033 .165 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2007 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -318.99 3086.81   -.103 .918 -8700.93 8062.94 
  NDA .651 .242 .374 2.696 .010 -.005 1.307 
  DA .170 .062 .382 2.749 .009 .002 .338 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2006 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -3133.89 4544.28   -.690 .495 -15473.47 9205.69 
  NDA .422 .460 .124 .916 .366 -.828 1.671 
  DA .424 .098 .585 4.326 .000 .158 .689 
 316 
 
Table 5.2.4 Cont. 
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2005 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -2631.99 2263.13   -1.163 .253 -8806.69 3542.72 
  NDA -.188 .163 -.098 -1.156 .256 -.632 .256 
  DA .733 .070 .896 10.517 .000 .543 .924 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2004 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -545.45 1680.19   -.325 .747 -5121.97 4031.06 
  NDA -.242 .146 -.150 -1.654 .107 -.640 .157 
  DA .717 .070 .931 10.262 .000 .527 .908 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2003 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -637.05 1064.08   -.599 .553 -3535.39 2261.29 
  NDA -.291 .184 -.133 -1.585 .122 -.792 .209 
  DA .718 .063 .962 11.477 .000 .548 .889 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2002 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -207.74 2612.98   -.080 .937 -7336.97 6921.48 
  NDA -2.944 1.176 -.604 -2.503 .017 -6.153 .265 
  DA .410 .199 .498 2.063 .047 -.132 .952 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2001 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -206.30 578.68   -.357 .723 -1777.67 1365.06 
  NDA -.402 .344 -.282 -1.169 .250 -1.336 .532 
  DA -.001 .045 -.003 -.011 .991 -.123 .122 
  
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
2000 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  
(Constant) -
214.7696 
166.1947   -1.292 .204 -664.8104 235.2713 
  NDA -.030 .111 -.076 -.272 .787 -.331 .270 
  DA -.009 .022 -.111 -.396 .695 -.067 .050 
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Table 5.2.4 Cont. 
  
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
99.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
1999 
a. Dependent 
Variable: E 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  (Constant) -375.12 234.76   -1.598 .118 -1010.02 259.79 
  NDA .138 .110 .284 1.259 .215 -.159 .436 
  DA -.084 .029 -.650 -2.879 .006 -.163 -.005 
Notes: Table 5.2.4 presents test resulst for Accrual Model 2 with a 99% Confidence Interval Level, for the 
formua PATt = β0jt + β1jt (NDA jt) + β2jt (DA jt) + εjt, where PATtj = Profit After Tax in period (t), NDA(t) = 
Non-Discretionary Accruals(t) = Accrued interest payable(t), DA(t) = Discretionary Accruals(t) = Other accruals 
and other liabilities(t), for the period 1999-2012. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
4. Descriptive statistics run with Earnings Management 1 and 2 models at 99% and 95% 
Confidence Interval Levels   
 
4.1.         Table 5.3.4: Descriptive statistics run with EM1 model at a 99% Confidence Interval Level   
 Statistic Std. Error 
Bootstrap 
Bias Std. Error 
99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
ETL 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .001011 .0066628 .000004 .006664 -.015395 .020662 
Std. Deviation .0983755   -.0035768 .0253418 .0342708 .1605079 
Skewness 2.227 .165 -.810 4.366 -9.562 11.096 
Kurtosis 54.866 .328 -2.387 22.627 19.831 147.838 
LTD 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .039763 .0301660 .000111 .030298 -.034152 .122960 
Std. Deviation .4453956   -.0040624 .0539001 .3043611 .5823664 
Skewness 2.396 .165 -.137 .505 .577 3.414 
Kurtosis 10.284 .328 -.703 2.920 3.546 19.017 
LTA 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .002537 .0030972 -.000033 .003090 -.005473 .010841 
Std. Deviation .0457295   -.0001666 .0026083 .0389652 .0524187 
Skewness .036 .165 -.005 .185 -.425 .492 
Kurtosis .873 .328 -.021 .317 .168 1.830 
GYEA 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .004188 .0137884 -.000051 .014000 -.026029 .046374 
Std. Deviation .2035833   -.0129302 .0704264 .0690813 .3684194 
Skewness 7.726 .165 -3.700 4.899 -4.749 11.652 
Kurtosis 101.101 .328 -37.645 38.443 5.075 158.741 
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Table 5.3.4 Cont. 
RPF 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .014942 .0207904 .000160 .021102 -.020894 .081706 
Std. Deviation .3069669   -.0460922 .1619637 .0063067 .5999402 
Skewness 13.087 .165 -7.979 9.934 -14.404 14.755 
Kurtosis 190.451 .328 -52.314 58.137 8.526 217.800 
SGI 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .020582 .0153097 -.000099 .015233 -.019246 .060181 
Std. Deviation .2260451   -.0036201 .0357894 .1448985 .3206813 
Skewness 2.227 .165 -.328 1.583 -2.215 4.931 
Kurtosis 21.524 .328 -3.546 7.574 3.815 38.406 
IRI 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .005958 .0088286 .000069 .008862 -.014997 .029865 
Std. Deviation .1303525   -.0012861 .0178548 .0891135 .1770936 
Skewness 2.043 .165 -.303 1.042 -.894 3.876 
Kurtosis 14.626 .328 -2.267 5.602 3.089 26.893 
GMI 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .002616 .0041606 -.000004 .004265 -.007991 .013520 
Std. Deviation .0614301   -.0002522 .0051003 .0476683 .0749977 
Skewness .832 .165 -.036 .411 -.383 1.738 
Kurtosis 4.217 .328 -.166 1.020 1.794 7.211 
NIM 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .001194 .0041184 -.000038 .004108 -.008563 .012443 
Std. Deviation .0608072   -.0010461 .0095840 .0405297 .0872436 
Skewness 2.745 .165 -.531 1.304 -.662 4.585 
Kurtosis 20.518 .328 -4.964 9.022 2.323 36.675 
PATM 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .023489 .0227703 -.000743 .022902 -.026678 .089819 
Std. Deviation .3361989   -.0155832 .0926123 .1282845 .5498122 
Skewness 6.368 .165 -1.529 3.023 -3.756 9.730 
Kurtosis 62.307 .328 -10.277 24.081 7.087 125.442 
ROE 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean -.6533 .32985 -.0065 .3289 -1.6492 .0764 
Std. Deviation 4.87015   -.11019 1.04676 2.31135 7.56970 
Skewness -4.966 .165 .672 1.469 -7.461 .602 
Kurtosis 39.106 .328 -6.456 14.188 8.655 81.817 
ROA 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean -.000024 .0004911 -.000006 .000495 -.001338 .001216 
Std. Deviation .0072512   -.0000807 .0009732 .0048288 .0098236 
Skewness -1.099 .165 .206 1.212 -3.569 2.035 
Kurtosis 13.743 .328 -1.562 4.353 3.179 24.643 
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Table 5.3.4 Cont. 
ETA 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean -.000095 .0003734 -.000009 .000375 -.001020 .000914 
Std. Deviation .0055131   -.0001085 .0010973 .0032024 .0083503 
Skewness 2.532 .165 -1.125 2.610 -3.013 5.880 
Kurtosis 35.383 .328 -9.042 13.791 2.389 61.298 
 
Notes: Table 5.3.4. ‘N’ stands for Number of Observation. Descriptive Statistics calculated for Equity to Loans 
(ETL), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Rate 
Paid on Funds (RPF), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI), Gross Margin Index 
(GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit After Tax Margin (PATM), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on 
Assets (ROA), Equity to Total Assets (ETA) ratios per Earnings Management model 1, or EM1, at a 99% 
confidence interval level and for all samples. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
4.2.     Table 5.3.6: Descriptive statistics run at a 95% Confidence Interval Level run with EM1 model 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Bootstrap 
Bias Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
ETL 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .001011 .0066628 .000146 .006456 -.011339 .014404 
Std. Deviation .0983755   -.0033369 .0250997 .0441853 .1423901 
Skewness 2.227 .165 -.612 4.240 -7.016 8.824 
Kurtosis 54.866 .328 -2.748 21.828 24.139 111.884 
LTD 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .039763 .0301660 .000212 .030207 -.017752 .101441 
Std. Deviation .4453956   -.0030111 .0528633 .3375424 .5471505 
Skewness 2.396 .165 -.118 .492 1.184 3.140 
Kurtosis 10.284 .328 -.641 2.884 4.782 16.065 
LTA 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .002537 .0030972 .000051 .003107 -.003427 .008713 
Std. Deviation .0457295   -.0001646 .0026537 .0402932 .0507422 
Skewness .036 .165 -.001 .187 -.337 .401 
Kurtosis .873 .328 -.023 .313 .299 1.504 
GYEA 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .004188 .0137884 -.000111 .013686 -.020315 .033120 
Std. Deviation .2035833   -.0125426 .0687086 .0835329 .3192493 
Skewness 7.726 .165 -3.591 4.877 -4.207 10.828 
Kurtosis 101.101 .328 -36.903 38.337 12.866 142.082 
RPF 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .014942 .0207904 -.000286 .020957 -.014577 .061215 
Std. Deviation .3069669   -.0501381 .1629337 .0138826 .5240006 
Skewness 13.087 .165 -8.397 10.104 -14.090 14.714 
Kurtosis 190.451 .328 -52.535 56.986 45.687 217.011 
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Table 5.3.6 Cont. 
SGI 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .020582 .0153097 -.000017 .015340 -.008497 .051980 
Std. Deviation .2260451   -.0032645 .0356026 .1587728 .2956397 
Skewness 2.227 .165 -.296 1.605 -1.376 4.582 
Kurtosis 21.524 .328 -3.324 7.777 5.267 33.934 
IRI 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .005958 .0088286 -.000351 .008614 -.011117 .023028 
Std. Deviation .1303525   -.0022287 .0172996 .0961433 .1640833 
Skewness 2.043 .165 -.360 1.041 -.426 3.388 
Kurtosis 14.626 .328 -2.430 5.593 4.121 23.029 
GMI 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .002616 .0041606 -.000026 .004112 -.005582 .010744 
Std. Deviation .0614301   -.0004753 .0052154 .0509322 .0715532 
Skewness .832 .165 -.037 .418 -.080 1.558 
Kurtosis 4.217 .328 -.142 1.045 2.298 6.332 
NIM 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .001194 .0041184 -.000001 .003997 -.006410 .009365 
Std. Deviation .0608072   -.0008755 .0094070 .0438366 .0794957 
Skewness 2.745 .165 -.508 1.302 -.135 4.212 
Kurtosis 20.518 .328 -4.763 8.976 3.112 31.332 
PATM 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean .023489 .0227703 -.000017 .022839 -.017573 .072492 
Std. Deviation .3361989   -.0134374 .0917579 .1501514 .5034629 
Skewness 6.368 .165 -1.385 2.948 -2.933 8.963 
Kurtosis 62.307 .328 -9.389 24.566 9.865 113.066 
ROE 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean -.6533 .32985 .0011 .3313 -1.3599 -.0480 
Std. Deviation 4.87015   -.11828 1.04806 2.85241 6.83999 
Skewness -4.966 .165 .720 1.458 -6.599 -.881 
Kurtosis 39.106 .328 -6.965 14.215 10.815 65.117 
ROA 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean -.000024 .0004911 .000006 .000488 -.001008 .000914 
Std. Deviation .0072512   -.0000992 .0009510 .0053530 .0090966 
Skewness -1.099 .165 .233 1.229 -3.034 1.613 
Kurtosis 13.743 .328 -1.541 4.326 4.572 20.919 
ETA 
N 218   0 0 218 218 
Mean -.000095 .0003734 .000004 .000372 -.000797 .000678 
Std. Deviation .0055131   -.0001138 .0010948 .0035152 .0076415 
Skewness 2.532 .165 -1.040 2.595 -2.632 5.408 
Kurtosis 35.383 .328 -8.631 14.064 4.825 53.209 
Notes: Table 5.3.6. ‘N’ is Number of Observation. Descriptive Statistics calculated per EM1 model at a 95% 
confidence interval level for Equity to Loans (ETL), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), 
Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Interest (Sales) 
Receivables Index (IRI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit After Tax Margin 
(PATM), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Equity to Total Assets (ETA) ratios. Source: Own 
calculation and presentation. 
 
 321 
 
4.3. Table 5.3.8. Descriptive Statistics run at a 99% Confidence Interval Level with EM2        
        model 
  
Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Bootstrap 
Bias 
Std. 
Error 
99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
DTE 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.003955 .0587862 .000976 .058549 -.161295 .146653 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0887351   -.0521860 .3443900 .2669927 1.8634801 
Skewness -4.581 .132 3.120 7.492 -15.975 13.483 
Kurtosis 125.706 .263 -15.104 50.031 30.087 281.033 
ETL 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean .006720 .0545462 .001384 .055730 -.138953 .153566 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0102095   -.0195939 .2328367 .3368684 1.5545301 
Skewness -1.628 .132 .617 4.799 -11.348 11.654 
Kurtosis 68.577 .263 4.660 30.465 29.424 199.143 
LTD 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean .006166 .0577162 .000874 .057485 -.129225 .158938 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0689181   -.0111813 .1910633 .6364149 1.5633930 
Skewness 4.610 .132 -.647 1.592 -.991 6.372 
Kurtosis 42.713 .263 -5.913 13.049 6.445 70.395 
LTA 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.064529 .0564761 -.000529 .057551 -.216561 .089067 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0459527   -.0023141 .0439212 .9268358 1.1585715 
Skewness .084 .132 -.001 .111 -.215 .366 
Kurtosis .379 .263 -.003 .217 -.118 .983 
GYEA 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.047920 .0643677 -.001471 .063455 -.220467 .117314 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.1921069   -.0551903 .3293300 .4808906 1.8920120 
Skewness .050 .132 -.116 6.077 -10.659 10.775 
Kurtosis 96.997 .263 -13.175 40.329 3.499 169.916 
RPF 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.002452 .0644935 -.000184 .064854 -.182415 .179750 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.1944364   -.1210792 .5013033 .0336680 2.2248807 
Skewness -.004 .132 .006 11.429 -18.476 18.474 
Kurtosis 168.133 .263 15.202 100.040 5.788 341.958 
SGI 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.044693 .0576534 -.002225 .057514 -.194826 .102548 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0677565   -.0046738 .0898688 .8304541 1.2972658 
Skewness -.160 .132 -.027 .577 -1.703 1.258 
Kurtosis 7.546 .263 -.067 1.475 4.365 12.294 
IRI 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean .006954 .0590932 -.000297 .060398 -.164065 .168682 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0944217   -.0889000 .4331671 .1364960 2.0191776 
Skewness -1.337 .132 .926 10.449 -17.687 17.617 
Kurtosis 163.922 .263 -5.701 102.923 4.083 322.693 
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Table 5.3.8 Cont. 
GMI 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.041510 .0516323 .000802 .051971 -.174691 .096834 
Std. 
Deviation 
.9562438   -.0093164 .1104514 .6570551 1.2353612 
Skewness .335 .132 .064 1.317 -2.954 3.260 
Kurtosis 17.465 .263 -.720 3.147 6.052 25.522 
NIM 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.025643 .0582048 .000161 .058487 -.175587 .128930 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0779680   -.0059650 .1092843 .8071481 1.3633029 
Skewness .258 .132 -.059 1.060 -2.144 2.680 
Kurtosis 12.106 .263 -1.257 3.931 2.828 20.472 
PATM 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.095885 .0426518 -.000035 .041989 -.210118 .014304 
Std. 
Deviation 
.7899220   -.0195984 .1618895 .3816945 1.1894158 
Skewness -1.854 .132 .434 3.502 -8.362 6.480 
Kurtosis 54.718 .263 -4.721 17.524 9.607 112.309 
ROE 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.00076 .055235 -.00015 .05491 -.15480 .14057 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.022968   -.033966 .236039 .410218 1.599794 
Skewness -.036 .132 -.012 4.755 -11.097 10.948 
Kurtosis 71.249 .263 -1.420 27.030 28.867 179.826 
ROA 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.026525 .0550494 -.000296 .055012 -.166873 .118164 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0195283   -.0089800 .1296263 .7378363 1.3751059 
Skewness -1.917 .132 .424 1.408 -4.335 1.580 
Kurtosis 21.436 .263 -4.023 8.844 3.859 37.208 
ETA 
 N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean .000000 .0539958 -.000986 .053303 -.153901 .147531 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0000163   -.0831471 .4152141 .0677927 1.8590332 
Skewness -.027 .132 .075 10.845 -18.263 18.255 
Kurtosis 167.462 .263 1.272 105.848 22.583 337.672 
Notes: Table 5.3.8 presents Descriptive Statistics of Skewness, Kurtosis and Std. Error results for all samples at 
a 99% Confidence Interval level for Debt to Equity (DTE), Equity to Loans (ETL), Loans to Deposits (LTD), 
Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Gross Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Sales Growth 
Index (SGI), Interest (Sales) Receivables Index (IRI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), 
Profit After Tax Margin (PATM), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Equity to Total Assets 
(ETA) ratios. ‘N’ stands for number of observation. Source: Own calculation and presentation. 
 
4.4.         Table 5.3.10. Descriptive Statistics run at a 95% Confidence Interval Level with EM2 model 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Bootstrap
a
 
Bias Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
DTE 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.003955 .0587862 -.000793 .059180 -.133457 .107918 
Std. Deviation 1.0887351   -.0585991 .3428303 .3606256 1.6729049 
Skewness -4.581 .132 2.942 7.501 -14.270 11.107 
Kurtosis 125.706 .263 -13.931 50.206 42.535 245.673 
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Table 5.3.10 Cont. 
ETL 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean .006720 .0545462 .000892 .054681 -.103902 .112514 
Std. Deviation 1.0102095   -.0311820 .2339411 .4963590 1.4214510 
Skewness -1.628 .132 .532 4.936 -9.532 9.777 
Kurtosis 68.577 .263 6.367 31.533 35.136 158.560 
LTD 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean .006166 .0577162 .000114 .058161 -.102976 .128873 
Std. Deviation 1.0689181   -.0186818 .1908883 .6870120 1.4396751 
Skewness 4.610 .132 -.697 1.639 -.332 5.923 
Kurtosis 42.713 .263 -6.115 13.456 7.582 59.410 
LTA 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.064529 .0564761 .000439 .055735 -.173505 .045256 
Std. Deviation 1.0459527   -.0023282 .0427638 .9572726 1.1251418 
Skewness .084 .132 -.001 .110 -.139 .293 
Kurtosis .379 .263 -.002 .214 -.003 .827 
GYEA 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.047920 .0643677 -.000629 .064043 -.177351 .076175 
Std. Deviation 1.1921069   -.0492521 .3260041 .5325820 1.7545010 
Skewness .050 .132 -.039 6.064 -9.862 9.921 
Kurtosis 96.997 .263 -12.546 39.791 8.678 157.556 
RPF 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.002452 .0644935 -.002109 .064467 -.137810 .133198 
Std. Deviation 1.1944364   -.1024817 .4955081 .0801613 1.8845064 
Skewness -.004 .132 -.302 11.320 -18.287 18.276 
Kurtosis 168.133 .263 14.630 98.513 54.311 341.694 
SGI 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.044693 .0576534 .000671 .058208 -.158349 .067347 
Std. Deviation 1.0677565   -.0023758 .0886739 .8921776 1.2375778 
Skewness -.160 .132 .006 .591 -1.336 .951 
Kurtosis 7.546 .263 -.082 1.492 4.921 10.775 
IRI 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean .006954 .0590932 -.000507 .058655 -.115082 .125829 
Std. Deviation 1.0944217   -.0919011 .4313247 .1516102 1.7311011 
Skewness -1.337 .132 .994 10.682 -17.522 17.416 
Kurtosis 163.922 .263 -1.025 104.867 8.109 319.552 
GMI 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.041510 .0516323 .000778 .051880 -.141321 .062715 
Std. Deviation .9562438   -.0094014 .1116162 .7303914 1.1707187 
Skewness .335 .132 .074 1.297 -2.136 2.891 
Kurtosis 17.465 .263 -.829 3.138 10.677 23.037 
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Table 5.3.10 Cont. 
NIM 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.025643 .0582048 -.000220 .058095 -.139941 .086799 
Std. Deviation 1.0779680   -.0080951 .1060602 .8792219 1.2861040 
Skewness .258 .132 -.070 1.051 -1.755 2.206 
Kurtosis 12.106 .263 -1.310 3.951 3.369 18.240 
PATM 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.095885 .0426518 -.001083 .042919 -.182730 -.015939 
Std. Deviation .7899220   -.0110092 .1609111 .4658713 1.0919404 
Skewness -1.854 .132 .427 3.517 -7.343 5.596 
Kurtosis 54.718 .263 -4.948 17.007 20.215 89.532 
ROE 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.00076 .055235 .00065 .05555 -.10796 .10887 
Std. Deviation 1.022968   -.030958 .233637 .513638 1.434417 
Skewness -.036 .132 -.052 4.741 -8.703 8.480 
Kurtosis 71.249 .263 -1.784 25.994 35.051 131.700 
ROA 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean -.026525 .0550494 .000461 .054732 -.137202 .081515 
Std. Deviation 1.0195283   -.0094873 .1313263 .7883543 1.2903749 
Skewness -1.917 .132 .429 1.434 -3.832 1.063 
Kurtosis 21.436 .263 -3.963 8.983 4.902 33.136 
ETA 
N 343   0 0 343 343 
Mean .000000 .0539958 .000725 .053169 -.112682 .112584 
Std. Deviation 1.0000163   -.0843793 .4154244 .0834750 1.5762603 
Skewness -.027 .132 .476 10.774 -18.101 18.117 
Kurtosis 167.462 .263 -.089 105.466 27.556 334.627 
 
Notes: Table 5.3.10 shows Descriptive Statistics results, for all samples at a 95% Confidence Interval level for 
Debt to Equity (DTE), Equity to Loans (ETL), Loans to Deposits (LTD), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), Gross 
Yield on Earning Assets (GYEA), Rate Paid on Funds (RPF), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Interest (Sales) 
Receivables Index (IRI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Net Interest Margin (NIM), Profit After Tax Margin 
(PATM), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Equity to Total Assets (ETA) ratios. Source: Own 
calculation and presentation. 
 
 
 
 
